Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2013: Three decades of uneven and unstable growth by NU. CEPAL
Economic Survey
of Latin America and the Caribbean




of Latin America and the Caribbean












Documents and Publications Division
The Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean is issued annually by the Economic Development Division of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The 2013 edition was prepared under the supervision of Juan Alberto 
Fuentes, Chief of the Division; Jürgen Weller and Sandra Manuelito were responsible for its overall coordination. 
In the preparation of this edition, the Economic Development Division was assisted by the Statistics Division, the Division 
of International Trade and Integration, the Sustainable Development and Human Settlements Division, the ECLAC subregional 
headquarters in Mexico City and Port of Spain and the national offices of the Commission in Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, 
Montevideo and Washington, D.C. 
Part I, entitled “The economic situation in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2013” was prepared by Juan Alberto Fuentes 
with input from the following experts: Luis Felipe Jiménez, Cameron Daneshvar and Miryam Saade (external sector), Ricardo Martner 
(fiscal policy), Ramón Pineda, Rodrigo Cárcamo and Benjamin Rae (monetary, exchange-rate and macroprudential policies), Sandra 
Manuelito (economic activity and prices) and Jürgen Weller (employment and wages). The economic projections were produced by 
Sandra Manuelito and Claudio Aravena.
Part II, entitled “Three decades of uneven and unstable growth”, was prepared by Juan Alberto Fuentes on the basis of input from 
Claudio Aravena, Rodrigo Cárcamo, Ivonne González, Gonzalo Iberti, Luis Felipe Jiménez, Cornelia Kaldewei, Sandra Manuelito, 
Ricardo Martner, Ramón Pineda and Jürgen Weller, and with contributions from the Division of International Trade and Integration, 
the Sustainable Development and Human Settlements Division and the ECLAC subregional headquarters in Mexico City. 
Assistance was received from the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) in the form of financing 
for a seminar at which the documents that served as inputs for Part II of the Economic Survey were presented. 
The country notes are based on studies conducted by the following experts: Olga Lucía Acosta, Juan Carlos Ramírez, Renata 
Pardo and (Colombia), Dillon Alleyne (Jamaica and Suriname), Rodrigo Cárcamo (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), Cameron 
Daneshvar (Paraguay), Maria Kristina Eisele (Honduras), Stefanie Garry (Guatemala), Randolph Gilbert (Haiti), Michael Hendrickson 
(Bahamas and Belize), Juan Pablo Jiménez and Cecilia Plottier (Uruguay), Luis Felipe Jiménez (Chile), Osvaldo Kacef and Daniel Vega 
(Argentina), Cornelia Kaldewei (Ecuador), Sandra Manuelito (Peru), Rodolfo Minzer (Costa Rica and Panama), Carlos Mussi (Brazil), 
Ramón Padilla (Mexico), Machel Pantin (Trinidad and Tobago), Willard Phillips (Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union), 
Benjamin Rae (Plurinational State of Bolivia), Indira Romero (Cuba), Francisco Villarreal (El Salvador), Kohei Yoshida (Guyana) and 
Willy Zapata (Nicaragua and Dominican Republic).
Alejandra Acevedo, Gabriel Aghon, Seung-jin Baek, Jazmín Chiu, Ivonne González, Michael Hanni, Gonzalo Iberti, Andrea 
Podestá, Benjamín Rae and Carolina Serpell were responsible for the processing and graphical presentation of the statistical data.
Notes
The following symbols have been used in the tables shown in the Survey: 
Three dots (…) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. 
A dash (-) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible. 
A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals. 
The word “dollars” refers to United States dollars unless otherwise specified.
United Nations Publication 
ISBN: 978-92-1-121833-6   •   E-ISBN: 978-92-1-056009-2
ISSN: 0257-2184
LC/G.2574-P   •   Sales No. E.13.II.G.3
Copyright © United Nations, August 2013. All rights reserved
Printed in Santiago, Chile   •   2013-575
Applications for the right to reproduce this work are welcomed and should be sent to the Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations 
Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior 






Foreword and executive summary ..........................................................................................................................9
Part I
The economic situation in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2013 ..................................................................23
Chapter I
Regional overview  ...............................................................................................................................................25
A. The external context ...................................................................................................................................27
1. The outlook for 2013 is for the global economy to grow at much the same rate as in 2012, 
 with the prospect of a gradual upturn ....................................................................................................27
2. World trade continues to grow slowly ...................................................................................................29
B. The external sector in Latin America and the Caribbean .............................................................................30
1. The region’s terms of trade weakened, albeit with differences from one country to the next  .................30
2. Imports outpace exports ........................................................................................................................32
3. Remittances from Europe continue to shrink  .........................................................................................35
4. Tourism contracts slightly ......................................................................................................................35
5. The current account shows a slight deterioration  ..................................................................................36
6. Access to external financing is maintained notwithstanding the financial volatility ................................37
7. The external financing mix has changed and more countries have gained access to it  ..........................38
C. Macroeconomic policies  ............................................................................................................................39
1. Inflationary pressures have increased slightly ........................................................................................39
2. Monetary policy strategies in the region have been diverse ...................................................................44
3. The pace of lending has slowed overall, except for consumer credit .....................................................46
4. Exchange rates have been under considerable external pressure ...........................................................48
5. Overall, international reserves have not fluctuated as widely ................................................................49
6. Some macroprudential policies became more flexible  ..........................................................................50
7. Tax receipts are expected to slow ..........................................................................................................50
8. Fiscal balances will depend on differentiated public expenditure policies  ............................................52
9. Fiscal vulnerability will remain a concern in the Caribbean, primarily in 
 the service-exporting countries  .............................................................................................................54
D. Economic growth, employment and wages  ................................................................................................54
1. Economic growth is slowing in most of the countries ............................................................................54
2. Consumption is still the main driver of growth, although it has lost some steam  ...................................56
3. The employment rate does not change significantly ..............................................................................58
4. Formal employment continues to grow, albeit more slowly, and real wages post modest gains ................ 59
E. Risks and challenges ...................................................................................................................................61
1. Latin America and the Caribbean still face serious risks in an adverse global economic climate  .............. 61
2. The fiscal space for facing the threat of a negative international economic scenario 
 has expanded in many countries ...........................................................................................................63
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................67
Part II 
Three decades of uneven and unstable growth .....................................................................................................69
Chapter I
Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1980 and 2012: stylized facts ..........................................71
Introduction  ....................................................................................................................................................73
A. Between 1980 and 2012: gains —though uneven and insufficient— in economic 
  growth and equality ....................................................................................................................................73
B. The growing role of external variability as a growth determinant ................................................................78
1. The 1980s: debt crisis  ...........................................................................................................................78
2. The 1990s: unstable growth amid external financial shocks and internal disequilibria ...........................79
3. 2000 to the present: an improved but still variable external context ......................................................80
Contents







C. Insufficient and variable capital accumulation and financing ......................................................................82
1. Investment still below 1980s levels, as a proportion of GDP .................................................................82
2. Investment boosted by higher national saving, as conditions became less vulnerable 
 in the past decade .................................................................................................................................84
D. Gradual strengthening of the fiscal accounts ...............................................................................................88
E. Lower inflation and flexible exchange-rate regimes .....................................................................................89




Income and aggregate demand over the past three decades ................................................................................99
Introduction  ..................................................................................................................................................101
A. Over the past decade, gross domestic income growth tripled and the operating 
  surplus share increased .............................................................................................................................101
B. The terms of trade contribution to disposable income surged in most of the countries ..............................103
C. Private consumption has become increasingly important as a determinant factor of growth ......................107
D. Greater trade openness coincided with a growing (net) export component of GDP ...................................109
E. There was a positive correlation between capacity use and investment  ....................................................112
F. There has been a positive correlation between growth and investment .....................................................113




Three decades of labour productivity and structural change ..............................................................................123 
Introduction  ..................................................................................................................................................125
A. A slow recovery for labour productivity ....................................................................................................125
B. Heterogeneous patterns in labour productivity ..........................................................................................125
C. A skilled labour force and capital accumulation as drivers of productivity ................................................126
D. The main trends have been tertiarization and investment in non-tradable sectors .....................................129
E. Structural change as a weak source of labour productivity ........................................................................133
F. The economic cycle and the negative impact of structural heterogeneity on productivity .........................136
G. The limited impact of international trade on productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean ..................137
1. The effect of intra-industry specialization on productivity remains small .............................................137
2. The incipient participation of Latin America and the Caribbean in international value chains  ............138




Macroeconomic policy enhancement and challenges for promoting growth with equality ................................143
Introduction  ..................................................................................................................................................145
A. The contribution of fiscal policy to growth and equality has gradually strengthened  ................................145
1. Debt reduction has helped stabilize economic agents’ expectations ....................................................145
2. Progress has been made in implementing countercyclical policies during 
 contrations of the economic cycle  ......................................................................................................147
3. Public investment has partially recovered ............................................................................................149
4. Social spending and fiscal policy support for growth with equality has strengthened  ..........................150
B. Monetary and exchange-rate policy have gradually come to play a greater role in reducing 
  nominal and real volatility ........................................................................................................................153
1. Monetary policy promoted nominal stability: a low-inflation path was reached in most of 
 the countries and made it possible to bring down interest rates as well ...............................................153
2. The establishment of flexible exchange-rate regimes with varying degrees of regulation 
 provided more room for monetary policy action  ................................................................................155
3. Monetary policy helped to reduce real economic growth volatility in the face 
 of the international financial crisis  ......................................................................................................156
4. Financial instability fed the build-up of international reserves .............................................................156







C. Strategic aspects of macroeconomic policy for boosting growth  ...............................................................160
1. Sound institutions are a must for boosting investment ..........................................................................160
2. Promoting investment in the short term calls for stabilizing, countercyclical  
 macroeconomic policies  ....................................................................................................................160
3. Stimulating investment in the medium and long term requires eliminating the bias in favour 
 of investment in non-tradable sectors and promoting fiscal, financial and employment 





Foreword and executive summary
Table Latin America and the Caribbean: variation in total gross domestic product, 2010-2013 .............22
Part I
Table I.1 Selected regions and countries: GDP growth, 2010-2014 ........................................................27
Table I.2 Latin America: year-on-year variation in export value, January 2011-April 2013 ......................33
Table I.3 Latin America: year-on-year variation in import value, January 2011-April 2013 .....................34
Table I.4 European Union: year-on-year variation in import value by country 
of origin, January 2011-March 2013 ........................................................................................34
Table I.5 Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): country risk as measured through 
sovereign bond spreads (EMBI Global), January 2010-June 2013 .............................................38
Table I.6 Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): external bond issues,  
January 2010-June 2013 ...........................................................................................................38
Table I.7 Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): cumulative real January to April 
year-on-year variation in public revenue and expenditure, 2011-2013 ....................................51
Table I.8 The Caribbean (13 countries): overall public balance, 2007-2012 ...........................................54
Table I.9 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): year-on-year quarterly variations 
in the index of economic activity, January 2011-March 2013 ..................................................55
Table I.10 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): year-on-year quarterly variations 
in indices of commerce sector activity, January 2011-March 2013 ...........................................56
Table I.11 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): year-on-year quarterly variations 
in indices of construction sector activity, January 2011-March 2013 ........................................57
Table I.12 Latin America and the Caribbean: goods exports by principal destination, 2011 ......................62
Table I.13 Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth in trading partners by export 
destination in 2010, weighted average, 2007-2013  .................................................................62
Table I.14 Latin America: spread between real growth rates of primary spending 
and GDP, 2009-2012 ...............................................................................................................63
Table I.15 Latin America and the Caribbean: central government fiscal balance, 2007 and 2012 .............65
Part II
Table I.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: indicators of per capita GDP growth, 1980-2012 ................74
Table I.2 Selected countries: indicators of per capita GDP growth, 1981-2012 .......................................75
Table I.3 Latin America: poverty and indigence, 1980-2012  ..................................................................78
Table I.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: average annual GDP growth of country groupings 
 (simple average) classified by economic specialization and size, 1970-2012 ...........................80
Table I.5 Latin America: gross fixed capital formation, 1980-2012 ..........................................................83
Table I.6 Latin America: gross fixed capital formation, public and private, 1980-2012 ...........................83
Table I.7 Latin America: national saving, 1980-2010  .............................................................................84
Table I.8 Latin America: public saving, 1980-2010  ................................................................................85
Table I.9 Latin America: private saving, 1980-2010  ...............................................................................86
Table I.10 Latin America: external saving, 1980-2010 ..............................................................................86
Table I.11 The Caribbean: gross fixed capital formation, 1990-2011 ........................................................87
Table I.12 The Caribbean: national and external saving, 1990-2011 .........................................................88
Table I.13 Latin America and the Caribbean: annual average inflation, 1980-2011 ..................................90







Table I.14 Latin America: degree of trade openness, 1980-2011 ...............................................................91
Table I.15 The Caribbean: degree of trade openness, 1990-2011 ..............................................................91
Table I.16 Latin America and the Caribbean: remittances received from abroad  
(personal transfers and employee remuneration), 1980-2011 ...................................................92
Table I.17 Latin America and the Caribbean: total portfolio investment, 1980-2012 .................................95
Table II.1 Latin America: components of gross domestic income, 1980-2010 ........................................102
Table II.2 Latin America (17 countries): drivers of the growth of per capita gross national  
disposable income (GNDI), 1981-2011 ..................................................................................105
Table II.3 Latin America (17 countries): annual average variation in total GDP, gross 
and net exports and non-export GDP, 1990-2010 ..................................................................111
Table II.4 Latin America: correlation between output gap and investment growth  .................................113
Table II.5 Latin America: correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient) between annual GDP 
growth and gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 1980-2010 .......................114
Table II.6 Latin America: correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient) between annual GDP 
growth and public and private gross fixed capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP, 1980-2010 ...............................................................................................................115
Table II.7 Latin America: correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient) between annual GDP 
growth and gross fixed capital formation in construction and machinery and 
equipment as a percentage of GDP, 1980-2010 .....................................................................115
Table III.1 Latin America (selected countries): growth in investment in tradable and non-tradable 
sectors and correlation to the exchange rate  ..........................................................................131
Table III.2 Latin America and other countries and regions: intra-industry trade, 2011 .............................138
Table IV.1 Latin America: maximum and minimum GDP gaps and cyclical balance, 1990-2012 .............. 148
Table IV.2 Latin America (20 countries): gap between real growth rates of primary 
spending and GDP, 1980-2012  .............................................................................................148
Table IV.3 The Caribbean (13 countries): gap between real growth rates of primary expenditure 
and GDP, 1990-2012 .............................................................................................................149
Table IV.4  Latin America and the Caribbean: average rate of inflation, 1990-2012 .................................154
Table IV.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: exchange-rate regimes, 1990-2010 ...................................155
Annex
Table A-1 Latin America and the Caribbean: main economic indicators  ................................................173
Table A-2 Latin America and the Caribbean: gross domestic product .....................................................174
Table A-3 Latin America and the Caribbean: gross domestic product .....................................................175
Table A-4 Latin America and the Caribbean: per capita gross domestic product .....................................176
Table A-5 Latin America and the Caribbean: gross domestic product .....................................................177
Table A-6 Latin America and the Caribbean: gross fixed capital formation .............................................177
Table A-7 Latin America and the Caribbean: balance of payments .........................................................178
Table A-8 Latin America and the Caribbean: international trade of goods ..............................................181
Table A-9 Latin America and the Caribbean: exports of goods, f.o.b.  .....................................................182
Table A-10 Latin America and the Caribbean: imports of goods, c.i.f. ......................................................183
Table A-11 Latin America: terms of trade for goods f.o.b./f.o.b. ................................................................184
Table A-12 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): remittances from emigrant workers ....184
Table A-13 Latin America and the Caribbean: net resource transfer ..........................................................185
Table A-14 Latin America and the Caribbean: net foreign direct investment .............................................186
Table A-15 Latin America and the Caribbean: total gross external debt ....................................................187
Table A-16 Latin America and the Caribbean: sovereign spreads on EMBI+ and EMBI Global ..................188
Table A-17 Latin America and the Caribbean: risk premia on five-year credit default swaps .....................188
Table A-18 Latin America and the Caribbean: international bond issues ..................................................189
Table A-19 Latin America and the Caribbean: stock exchange indices .....................................................189
Table A-20 Latin America and the Caribbean: gross international reserves ...............................................190
Table A-21 Latin America and the Caribbean: real effective exchange rates .............................................191
Table A-22 Latin America and the Caribbean: participation rate ...............................................................192
Table A-23 Latin America and the Caribbean: open urban unemployment ...............................................193
Table A-24 Latin America and the Caribbean: employment rate ...............................................................194
Table A-25 Latin America and the Caribbean: formal employment indicators ..........................................195
Table A-26 Latin America: visible underemployment by hours  ................................................................195
Table A-27 Latin America: real average wages .........................................................................................196







Table A-28 Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary indicators ..........................................................197
Table A-29 Latin America and the Caribbean: domestic credit .................................................................199
Table A-30 Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary policy rates ........................................................200
Table A-31 Latin America and the Caribbean: representative lending rates ...............................................201
Table A-32 Latin America and the Caribbean: consumer prices  ...............................................................202
Table A-33 Latin America and the Caribbean: central government primary and overall balances .............203
Table A-34 Latin America and the Caribbean: central government tax revenues composition ..................204
Table A-35 Latin America and the Caribbean: central government expenditure composition ...................205
Table A-36 Latin America and the Caribbean: non-financial public sector gross public debt ....................206
Figures
Part I
Figure I.1 Europe (selected countries): five-year credit default swap risk premiums, 
July 2009-May 2013 ................................................................................................................28
Figure I.2 Year-on-year variation in world export volume by region, three-month 
moving average, January 2008-April 2013 ...............................................................................29
Figure I.3 Year-on-year variation in world import volume by region, three-month 
moving average, January 2008-April 2013 ...............................................................................29
Figure I.4 Latin America: price indices for export commodities and manufactured goods,  
three-month moving average, January 2009-April 2013 ...........................................................30
Figure I.5 Latin America: variation in the terms of trade, 2009-2013 ........................................................31
Figure I.6 Latin America: variation in exports by volume and price, 2013 ................................................32
Figure I.7 Latin America: variation in import volume and price, 2013 ......................................................32
Figure I.8 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): variation in inflows 
of remittances from migrants abroad, 2010-2013 .....................................................................35
Figure I.9 Latin America and the Caribbean: year-on-year variation in international  
tourist arrivals, 2009-2013 .......................................................................................................36
Figure I.10 Latin America: current account structure, 2006-2013 ...............................................................36
Figure I.11 Latin America (14 countries): current account balance and components 
of the financial account, January 2010-March 2013 .................................................................37
Figure I.12 Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): external bond issues on international 
markets and risk according to EMBI+, January 2010-June 2013 ................................................39
Figure I.13 Latin America and the Caribbean: twelve-month variation in the consumer  
price index, simple average, January 2007-May 2013 ..............................................................40
Figure I.14 Latin America: twelve-month variation in the consumer price index by inflation  
component, simple average, January 2007-May 2013 ..............................................................40
Figure I.15 Latin America: twelve-month variation in the consumer price index, food price index  
and core inflation index, simple average, January 2007-May 2013 ..........................................41
Figure I.16 Latin America: variation in the consumer price index and food price index  
in the 12 months to May 2013 .................................................................................................43
Figure I.17 Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary policy rates of the central banks which  
raised their rates in 2013, January 2012-June 2013 ..................................................................44
Figure I.18 Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary policy rates of the central banks that  
lowered their rates in 2013, January 2012 to June 2013 ...........................................................45
Figure I.19 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): annualized growth 
in the monetary base, January 2011-April 2013 .......................................................................45
Figure I.20 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): annualized growth of net 
domestic credit, January 2011 to May 2013 .............................................................................46
Figure I.21 Latin America and the Caribbean: annualized growth in the credit portfolio for 
financing consumption and industrial, commercial and mortgage activities 
(regional average), January 2011-March 2013 ..........................................................................47
Figure I.22 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru: nominal exchange rate and external 
financial conditions, July 2010-June 2013 ................................................................................48
Figure I.23 Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Paraguay and Uruguay: 
nominal exchange rate and external financial conditions, July 2010-June 2013 .......................49
Figure I.24 Latin America and the Caribbean: variation in international reserves, 2012 and 2013 ................. 50







Figure I.25 Latin America and the Caribbean (simple average for 14 countries): year-on-year 
real variation in public revenue and expenditure January 2010-April 2013 ..............................51
Figure I.26 Latin America (19 countries): central government fiscal indicators, 2000-2013 ........................53
Figure I.27 Latin America: year-on-year change in quarterly GDP, weighted average,  
January 2008-March 2013 .......................................................................................................55
Figure I.28 Latin America and the Caribbean: index of industrial activity, January 2008-April 2013 .............. 57
Figure I.29 Latin America: quarterly year-on-year change in GDP and the growth contribution 
of the components of aggregate demand, January 2011-March 2013 .......................................58
Figure I.30 Latin America and the Caribbean (10 countries): year-on-year variation  
in employment and unemployment rates .................................................................................59
Figure I.31 Latin America (selected countries): year-on-year variation in formal employment, 
first quarters of 2011, 2012 and 2013 ......................................................................................60
Figure I.32 Latin America (9 countries): year-on-year variation in nominal wages, consumer 
price index and real wages, 2012 and first quarter of 2013 ......................................................60
Figure I.33 Latin America: central government overall public balance, 2007 and 2012 .............................66
Figure I.34 Latin America: central government public debt, 2007 and 2012 ..............................................66
Figure I.35 The Caribbean: central government overall public balance, 2007 and 2012 ............................66
Figure I.36 The Caribbean: central government public debt, 2007 and 2012 .............................................67
Part II
Figure I.1 Latin America, Republic of Korea and China: per capita GDP compared 
with per capita GDP of the United States, 1950-2010  .............................................................75
Figure I.2 Latin America: disparity between countries in per capita GDP, in dollars 
at constant 2005 prices, 1980-2012 .........................................................................................76
Figure I.3 Latin America (18 countries): Gini coefficient, 1980-2011 .......................................................77
Figure I.4 Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth and terms of trade, 1970-2012 .......................82
Figure I.5 Latin America: gross fixed capital formation, 1980-2012 ..........................................................82
Figure I.6 Latin America: overall fiscal balance, 1980-2012 .....................................................................89
Figure I.7 Latin America: average annual purchasing power of goods exports, 1981-2010 .......................92
Figure I.8 Latin America and the Caribbean: interest payments abroad, 1980-2012 .................................93
Figure I.9 Latin America and the Caribbean: foreign direct investment and portfolio investment 
income, 1980-2012 .................................................................................................................93
Figure I.10 Latin America and the Caribbean: net FDI flows, 1980-2012 ...................................................94
Figure II.1 Latin America: change in and contributions to the growth of per capita gross national 
disposable income, 1981-2011 ..............................................................................................106
Figure II.2 South America: change in and contributions to the growth of per capita gross 
 national disposable income, 1981-2011 ................................................................................106
Figure II.3 Central America: change in and contributions to the growth of per capita
 gross national disposable income, 1981-2011 ........................................................................107
Figure II.4 Latin America: change in per capita gross national disposable income (GNDI) 
associated with changes in the terms of trade (ToT), 1990-2002 and 2003-2009 ....................108
Figure II.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP variation and contribution to the growth 
 of aggregate demand components  .........................................................................................109
Figure II.6 Latin America and the Caribbean and the world: trade openness indicators ...........................110
Figure II.7 Latin America (17 countries): GDP share of gross and net exports, 1990-2010 .......................111
Figure II.8 Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate 
and investment rate (gross fixed capital formation, GFCF), 1980-2010 ...................................116
Figure II.9 Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth
 rate and public investment rate, 1980-2010 ...........................................................................117
Figure II.10 Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate 
 and private investment rate, 1980-2010 .................................................................................118
Figure II.11 Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate 
 and construction investment rate, 1980-2010 ........................................................................118
Figure II.12 Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate 
and machinery and equipment investment rate, 1980-2010 ...................................................119
Figure III.1 Latin America and the Caribbean (25 countries): average labour productivity, 2012 ................. 125
Figure III.2 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): value added per worker, 
by sector, 2000-2011 .............................................................................................................126







Figure III.3 Latin America: per capita GDP and education level of the urban economically 
active population, late 2000s .................................................................................................127
Figure III.4  Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): gross capital formation per worker,  
simple average, 1980-2011 ....................................................................................................128
Figure III.5 Latin America (16 countries): variance decomposition of labour productivity 
as a result of investment, 1980-2010 ......................................................................................128
Figure III.6 Latin America (19 countries): sectoral composition of GDP, 1950-2011 ................................129
Figure III.7 Latin America and the Caribbean: employment by sector, dates between 1950 and 2011 ......... 130
Figure III.8 Latin America (selected countries): destination of investment in tradable and 
non-tradable sectors and decomposition of the growth rate, 
1993-2002 and 2003-2009 ....................................................................................................132
Figure III.9 Latin America and the Caribbean (23 countries): impact of intra- and intersectoral 
changes on annual variation in average labour productivity, 
1990-2002 and 2002-2011 ....................................................................................................134
Figure III.10 Latin America and the Caribbean: contribution of the variation in employment and 
labour productivity to output growth, by branch of activity, 
1990-2002 and 2002-2011 ....................................................................................................135
Figure III.11 Latin America (16 countries): relative income of own-account workers (not including 
professionals or technical workers) as a proportion of the income of private-sector 
employees in companies with five or more workers, by per capita GDP, 
around 2005-around 2010 .....................................................................................................136
Figure III.12 Latin America (selected countries): vertical integration index, 2001, 2004 and 2007 .............139
Figure IV.1 Latin America (19 countries): external public debt (1970-2012) and domestic 
public debt (1990-2012) ........................................................................................................146
Figure IV.2 Latin America and the Caribbean: drivers of changes in central government debt, 
1999-2012 .............................................................................................................................147
Figure IV.3 Latin America (20 countries) and the Caribbean (13 countries): composition 
of public expenditure .............................................................................................................150
Figure IV.4 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): public social spending, 
2011and 1990 .......................................................................................................................151
Figure IV.5 Latin America and the Caribbean: tax structure (without social security), 2000 and 2012 .......... 152
Figure IV.6 Latin America: average lending rates, 1995-2013 ...................................................................154
Figure IV.7 Latin America and the Caribbean: real exchange rate against the United States dollar, 
by subregion, 1980-2012 .......................................................................................................155
Figure IV.8 Latin America and the Caribbean: international reserves, by subregion, 1980-2012 ...............157
Figure IV.9 Latin America and the Caribbean: international reserves, 2002-2012 .....................................157
Figure IV.10 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): exchange-rate volatility 
and annual build-up of international reserves, January 2001 to September 2012 ....................... 158
Figure IV.11 Latin America and the Caribbean: extraregional real effective exchange rate, 
January 2008-March 2013  ....................................................................................................159
Boxes
Part I
Box I.1 Differential inflation and income distribution: the flip side of improving terms of trade ............... 41
Part II
Box I.1 Natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean ................................................................81
Box IV.1 Economic growth and energy consumption in Latin America and the Caribbean:  
a long-term challenge ............................................................................................................164
























Like previous editions, the sixty-fifth edition of Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean has two 
parts. The first part examines the recent performance of the economies of the region and the outlook for the 
current year, and the second part discusses long-term aspects of the economic development of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
Part one highlights the volatile global economic climate facing the region during 2013 owing to slow debt-crisis 
recovery in a number of eurozone countries, heightened uncertainty as the situation in some of them worsened, the 
policy response on the part of developed economies that sent global liquidity soaring, and a slowdown in major Asian 
economies. And despite some signs of improvement in the United States, the recovery there has yet to gain traction. 
During 2013 Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to face a challenging external environment that will cool 
demand for exports, act as a drag on rising export prices and even, in some cases, drive them down. This part also 
analyses the consequences of this external context for the region, as well as its macroeconomic policy response seeking 
to buffer the impact of the global economic slowdown. Net exports are no longer the main driver of demand; for the 
second year in a row, consumption has played this role, on the strength of rising employment rates, real wages and 
lending, followed by investment. Real currency appreciation, fuelled by high global liquidity, has eroded tradable-sector 
competitiveness even more and encouraged spending on imported goods, thereby widening the current account deficit. 
Since late 2012 and in 2013 to date, sagging exports and the outlook for a global economic slowdown have 
progressively dampened economic activity and slowed growth in key variables such as export volume, investment and 
employment. In short, from 2013 the Latin American and Caribbean countries have been facing a stagnant external 
environment calling for macroeconomic policy adjustments that should be cautious so as to avoid exacerbating 
potential imbalances, in particular in the current account. The region, with certain exceptions, can draw on substantial 
strengths to address these challenges: high international reserves, little external public debt and low inflation. While 
this provides some monetary and fiscal policy space for mitigating temporary external shocks, the expected slow 
global growth scenario also requires measures geared towards structural change that will boost competitiveness and 
enhance long-term growth factors. 
The second part of this edition of the Economic Survey approaches this issue by looking at how macroeconomic 
policy contributes to growth. It starts by examining stylized patterns of growth during the past three decades, from 
the debt crisis of the 1980s to the present. Except in a few cases, per capita GDP has grown very slowly and there 
has been little convergence towards the levels seen in more developed countries. Emphasis is placed on the low 
investment rate and the degree of dependence on external saving, whose fluctuations have contributed a good deal 
to the swings in growth. Productivity gains have been insufficient. 
But the region has seen significant changes over the past three decades in terms of external integration and 
macroeconomic regimes, reflected in sounder public finances, lower inflation and unemployment, and progress against 
poverty and in income distribution. These improvements provide a good basis for stepping up investment, which is the 
main channel for structural change and productivity gains. The requirements for this are multidimensional, involving 
production and institutional development beyond the scope of macroeconomic policy. However, macroeconomic policy 
has a key contribution to make. By preventing the accumulation of imbalances leading to crises, it creates the necessary 
conditions for deploying countercyclical measures to sustain the growth of output and employment and result in real 
interest rates that support investment and a real exchange rate that is conducive to tradable-sector competitiveness. 
Lastly, country notes, which look at the economic situation of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
during 2012 and the first half of 2013, may be viewed on the ECLAC webpage (www.eclac.org). These notes are 
published along with a statistical annex, which tracks the main economic indicators. The tables in the statistical annex 
show, at a glance, data for recent years and can be used to create spreadsheets. 









1. The economic situation in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2013
GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to grow by 3% in 2013, similar to the pace set in 2012
Latin America and the Caribbean will see GDP grow by an estimated 3% in 2013 instead of the 3.5% estimated 
by ECLAC in April; this pace is similar to the figure for 2012. Region-wide, this performance is due in part to slow 
growth in Brazil and Mexico. Economic activity has eased off in a number of countries that had been posting high 
rates of growth (Chile, Panama and Peru). With external demand slackening, the main source of growth is still rising 
consumption, although the pace in 2013 will be slower than in 2012. The contribution of investment is expected to 
drop even more; the negative contribution of net exports (that is, minus import value) is expected to be larger. These 
trends highlight problems arising from low growth in most of the economies of the region and point to the need to 
broaden and diversify their sources of growth, as proposed in the second part of this issue of the Economic Survey.
The region’s modest performance is linked to a global economic growth rate in 2013 that is expected to be 
similar to the 2.3% recorded in 2012, although the outlook for next year is for economic growth to pick up speed. 
Although the recession in eurozone economies has carried over into 2013, the developing countries will continue 
to drive global economic growth; it is believed that the policies adopted by the United States and Japan will help 
these two economies rally and boost economic growth worldwide. 
The forecast is for uneven weakening of the terms of trade, modest export growth and a larger 
current account deficit
The first half of 2013 saw a drop in the prices of some of the region’s export commodities (minerals and metals, 
oil and some food items). While this trend is linked to the eurozone recession, the main contributing factor is slightly 
slower growth in China as it transitions to a growth path that depends more on the expansion of consumption and less 
on the expansion of investment, unlike in the recent past. For Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, projections 
are that the terms of trade will hover near the 2012 level. But the impact will vary among countries depending on 
their export structure. The terms of trade are likely to worsen the most in the mineral- and metal-exporting countries 
(Chile, Peru and Suriname). Countries that export hydrocarbons (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago) and food (Argentina and Paraguay) will also see 
some deterioration, to varying degrees. Net importers of food and fuel, which are concentrated in Central America 
and the Caribbean, could see improving terms of trade. No significant changes in this regard are expected in Mexico 
and Brazil, due in part to their more diversified export structure.
One of the more direct consequences of moderate global economic growth has been slower growth of 
exports from Latin America and the Caribbean. The region’s export value is expected to expand some 4% in 2013, 
outpacing the 1.5% recorded in 2012. Import value is forecast to rise more, by 6% for the year. The lacklustre 
export performance expected for the region in 2013 after growth rates upwards of 20% in 2010 and 2011 is heavily 
influenced by declining exports from some countries of South America —in particular, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Peru— during the first few months of 2013. The main reason is the recession in eurozone countries, which 
are a major destination for their exports, coupled with a downtick in the prices of products that make up a high 
proportion of their total exports.
Remittances from Europe continue to decline, unlike those from the United States (except in Mexico, possibly 
because of a reversal of its migration flows). Tourism flows are slackening due to the combined impact of slower 
economic growth in the developed countries and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean themselves, 
since intraregional tourism has soared in the past few years. These factors together are likely to worsen the region’s 
goods and services trade balance as well as the current account balance. The current account deficit is expected to 
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Access to external financing remains open despite financial volatility
International financial volatility increased in 2013 as well, as reflected in wide exchange-rate swings in several 
countries of the region. Recent unemployment rate trends and positive signs of economic growth in the United States 
led to the June announcement by United States Federal Reserve System Chairman Ben Bernanke that the monetary 
stimulus programme might be terminated in mid-2014. The announcement sent the value of the dollar up, pushed 
major stock exchanges down (both worldwide and in Latin America) and triggered a market sell-off, especially for 
fixed-income securities, and drove up the sovereign debt risk premium for many of the countries of the world. This 
suggests that withdrawing the monetary stimulus measures will spark money- and equity-market volatility, which 
poses a serious challenge to the authorities of the region.
Nevertheless, the region still has access to external financing to cover the wider current account deficit despite 
international financial volatility and a risk-perception pattern influenced by short-term reactions from financial 
investors that are very sensitive to announcements of possible changes in United States monetary policy and to 
reports on the outlook for global economic growth. Net foreign direct investment and portfolio investment flows 
continued to climb during the first few months of 2013, as did short-term flows of cross-border deposits and bank 
loans. Corporate bond issues were substantial during the first five months of 2013 (well above half the figure for all 
of 2012), as were sovereign bond issues by countries of the region and placements by those that are more integrated 
into international financial markets.
Employment and wage growth slows
As a result of the slowdown of economic growth in the region, no significant increase in the demand for labour 
is expected in 2013. Unemployment inched down from 6.9% to 6.7% during the first quarter of 2013, owing mainly 
to a lower labour-market participation rate in keeping with the drop in labour supply. The unemployment rate would 
not have shrunk had the labour supply trend been similar to the previous year. With regional consumption expanding 
at a slower pace in 2013, real wages in the countries of the region have not grown as much as in 2012, except in 
Chile and Colombia, where wages rose more.
Inflation edges up
In the first five months of 2013 the regional inflation rate edged up from the December 2012 level, although there 
were substantial differences among countries. In May 2013, cumulative 12-month inflation for the region stood at 
6%, compared with 5.5% in December 2012 and 5.8% in May 2012. Double-digit price growth in countries such 
as Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, along with more recent increases in other countries of the 
region, indicates that in a number of cases the scope for implementing (countercyclical) monetary measures geared 
towards boosting growth will shrink or vanish.
Monetary and fiscal policies are growing more disparate
Increasing uncertainties arising from the impact of international financial flows linked to monetary 
announcements made in developed economies (especially in the United States), and fears about a potential 
decline in economic activity in the face of sluggish external demand and growing inflationary pressures in some 
economies of the region, have led to shifting priorities and disparate responses by monetary authorities in the 
region. As a result, in 2013 some countries of the region have taken a more restrictive monetary policy stance 
(Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay) while others (Dominican Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana and Mexico) 
have followed a more robust stimulus policy. But in most of the countries the monetary policy orientation has 
not changed significantly. Lending has slid in Latin America and the Caribbean overall, although consumer 
lending is still growing and, in general, there have been no abrupt changes in the level of international reserves 
held by the countries of the region.
Tax receipts are likely to fall off in most of the countries in 2013, mainly as a result of cooling consumption and 
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to this scenario, too, in different ways. Some countries have moderated spending and others have stepped it up, 
within certain limits. On the one hand there are countries that have structural rules or are taking countercyclical or 
neutral steps (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru). On the other hand, there are countries whose policies 
are geared more towards achieving annual fiscal targets, regardless of the macroeconomic cycle. Lastly, a number of 
countries have decreased their public debt in recent years and have access to funding for their deficits, giving them 
fiscal space for countercyclical policies.
2. Three decades of uneven and unstable growth 
Profound economic transformations have taken place
Over the past three decades Latin America and the Caribbean saw uneven economic growth, reflected in a 
generally slow expansion of per capita GDP despite a speed-up during the third decade, and in the fact that few 
countries managed to narrow their gap with more developed countries. Even in these cases, performance was 
significantly weaker than in the countries of Asia, where growth picked up significantly. 
During the 1980s, inequality and poverty indicators deteriorated —quite sharply in some cases. It was not for 
some time (the 2000s) that they began to improve, on the back of stronger growth, labour-market improvements and 
the launch of social policies. But high levels of inequality and poverty remain in a number of cases. 
The changes taking place in the region have included substantial changes in external macroeconomic 
integration. The vast majority of countries now have higher ratios of foreign trade and foreign direct investment, 
revealing a greater degree of productive interaction with the rest of the world than 30 years ago. These changes 
and external deleveraging have lightened the interest payment burden and increased the rents from foreign 
investment, although a significant proportion is reinvested. Remittances have become a major source of resources 
for the region —initially for the countries of the Caribbean and subsequently for the countries of Central and 
South America.
These three decades have also seen, to varying degrees among countries, profound changes in macroeconomic 
regimes and, especially, a strengthening of monetary and fiscal policies that helped to reduce inflation and improve 
the fiscal accounts, thereby improving performance in the face of the global financial crisis. But not all of the changes 
have contributed to growth, and three sources of weakness can be identified in the region. They are the potential end 
of the key export commodity price boom, an insufficient increase in investment, and, linked to it, an uneven and still 
precarious rise in labour productivity.
Despite the favourable terms-of-trade trend, capital accumulation has been insufficient and there 
has been little progress in labour productivity
In the first place, the terms-of-trade contribution to income growth has been particularly large during the last 
decade, but it is at risk of diminishing. This contribution, while negative in the 1980s, partially recovered during the 
1990s and has been rising sharply since 2003, more so in those economies that are more specialized in the production 
and export of raw materials, where they account for at least one third of the growth of national disposable income in 
recent years. Income growth also fed a significant expansion of domestic demand in the past decade. Three factors 
contributed to this: the greater contribution of public and private consumption, procyclical investment trends, and 
the persistent negative contribution of net exports.1 Indeed, the contribution to non-export GDP growth (that is, the 
sum of consumption and investment, referred to as absorption) was slightly greater over the past decade than in the 
previous period. Consumption became the component of demand that contributed the most to growth, especially in 
the slowdown scenario over the past few years.
1 Net exports are total exports are less total imports. When the goods and services import volume is greater than the goods and services 
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The growing importance of consumption as a driver of growth is associated with increases in the wage bill resulting 
from labour-market improvements, redistribution policies (chiefly over the past decade) and expanding consumer 
credit. The operating surplus component of GDP (which can be associated with the concept of enterprise savings) 
has increased gradually (more markedly during the past decade) and, in most countries, eroded the compensation 
of employees component as well as, in some cases, the tax component. However, in a number of countries of the 
region, the growing operating surplus has boosted public savings as government revenues rose on the strength of 
higher international prices for raw materials. These countries have therefore been able to implement redistributive 
public policies that have tended to partially offset the concentrator effect of the higher operating surplus share. 
This is one of the reasons why the Gini index of income concentration tended to improve in most of the countries 
during the past decade.
Second, capital accumulation has been expanding more slowly, unlike consumption. Investment held at 
less than 20% of GDP for long periods, owing to the decline in public investment in the wake of the adjustment 
programmes of the 1980s and insufficient stimulus for private investment stemming from instability during the 
1990s despite partial recovery from the lows of the so-called lost decade. The 2000s brought an increase in 
investment and savings, fuelled by rising national disposable income (thanks, in some cases, to higher export 
prices), brighter growth expectations that spurred an expansion of spending in developed countries, and growth 
in China. National savings grew faster than investment, pushing external savings down and mitigating the 
external vulnerability of a number of countries of the region to the shocks that would come from the international 
financial crisis. However, as noted above, investment did not match the levels seen in other emerging countries, 
such as those in Asia. 
Through what is known as the accelerator effect, investment trends are to a large measure driven by aggregate 
demand and economic growth itself. The negative correlation between GDP gap and investment growth in the region, 
and the positive correlation between the GDP growth rate and the investment rate point to a close link between 
investment, utilized capacity and growth expectations. The findings of a causality analysis indicate that acceleration 
of the GDP growth rate precedes changes in investment rates, confirming that increases in the investment rate have 
been linked to aggregate demand pressures.
Thirdly, labour productivity has increased over the past decade, albeit unevenly, as investment and labour-force 
skill levels rose. The most recent surge in labour productivity stands in contrast to the decline during the 1980s (when 
investment slumped) and the lacklustre showing in the following decade (when investment grew very little).
Productivity trends have been shaped by investment patterns
Two related factors were behind the contribution of investment to productivity. On the one hand, in several 
countries exchange-rate appreciation and high raw materials prices, among other variables, likely boosted investment 
in the non-tradable sectors and in the exploitation of natural resources, with no equivalent or higher growth in the rest 
of the tradable sectors. And labour productivity grew less in the non-tradable sectors than in the rest of the tradable 
sectors. This helped to keep productivity increases from being lower than the levels that could have been achieved 
with a more balanced process and a higher investment rate. Moreover, this investment orientation meant that labour 
productivity gains in the past decade were chiefly the result of greater reallocation of resources within branches of 
activity, compared with productivity gains stemming from shifting resources from lower-productivity branches of 
activity towards higher-productivity ones.
The predominantly inter-industry nature of the pattern of specialization in Latin America, which was further 
strengthened by the increase in trade with China (especially during the past decade), has tended to be less favourable 
for technology dissemination and learning than the intra-industry specialization of trade and production relations 
in other regions (for example, in Asia), so it has contributed less to productivity gains. And the participation of the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in international value chains, especially in higher-productivity and 
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Strengthening macroeconomic policies boosts their potential for contributing to economic growth 
in the future
The gradual strengthening of fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies in recent decades suggests that these 
macroeconomic policies can be instrumental in boosting growth with equality in the future. After the debt crisis 
of the 1980s, the region managed to lower its debt burden and stabilize production agents’ expectations, although 
some Caribbean countries are still very highly indebted. Progress was also made in implementing countercyclical 
fiscal policies during economic cycle contractions, especially in 2009, although for a number of countries applying 
such policies during booms remains a challenge. Public investment has partially recovered, and social spending and 
fiscal policy support for growth with equality has been enhanced. 
There has been a gradual consolidation of the contribution that monetary and exchange-rate policy makes to 
reducing nominal and real volatility, initially by helping to bring inflation down to very low levels in most countries 
(which also made it possible to lower interest rates), and then through countercyclical policies that helped to smooth 
the volatility of economic growth during the international financial crisis. In a number of countries, flexible exchange-
rate regimes, with varying degrees of regulation, provided more room for monetary policy action, as did the build-up 
of international reserves, which became an insurance mechanism in the face of international financial instability.
Macroeconomic policy should provide strategic support for investment in tradable sectors
Investment and a skilled workforce are key for productivity and growth, and macroeconomic policy enhancement 
is still uneven in the region. This calls for a strategic focus on investment promotion and workforce training, as well 
as on helping to create the conditions for diversifying the production structure. There are four reasons that warrant 
this strategic macroeconomic policy focus on fostering investment in the region, particularly in the tradable sectors:2
(i) the likely end of the export commodity price boom associated with the expansion of China makes it advisable 
to diversify the production structure and promote new axes of sustainable growth in an uncertain environment 
where combining public and private investment can generate significant externalities;
(ii) increasing reliance over the past few years on expanding consumption in order to grow GDP, set against the 
declining investment share and the negative contribution of net exports, underlines the need to make boosting 
investment a priority; 
(iii) the key role of investment as one of the main channels for incorporating technological progress, increasing 
productivity and promoting structural change make investment a must for ensuring sustainable growth; and
(iv) the recent trend in which investment in non-tradable (lower-productivity) sectors has been increasing without 
an equal or greater rise in a wider variety of tradable (higher-productivity) sectors needs to be reversed. This 
would help to promote more balanced structural change with more linkages, where the production of goods 
and services, by generating net exports, would mitigate the risk of potential external constraints on growth.
Investment promotion needs sound institutions: towards social compacts for investment
The role of macroeconomic policy in promoting growth and productivity by encouraging investment and enhancing 
workforce skills has an institutional dimension and a short- and long-term policy dimension. On the one hand is the 
need for an institutional framework that fosters macroeconomic, industrial, environmental and labour policy synergies 
to ensure that government action is on a consistent, sustained course and includes tacit or explicit compacts between 
the State, the business community, workers and social organizations in general in order to move in the same direction. 
Boosting private investment generally requires a set of economic, institutional and social conditions that provide an 
attractive outlook for long-term returns; social compacts for investment could contribute to this. 
2 Favouring the tradable sectors by means of special stimulus measures would mean prioritizing exportable and importable sectors over 
non-tradable ones. But the former include natural resource-producing sectors that, because they have absolute advantages and generate 
rents, are unlike other sectors in that they do not need policy instruments such as subsidies to encourage investment in them. They 
should instead be the focus of other kinds of policies, including tax policies aimed at rent capture. That is why the proposal herein is 
for using subsidies to foster investment in the tradable sectors in a more limited sense that takes account of their forward and backward 
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Joint public-private sector action in each country would do much to build, for the long haul, a shared vision 
and institutional arrangements aimed at reducing the level of uncertainty in investment decision-making, with 
macroeconomic policies that ensure appropriate relative prices, financing, public investment and infrastructure 
(energy, transport and telecommunications) concessions and management of demand, together with labour, social, 
environmental, regulatory and sectoral or industrial policies that make the process sustainable. In addition to these 
actions, inclusive growth makes investment socially sustainable. In general, this is helped by a political and institutional 
framework that enjoys broad legitimacy and provides space for expressing views and interests and for channeling 
social, environmental or other conflicts towards a solution.
Countercyclical macroeconomic policies with a stabilizing impact are a must 
To ensure sustained growth of investment, taking into account the positive correlations between degree of 
installed capacity utilization, investment and growth, countercyclical and macroeconomic stabilization policies need 
to be put in place over the short run in order to avoid idle capacity, help prevent wide fluctuations in growth and 
prevent crises. In the first place, bearing in mind that idle capacity disincentivizes investment, it would be necessary 
to achieve and maintain levels of activity in keeping with high, sustainable use of production capacities by means 
of proper management of aggregate demand. Macroeconomic policy that is conducive to a high use of capacities 
means having real interest rates that do not discourage real investment, inflation within a socially tolerable range, real 
exchange rates without sustained deviations from the long-term trend, sustainable public and external finances, low 
unemployment and sound, stable financial systems that promote intermediation and risk diversification in keeping 
with each country’s production structure and labour market.
Secondly, the negative impacts that economic downturns have on investment call for developing countercyclical 
capacities in order to counteract or mitigate downswings triggered by external and internal shocks. The economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean have a long history of such shocks set off by economic, social or political 
factors, extreme events or natural disasters, causing wide fluctuations and declines in activity that have negatively 
impacted investment and, therefore, growth. Achieving a high degree of production capacity use therefore justifies 
the implementation of temporary countercyclical policies to smooth the fluctuations resulting from such shocks.
Thirdly, beyond the fluctuations caused by temporary shocks, macroeconomic policy should, by promoting 
internal and external balances that are sustainable over time, help to prevent national crises that lead to recessions, 
slow growth and idle production capacity. Over the past few decades, Latin America and the Caribbean has gone 
through crises sparked by the long-term unsustainability of finances (public and private, domestic and external) 
together with a serious loss of tradable-sector competitiveness.
To ensure consistency over the long run by seeking debt reduction during upswings and accepting larger deficits 
during periods of slower growth so as to help stabilize GDP and investment growth, second-generation macro-fiscal 
rules should have a medium-term structural balance target, exception and transitory clauses and some room for 
manoeuvre to deal with catastrophic events or persistent recessionary conditions. 
Second-generation macro-fiscal rules also require substantial institutional development, especially the ability 
to transform sensitivity analyses and prospective scenarios into budgeting procedures so as to ensure appropriate 
multi-year budget programming, clauses of exception and explicit treatment of major “windfall revenues”. As part 
of a broader institutional framework, countercyclical policies, in order to be effective, should encompass actions on 
multiple fronts, including monetary, macroprudential, labour (including wages) and production policies. 
The bias in favour of investment in non-tradable sectors should be eliminated and replaced with 
fiscal and financial policies that foster structural change
Stimulating investment in the medium and long term calls for eliminating any potential bias in favour of investment 
in non-tradable sectors and promoting fiscal, financial, trade and employment policies that support structural change, 
that is, the reallocation of resources and labour from lower-productivity non-tradable sectors to a wider variety of 
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high and stable real exchange rates, financial mechanisms that allow exchange-rate hedges, market intervention to 
reduce exchange-rate volatility or facilitating pension-fund or sovereign wealth-fund investment abroad. 
However, the ability of exchange-rate policy to promote investment in tradable sectors can be constrained by 
the malleability of financial flows, making it difficult to achieve full, lasting control over them, and by the quasi-fiscal 
costs (opportunity costs of building up international reserves and sterilization costs, in particular). Any relative price 
bias against investment in tradable (non-primary) sectors resulting from overvalued exchange rates that are hard to 
level warrant the application of other, non-contractionary, policy instruments in order to address this issue. 
Fiscal policy, and financial policy in particular, should foster this structural change, driven by investments in the 
tradable sectors, along three fronts. First, public or public-private partnerships should target infrastructure (complementary 
non-tradable sector) with the aim of reducing the logistical and transport costs associated with the delivery of tradable 
goods and services, thereby offsetting what could be an unfavourable relative price ratio resulting from an overvalued 
exchange rate (or to enhance a more favourable relative price ratio stemming from exchange-rate undervaluation). 
This impact can be boosted by means of a region-wide financial policy orientation enabling national, regional and 
international public banks to focus their resources on meeting this need, on the basis of general recognition that there 
are marked gaps and lags in this area. 
Second, subsidies could be channeled (including by means of budgets, in order to facilitate evaluation 
and transparency) to promote complementarities (externalities) between private investment projects as well as 
structural change associated with investments in the tradable sectors with greater linkages, taking account of their 
environmental sustainability.
Thirdly, designing appropriate incentives is just as important as improving public capacities to implement these 
measures and coordinate public and private investment. Fiscal transparency, which should especially be extended to 
encompass all subsidies, must play a key role as a deterrent against possible abuses in the use of these instruments.
National systems of vocational education and training should be strengthened to favor structural change
Long-term employment policies should include fostering investment in higher value-added tradable sectors. 
In other words, they should facilitate structural change. Particular attention should be paid to developing national 
systems of vocational education and training, with a triple focus: (i) initial technical training for young people in 
line with production-system demand; (ii) continuing training that enables workers to upgrade their knowledge and 
skills throughout their working lives; and (iii) training of workers in low-productivity sectors in order to facilitate their 
mobility towards higher-productivity sectors, for which many of them need additional skills.
Training poses challenges that are often related to information and communication technologies, which make 
up a growing share of many investments. National systems of vocational education and training must take account 
of the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, which often run into difficulties in finding skilled labour that 
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Latin America and the Caribbean: variation in total gross domestic product, 2010-2013
(Percentages on the basis of dollars at constant 2005 prices)
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 a
Argentina 9.2 8.9 1.9 3.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 4.1 5.2 5.2 5.5
Brazil 6.9 2.7 0.9 2.5
Chile 5.8 5.9 5.6 4.6
Colombia 4.0 6.6 4.0 4.0
Costa Rica 5.0 4.4 5.1 3.0
Cuba 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.0
Dominican Republic 7.8 4.5 3.9 3.0
Ecuador 2.8 7.4 5.0 3.8
El Salvador 1.4 2.2 1.9 2.0
Guatemala 2.9 4.2 3.0 3.0
Haiti -5.4 5.6 2.8 3.5
Honduras 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.0
Mexico 5.3 3.9 3.9 2.8
Nicaragua 3.6 5.4 5.2 5.0
Panama 7.5 10.8 10.7 7.5
Paraguay 13.1 4.3 -1.2 12.5
Peru 8.8 6.9 6.3 5.9
Uruguay 8.9 6.5 3.9 3.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -1.5 4.2 5.6 1.0
Latin America 5.7 4.4 3.0 3.0
Antigua and Barbuda -7.1 -2.8 2.3 2.4
Bahamas 1.0 1.7 1.8 3.0
Barbados 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.7
Belize 3.9 2.3 5.3 2.7
Dominica 1.2 1.0 -1.5 1.4
Grenada -0.4 1.0 -0.8 1.2
Guyana 4.4 5.4 4.8 4.8
Jamaica -1.5 1.3 -0.3 0.5
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.2 1.7 -1.1 2.5
Saint Lucia 0.2 1.4 -3.0 2.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -3.4 -0.7 1.5 1.1
Suriname 4.1 4.7 4.4 4.5
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2 -2.6 1.2 2.0
The Caribbean 0.2 0.1 1.2 2.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.6 4.3 3.0 3.0
Central America (including Cuba, Dominican Republic and Haiti) 4.2 4.5 4.2 3.5
Central America 4.1 5.2 5.0 4.0
South America (10 countries) 6.1 4.6 2.5 3.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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A. The external context
1. The outlook for 2013 is for the global economy to grow at much the same rate 
as in 2012, with the prospect of a gradual upturn
In 2013, world GDP growth is projected to be similar to that of 2012, while 2014 should see economic growth pick 
up speed (see table I.1). Notwithstanding the persistent recession in the eurozone in 2013, the developing countries 
are expected to continue to drive growth in the world economy, while policies adopted by the United States and 
Japan should help to revitalize their own economies and boost growth worldwide. 
Table I.1 
Selected regions and countries: GDP growth, 2010-2014
(Percentages) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 a 2014 a
World 4.0 2.8 2.3 2.3 3.1
Developed countries 2.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 2.0
United States 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.6
Japan 4.5 -0.6 2.0 1.3 1.6
Eurozone 2.1 1.4 -0.6 -0.4 1.1
Developing countries 7.7 5.8 4.6 5.0 5.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 6.0 4.3 3.0 3.0 4.2
Brazil 7.5 2.8 0.9 3.0 4.2
Russian Federation 4.3 4.3 3.4 2.9 3.5
India 9.6 7.5 5.1 5.5 6.1
China 10.3 9.2 7.8 7.8 7.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
a  The figures for 2013 and 2014 are projections.
In the first half of 2013, sluggish private lending in the eurozone and record high unemployment rates (above 
all in Greece, Portugal and Spain), together with persistent uncertainty and a contractionary fiscal policy, were part 
and parcel of an already entrenched recession. The fragile financial system has curbed credit expansion and limited 
the scope for an economic recovery. Recent forecasts suggest that a modest increase in lending, less restrictive fiscal 
policies and a rally in exports will help the eurozone return to positive growth territory in the second quarter of 
2013, although growth rates will remain low.1 But even with an economic upturn in the eurozone, growth there will 
probably remain timid for a long time, since institutional reforms underpinned by banking and fiscal agreements 
and the achievement of sustained fiscal consolidation in all countries in the zone will be difficult to implement. A 
robust economic recovery in the United States and a return to strong, sustainable growth in China would do much 
to revive the eurozone’s trade performance. 
The announcement of the programme of direct monetary transfers (DMT) for purchasing short-term public debt from 
countries with economic problems has yielded positive results although so far the option has not been drawn on. The 
very existence of this programme has reduced and stabilized swap risk premiums in eurozone countries (see figure I.1). 
This programme, together with a change in policy in some countries, including Portugal and Spain, designed to avoid 
such extreme austerity policies as those applied in Greece, has provided temporary stability within the zone. In 2013, 
authorities maintained the policy that consisted in prioritizing fiscal adjustment, stabilizing public debt and easing the 
financial system. Consequently, forecasts for the second half of 2013 point to a slighter contraction in the eurozone.
In 2013, the Chinese economy is expected to maintain a similar growth rate to that of 2012 with a possible 
downtrend. This is attributable mainly to falling exports, as a result of the eurozone crisis, and a contraction in foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Moreover, the Government of China is in transition as it reorients the economy towards 
consumption, although it has not yet succeeded in consolidating this effort. China’s recent economic performance 
has not met analysts’ expectations. Rising housing prices in 2013 have raised questions about the possibility of an 
overheating real-estate market. If these prices continue to soar, it would put a damper on expectations that interest 
rates would be cut soon in order to revive economic growth. 
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Figure I.1 
Europe (selected countries): five-year credit default swap  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Bloomberg
The monetary authorities in the United States have applied a stimulus policy, their target being to bring 
VOFNQMPZNFOUEPXO UPCFGPSF UIFZXJOEEPXO UIFQSPHSBNNF *O +VOF JO WJFXPG UIF SFDFOU USFOE
in unemployment and the positive signs of economic growth, the Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, 
BOOPVODFEUIBUUIFQSPHSBNNFNJHIUCFUFSNJOBUFEJONJE5IBUBOOPVODFNFOUUSJHHFSFEBGBMMJOUIF
main stock exchanges around the world and a wave of sales especially on fixed-income markets, as well as an 
increase in the sovereign risk premiums of many countries around the world. This suggests that a withdrawal of 
monetary stimulus would feed money market and stock market volatility, posing a serious challenge to monetary 
authorities worldwide.
In 2013, an unemployment rate downtrend and an improvement in the credit and real estate markets in the 
United States have helped to boost private demand. Recent economic indicators show that economic activity in 
the United States seems to be posting a moderate recovery in tandem with a decrease in unemployment. However, 
unemployment rates remain high when compared with historical rates and their reduction is partly due to a lower 
labour-force participation rate and not to a stronger job market.
In April 2013 the Central Bank of Japan decided on a policy shift geared to monetary stimulus in an effort to 
boost the national economy. It set an inflation target of 2%, which could have a positive outcome in the short term. 
The rebound in Japanese exports, triggered by the depreciation of the yen, and the growth in manufacturing output 
are signs of a recovery. However, the sustainability of the medium- and long-term public debt in the face of high 
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2. World trade continues to grow slowly
With a year-on-year variation of 2.1% during the first four months of 2013, slightly higher than the figure (1.8%) 
recorded in 2012, world export volume continues to show signs of a sustained upturn (see figure I.2). The sluggish 
growth in world trade flows is due mainly to the recession in the eurozone, the slowdown in the Chinese economy 
and the still tentative economic revival in the United States. While exports from the emerging economies in Asia have 
shown more robust growth since the start of 2013 than in 2012, the rate remains significantly below 2011 levels. 
The developed countries display the same lacklustre performance as in 2012. While United States exports recorded 
a very modest expansion up to April, shipments from the eurozone countries and Japan contracted.
Figure I.2 
Year-on-year variation in world export volume by region, three-month 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB).
Import volume into the industrialized countries has followed a similar pattern to exports. No increase in imports 
into the United States or Japan was observed in the first few months of 2013, representing a downturn from the 
moderate increase in 2012. Imports into the countries of the eurozone continued to shrink. The emerging economies 




Year-on-year variation in world import volume by region, three-month 
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B. The external sector in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. The region’s terms of trade weakened, albeit with differences from one country 
to the next
The fall in price of several of the region’s export commodities in 2012 and so far in 2013 may be viewed as part of 
a medium- to long-term stagnation and even a gradual decline in the prices of these goods. This may be caused, 
on the one hand, by the outlook for more moderate growth in China, the principal destination for several of the 
region’s primary products, and, on the other, by an increase in the supply of these products worldwide. 
While no sharp slump in these commodity prices is expected and no firm predictions can be made given 
their current volatility, price levels are expected to remain relatively high albeit less so than in the past decade. 
As discussed in part II of this Survey, more than a third of the growth in disposable national income in most South 
American countries over the past decade was attributable to the improved terms of trade. This deterioration may 
well have negative implications unless countries succeed in diversifying their production structure, especially in 
the region’s tradable sectors.
%VSJOHUIFGJSTUIBMGPGBOVNCFSPGUIFSFHJPOTFYQPSUQSPEVDUTFYQFSJFODFEBGBMMJOQSJDFT	TFFGJHVSFø*
2 
Following the steep drop in ore and metal prices in 2012, these prices rallied to some extent in the second half of 
the year and subsequently recorded a moderate but steady decline in the first half of 2013, to a level 3.9% below 
UIBUPGUIFTBNFQFSJPEJOBOECFMPXUIFGJHVSFGPS+BOVBSZ
Figure I.4 
Latin America: price indices for export commodities and manufactured goods,  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB).








period. However, in comparison with the figures for January 2013, the prices of these two products were down by 
BOESFTQFDUJWFMZ5IFNPOUIJODSFBTFJOUIFQSJDFPGJSPO#SB[JMTNBJOFYQPSUDPNNPEJUZXBT
PWFSUIFTBNFQFSJPEVTJOHUIFWBMVFPG#SB[JMJBOFYQPSUTBTUIFCFODINBSL'PSUIFSFTUPGPSFBOENFUBM
prices as a whole fell moderately compared with the 2012 level. 
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Forecasts for weak growth in the global economy and the subsequent slowdown in demand, above all in the 
FVSP[POFDPOUSJCVUFEUPBTIBSQGBMMJOPJMQSJDFT	CZZFBSPOZFBS
JOUIFGJSTUIBMGPGUIFZFBS5IJTXBT
however, partly due to the fact that oil prices had remained relatively high during the first months of 2012, prior 
to sustaining a significant slide in the second quarter of the year. On average, the oil price is projected to decline 
slightly in 2013 owing to the forecast of relatively low growth in the global economy in 2013.
'PPEQSJDFTGFMMCZJOUIFGJSTUIBMGPGUIFZFBSNBJOMZBTBSFTVMUPGBTIBSQESPQ	
JOUIFQSJDFPG
sugar. This drop was due to the expected rebound of the sugar cane crop in Brazil (the leading exporter of this product 
XPSMEXJEF
8IFBUBOENBJ[FQSJDFTTPBSFECZBOESFTQFDUJWFMZTJODFUIFTUBSUPGQPPSHSPXJOH
conditions and delays in crop planting in the United States stemmed the fall in food prices overall. 
While coffee consumption continued to increase globally, growth in demand was outstripped by the expansion 
in world production. Prices thus continued to decline: by 28% during the first half of 2013 compared with the same 
period a year earlier. Oil and oilseed prices rose by 2.2% in the first half of 2013, but this trend is likely to be reversed 
during the rest of the year, as favourable weather conditions in South America will boost output, in particular in 
Argentina and Paraguay.
These variations will have different impacts on the terms of trade of the countries of the region, depending 
on their export mix. In the region as a whole, the terms of trade are projected to remain at much the same level 
as in 2012, thanks in part to the performance of Brazil and Mexico, the two leading exporting countries in the 
region. Both countries’ terms of trade should remain stable. In the case of Brazil, the main factor behind this result 
was the good price being fetched for the country’s iron ore exports, which offset the modest rise in the price of its 
imports. In the case of Mexico, the pattern of the terms of trade reflects its export structure, which is based mainly 
on manufactured goods.
The prospect of a marked fall in the price of oil and oilseeds triggered by the recovery in soybean production 
in 2013 thanks to favourable weather conditions will be reflected in a slight deterioration in the terms of trade of 
the subgroup of countries that export agro-industrial goods (Argentina and Paraguay). The ore- and metal-exporting 
countries (Chile and Peru) can expect a worsening of their terms of trade in 2013. The hydrocarbon-exporting 
countries (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Trinidad and 
Tobago) will also see little improvement in their terms of trade, with results that vary from one country to another. 
The Central American and Caribbean countries may look forward to a modest improvement in their terms of trade, 






























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
a  The figures for 2013 are projections.
b Chile, Guyana, Peru and Suriname.
c Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.
d Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago.
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2. Imports outpace exports
'PSFYQPSUT GSPN UIF SFHJPOBSFFYQFDUFE UPHPVQCZ JOWBMVF UFSNTBO JNQSPWFNFOUDPNQBSFE
XJUIUIFSBUFPGSFDPSEFEJOCVUNVDIMPXFSUIBOUIFGJHVSF	
"TJOCVUVOMJLFUIF
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
a  Projections.
Figure I.7 
Latin America: variation in import volume and price, 2013a
(Percentages)



















Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2013
Earlier estimates are based on the region’s weaker export performance starting in the second quarter of 2012 
and continuing into the first few months of 2013.3 Total exports from the region dropped by 1.2% year on year4 
in the period January-April, although they rallied slightly in the course of the month (see table I.2). The decline 
in shipments from the region was due for the most part to a 2.5% decrease in exports from the South American 
countries. The unfavourable context, characterized by persistent uncertainty, and weak external demand, especially 
from the industrialized countries, continued to have a negative impact on trade flows from Latin America in the 
early months of 2013. The fall-off in exports from the South American countries (in particular, Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Peru) was due mainly to the situation in the eurozone countries, a major destination for the 
exports from the South American economies, since shipments to that region have plummeted since the beginning 
of 2013 (see table I.4).
Table I.2 
Latin America: year-on-year variation in export value, January 2011-April 2013
(Percentages)
  2011 2012 2013
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Argentina 29.6 21.5 25.5 18.1 5.5 -8.8 -5.9 -3.1 -2.5 12.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 25.0 29.8 42.5 24.6 21.8 31.7 19.0 39.0 30.8 -3.8
Brazil 30.6 34.3 28.6 15.9 7.5 -7.4 -11.6 -6.1 -7.7 5.4
Chile 29.4 30.3 4.4 -0.2 -1.7 -7.5 -10.1 3.5 -4.1 4.9
Colombia 38.3 45.9 48.0 40.9 22.9 3.0 0.5 -0.2 -9.5 -
Costa Rica 4.0 12.4 11.5 13.0 17.4 9.7 6.5 7.0 -2.4 4.6
Dominican Republic 26.6 33.6 27.0 22.6 8.4 -2.0 5.3 11.2 - -
Ecuador 29.2 29.4 36.0 17.5 16.1 6.1 5.4 0.2 -0.5 -4.8
El Salvador 28.0 24.1 13.8 6.7 0.6 -8.0 4.2 6.4 -2.9 17.7
Guatemala 26.1 22.6 29.9 13.8 -3.0 -4.6 -3.8 -4.9 -1.3 6.7
Haiti 12.1 99.6 27.3 33.9 11.6 -7.4 4.5 0.5 16.7 -
Honduras 54.2 55.2 26.3 27.4 10.4 -0.9 40.5 -0.9 -12.6 -
Mexico 22.8 19.6 16.5 10.5 9.5 5.6 3.6 5.9 -1.4 6.3
Nicaragua 33.0 22.4 12.1 20.5 9.1 14.4 31.9 21.3 -9.1 -11.7
Panama 28.7 33.4 57.5 15.4 28.1 5.0 -7.4 5.6 -13.2 -
Paraguay 6.9 20.6 41.6 7.5 -4.5 -7.3 -14.3 4.2 36.7 49.2
Peru 27.5 43.9 38.7 13.1 18.5 -9.9 -10.0 -0.4 -15.0 -3.2
Uruguay 28.6 9.2 23.5 13.0 13.6 7.2 15.9 4.8 -10.7 -6.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 26.5 56.4 54.3 29.5 23.3 -5.8 -2.6 7.6 -13.7 -
Latin America 26.9 29.4 25.7 14.8 10.5 -1.6 -3.3 1.7 -5.1 5.9
South America 29.6 35.3 30.4 17.2 10.9 -5.5 -7.1 -0.7 -7.1 5.6
Central America 22.9 20.4 18.1 11.0 9.9 5.2 3.4 5.7 -2.1 6.3
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
a  Data for April. The total amounts for this period relate to the countries for which data were available for this month: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
Imports into the region continued to expand in the first few months of 2013, but at moderate rates compared 
with recent years. In the period January-April, a 6.4% expansion year-on-year was recorded, driven by an 8.5% 
increase in imports into the South American countries (see table I.3). This reflects the resilience of consumption 
growth and exchange-rate appreciation in the first quarter of the year.5 Thus, in April, the region recorded a year-
on-year 1.2% contraction in exports and a 6.4% year-on-year expansion in imports. 
3 This decline is attributable in part to the fact that the fall in exports from the region started in the second quarter of 2012, making the 
year-on-year fall in the first quarter of 2013 look sharper. 
4 This figure relates to the countries for which data were available for January-April 2013, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
5 As explained below in the analysis of monetary, exchange-rate and macroprudential policies, the trend towards appreciation was 
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Table I.3 
Latin America: year-on-year variation in import value, January 2011-April 2013
(Percentages)
  2011 2012 2013
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Argentina 38.5 37.8 34.0 16.4 -0.1 -10.8 -13.2 -4.9 4.9 32.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 28.5 31.3 47.4 38.4 23.4 9.8 -5.0 8.2 10.2 19.0
Brazil 25.4 33.3 20.9 19.8 9.5 0.4 -11.1 -1.7 6.3 15.7
Chile 37.1 31.1 27.6 18.2 7.1 3.6 0.8 11.1 6.0 12.5
Colombia 38.0 43.4 31.1 25.8 16.1 11.6 5.9 3.7 1.0 -
Costa Rica 21.7 15.8 20.9 19.7 13.5 9.3 2.2 9.0 -0.1 21.0
Dominican Republic 17.0 12.2 8.8 9.5 8.8 -0.7 5.8 -1.1 - -
Ecuador 23.5 20.8 13.2 15.8 13.1 4.5 6.3 -6.9 6.2 -1.5
El Salvador 22.7 19.4 24.0 8.2 5.9 -3.3 2.4 7.8 0.2 14.3
Guatemala 26.1 26.7 19.3 9.8 7.1 -1.1 -2.4 6.3 0.5 21.6
Haiti 23.4 30.1 -13.5 1.1 -1.8 -9.6 -19.9 -12.6 1.7 -
Honduras 21.7 30.0 32.6 21.8 16.5 -4.1 3.7 7.2 -6.7 -
Mexico 20.6 17.8 18.1 10.0 10.0 5.6 0.5 7.2 1.6 11.8
Nicaragua 39.3 20.9 22.1 19.5 13.8 17.5 7.1 11.6 -7.6 4.7
Panama 36.6 30.5 44.7 22.4 13.5 5.5 3.2 6.2 -0.7 -
Paraguay 27.9 31.9 28.4 7.6 -2.9 -11.2 -10.0 -2.8 12.9 21.5
Peru 29.4 44.8 24.0 18.0 16.7 4.5 13.7 10.7 6.6 9.6
Uruguay 48.1 34.5 25.3 0.8 11.4 7.9 7.8 7.5 -8.9 12.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 18.9 23.5 18.8 26.0 52.2 5.4 23.6 33.5 1.9 -
Latin America 25.6 26.8 21.4 15.5 11.5 2.8 -1.5 5.5 3.4 14.3
South America 29.7 33.6 24.5 19.5 12.7 1.3 -2.7 4.3 4.9 16.1
Central America 20.5 17.9 17.1 10.0 9.9 5.0 0.3 7.2 1.3 12.5
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
a Data for April; the total amounts for this period relate to the countries for which data were available for the month of April (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay).
Table I.4 
European Union: year-on-year variation in import value by country 
of origin, January 2011-March 2013
(Percentages)
 
Share in  2011 a
2011 2012 2013
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Argentina 16.9 34.9 24.5 8.3 0.2 -1.0 -8.3 2.0 -20.2 -29.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 8.7 24.9 -17.6 -8.5 27.7 -17.2 0.1 20.1 45.2 37.0
Brazil 20.7 29.7 23.4 19.1 -0.1 3.1 -3.7 -11.4 -5.7 -13.8
Chile 17.7 33.9 28.1 11.0 -2.4 -11.4 -16.8 -9.4 -14.1 -10.3
Colombia 15.6 32.1 35.2 59.9 54.9 72.0 41.5 3.1 0.2 -33.3
Costa Rica 17.9 5.3 -1.5 -0.1 27.1 38.5 19.3 15.7 1.9 -19.8
Dominican Republic 12.8 7.0 -0.1 2.9 -18.1 21.7 2.3 -0.1 -4.4 -3.9
Ecuador 12.0 22.0 14.0 5.8 25.2 0.0 0.8 24.5 -6.8 -2.9
El Salvador 6.0 47.5 66.2 30.4 88.5 -27.2 -38.3 -26.8 -24.5 -22.9
Guatemala 6.8 29.1 49.5 17.8 9.1 5.7 -0.5 19.8 23.9 -6.4
Honduras 27.6 67.4 47.7 47.5 7.6 18.2 6.2 9.0 55.5 -23.8
Mexico 5.5 39.2 12.8 23.6 17.5 11.0 27.3 16.4 7.2 3.4
Nicaragua 12.1 40.7 27.6 56.5 8.5 1.7 -4.9 -4.3 16.6 -14.6
Panama 3.4 -70.5 -20.1 -15.6 -40.6 56.5 79.3 -9.0 -37.6 12.7
Paraguay 9.1 0.2 22.0 9.5 42.6 88.4 -38.1 -19.7 -31.9 19.2
Peru 18.2 49.2 21.7 16.2 14.0 -0.9 3.4 0.5 -8.4 -12.8
Uruguay 14.9 17.0 -1.9 -11.1 11.6 -6.6 -18.1 -3.4 -3.5 10.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 6.1 21.4 -7.1 1.8 22.3 0.8 21.6 22.2 -7.7 -3.7
Total 13.0 30.0 19.4 16.7 9.5 8.0 3.1 -0.3 -4.9 -12.9
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(EUROSTAT).
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3. Remittances from Europe continue to shrink
In the first few months of 2013, trends in remittance inflows from migrant workers varied significantly from 
one country to the next (see figure I.8). Significant increases were recorded in inflows into Guatemala (6.9%), 
)POEVSBT 	
 BOE/JDBSBHVB 	
 GPMMPXJOH B SFMBUJWF JNQSPWFNFOU JO FDPOPNJD BOE MBCPVSNBSLFU
prospects in the United States, the principal host country of migrants from Guatemala and Honduras. In the 
case of Nicaragua, economic growth in Costa Rica was another factor along with growth in the United States, 
as both of these economies are major destinations for migrants from this country. The low growth in remittance 
flows to Colombia reflects the still difficult labour situation in Spain, the main destination for Colombian 
migrants, with the unemployment rate continuing to soar to over 27% in the early months of 2013. Mexico 
(the top remittance-receiving country in Latin America) saw its inflows drop by 9.3% in the first four months 
of the year. The reversal of migration flows from Mexico to the United States seems to be one of the factors 
contributing to trend in remittances to Mexico. Estimates provided by the Pew Research Center show that in the 
past year, the number of Mexican emigrants entering the United States was offset by the number of emigrant 
workers returning to Mexico.6
Figure I.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): variation in inflows 
of remittances from migrants abroad, 2010-2013a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
a  The figures for 2013 relate to different periods depending on the countries: Jamaica and Nicaragua: first quarter; Colombia, Honduras and Mexico: January to April; 
and El Salvador and Guatemala: January to May. No data were available for 2013 for Ecuador or the Dominican Republic.
4. Tourism contracts slightly
Overall international tourist flows to the region as well as all subregions —South America, Central America, the 
Caribbean and Mexico— (see figure I.9) fell in the early months of 2013 compared with the year-earlier period. 
The drop in tourist arrivals reflects the uncertainty and low economic growth prevailing in the external context. 
While Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean —subregions where tourism is a critical source of income for 
their economies— recorded falls of 1.1%, 1.3% and 2.2%, respectively, the decline in South America was just 
0.2%. However, this last figure contrasts sharply with the surge in tourist arrivals in the countries of South America 
since 2010. The recent fall-off in tourist arrivals is believed to reflect the slowdown in economic activity within 
the region itself, which has had an impact on intraregional tourism and business travel.











Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Figure I.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean: year-on-year variation in international  
tourist arrivals, 2009-2013a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
a  The figures for 2013 relate to the first quarter. 
5. The current account shows a slight deterioration
With imports expected to outstrip exports in 2013, the goods trade balance will weaken, with the surplus falling from 0.9% 
of GDP in 2012 to 0.6 of GDP in 2013. The gloomy outlook for tourism in the region will mean that the service balance 
EFGJDJUXJMMSFNBJOBUPG(%1JO5IVTUIFHPPETBOETFSWJDFTUSBEFCBMBODFDPVMETIPXBEFGJDJUFRVJWBMFOU
UPPG(%1JODPNQBSFEXJUIBEFGJDJUPGPG(%1JO5IFUSBOTGFSCBMBODFJTFYQFDUFEUPEJNJOJTI
slightly to a surplus equivalent to 1% of GDP in 2013, down from a surplus of 1.1% of GDP in 2012. This outcome 
is due in large part to the downward trend in remittances sent to Mexico by migrant workers. A slight improvement is 
FYQFDUFEJOUIFJODPNFCBMBODF	GSPNBEFGJDJUFRVJWBMFOUUPPG(%1JOUPPG(%1JO
BTQSJDFT
for various export commodities stagnate or fall; this trend will have a negative impact on the performance of the foreign 
companies that operate or invest in the region, with a resulting reduction in repatriated profits.
The deterioration in the trade balance, due to the steeper increase in imports than in exports, will drive the changes 
in the current account in 2013. Accordingly, the overall current account deficit for Latin America will probably climb 
from 1.8% of GDP in 2012 to 2.0% of GDP in 2013, the highest since 2001 (see figure I.10).
Figure I.10 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
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6. Access to external financing is maintained notwithstanding the financial volatility
External financing trends for Latin America have held in 2013 to date. As in 2012, net inflows of FDI and portfolio 
investments have been steady and there has been a build-up, albeit less significant, of international reserves 
(see figure I.11). In terms of gross flows, inward FDI has picked up since the fourth quarter of 2010 and has maintained 
BRVBSUFSMZ SBUFPG CFUXFFO64 USJMMJPO BOE64 USJMMJPO"QPSUJPOPG UIFTF '%* JOGMPXT JT JOUSBSFHJPOBM
investment, with investment outflows to other countries of the region growing each quarter by between US$ 9 trillion 
BOE64øøUSJMMJPO7 since the end of 2011. 
Figure I.11 
Latin America (14 countries): current account balance and components of the 
financial account, January 2010-March 2013a
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the Latin Finance Bonds Database, JP Morgan and 
Merrill Lynch.
a  The figures for the first quarter of 2013 include a set of six countries, which accounted for close to 76.5% of the GDP in Latin America in 2012: Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Peru. No quarterly balance-of-payments data are available for the countries of the Caribbean.
In 2012, Latin America continued to easily weather global financial market variability and had ready access 
to funding. The current account deficit, which averaged 1.8% of regional GDP, was easily offset by net FDI inflows 
(2.2% of GDP) and portfolio investments (1.7%), although there were net outflows of other more volatile financial 
flows in an amount equivalent to 1% of GDP, or slightly above the rate recorded in previous years. This set of factors 
has led to a fresh rise in international reserves equivalent to 1% of GDP in 2012, the smallest increase in reserves 
since 2009, at the peak of the global financial crisis. In the first quarter of 2013, net inflows of FDI and portfolio 
JOWFTUNFOUTDPOUJOVFEBUBSBUFPGBOESFTQFDUJWFMZPGSFHJPOBM(%10UIFSOFUJOWFTUNFOUMJBCJMJUJFT
which corresponded to short-term cross-border deposit flows and bank lending, were positive for the first time in 
several quarters standing at the equivalent of 1% of regional GDP, attributable almost exclusively to inflows into Brazil. 
Thus, along with a current account deficit in excess of 2% of regional GDP, international reserves again expanded 
by 0.8% of GDP (see figure I.11).8
Continued access to external financial flows in 2013 is linked to a long-term improvement in the levels of external 
debt, international reserves and other factors, which have resulted in steady debt upgrades for many countries in 
Latin America. Nevertheless, risk premiums as measured by sovereign bond spreads have fluctuated in line with the 
uncertainty generated mainly by the situation in some of the European economies. In the first half of 2012, there was 
some degree of volatility and an uptrend in sovereign risk, which was eventually reined in once the European Central 
Bank (ECB) reframed its policy in support of debt sustainability among the eurozone governments. 
7 In order to ensure comparability over time, these figures include just the six countries for which quarterly information for 2013 was 
available at the time of writing (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Peru).
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Since then and throughout the first half of 2013, various spreads in the region have trended downward slightly. 
This risk perception dynamic has been continually shaken by financial investors’ short-term response to different 
announcements of possible changes in United States monetary policy and global growth trends. However, some 
countries in the region continue to show wide spreads, linked to factors specific to each (see table I.5).
Table I.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): country risk as measured through sovereign  
bond spreads (EMBI Global), January 2010-June 2013
(Basis points)
Annual averages 2012 2013
2010 2011 2012 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 January February March April May June
Argentina 696 701 1 007 854 1 095 1 012 1 066 1 102 1 287 1 307 1 210 1 167 1 199
Belize 818 1 011 1 968 1 656 1 706 2 195 2 317 1 558 1 350 789 777 734 872
Brazil 209 195 184 200 213 175 149 154 178 190 173 208 243
Chile 131 140 150 157 171 148 124 124 140 153 141 153 180
Colombia 194 166 150 171 172 136 119 132 141 147 131 167 193
Dominican Republic 373 453 459 535 511 439 349 344 394 385 379 359 401
Ecuador 954 819 827 810 877 795 826 704 704 700 647 626 665
El Salvador 322 383 450 470 486 442 400 332 341 350 366 382 436
Jamaica 492 485 656 624 634 662 702 668 691 680 686 653 623
Mexico 191 188 190 208 213 178 163 165 180 182 169 196 223
Panama 181 172 165 182 188 155 133 140 163 169 149 160 218
Peru 179 194 158 191 185 138 118 129 138 147 132 159 201
Trinidad and Tobago      
Uruguay 219 200 176 200 213 156 134 132 164 173 153 173 235
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1 107 1 213 996 1 003 1 088 1 019 875 746 737 797 821 878 976
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (15 countries) 433 451 538 519 554 547 534 519 536 540 424 430 476
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global).  
7. The external financing mix has changed and more countries have gained 
access to it
External bond issues continued at a brisk pace in 2012 and in the first six months of 2013, but with significant changes 
in their composition. In the first half of 2012, sovereign and quasi-sovereign bond issues remained buoyant. Since 
then, it is banks and private companies that have taken advantage of the low cost of borrowing and the region’s risk 
rating to obtain funds abroad, stepping up their bond issues. During the first six months of 2013, regional bond issues 
totalled US$ 59.040 billion, more than half of the figure for all of 2012, so the total for 2013 is expected to be higher 
than in 2012 (see table I.6 and figure I.12).
Table I.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): external bond issues, January 2010-June 2013
(Millions of dollars)
  2010 2011 2012 January-June 2013
Argentina 3 146 2 193 663 0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0 0 500 0
Brazil 39 580 38 147 50 092 25 176
Chile 6 750 6 049 9 443 5 931
Colombia 1 912 6 411 7 459 4 200
Costa Rica 0 250 1 250 1 500
Dominican Republic 1 034 750 750 1 300
Ecuador 0 0 0 0
El Salvador 450 654 800 310
Guatemala 0 150 1 400 800
Honduras 20 0 0 500
Mexico 19 957 25 846 28 147 11 399
Panama 0 897 1 100 750
Paraguay 0 100 500 500
Peru 4 693 2 455 7 240 5 375
Uruguay 0 1 493 500 0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3 000 7 200 0 0
Jamaica 1 075 694 1 750 1 300
Trinidad and Tobago 0 175 0 0
Latin America and the Caribbean 81 617 93 464 111 594 69 040
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Figure I.12 
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): external bond issues on international markets  
and risk according to EMBI+, January 2010-June 2013
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the Latin Finance (bonds database), JP Morgan and 
Merrill Lynch.
In 2012 and 2013, a new group of countries have also been taking advantage of these resources: Honduras 
BOE1MVSJOBUJPOBM4UBUFPG#PMJWJBFBDIXJUITPWFSFJHOJTTVFTPG64NJMMJPOBOE(VBUFNBMBXJUITPWFSFJHO
corporate and bank issues totalling US$ 2.2 billion. From January to May 2013, the main countries issuing external 
bonds were Brazil (due mainly to Petrobras bonds), Mexico and Peru. 
The picture in the Caribbean is markedly different, even more so when the figures for Trinidad and Tobago are 
not included, since the size of its economy and its export profile (which differs from the rest of the region) affect 
the aggregate results. Thus, without Trinidad and Tobago, the current account deficit stood at 11% of subregional 
(%1QBSUMZPGGTFUCZOFUGMPXTPG'%*FRVJWBMFOUUPPG(%1BOEPGQPSUGPMJPJOWFTUNFOUTBOEPUIFSMJBCJMJUJFT
equivalent to 6% of subregional GDP. As a result, international reserves contracted by the equivalent of 1% of 
subregional GDP in 2012.
C. Macroeconomic policies
1. Inflationary pressures have increased slightly
Some countries of the region have adopted a contractionary monetary policy stance in response to higher inflationary 
pressures. In the first five months of 2013, regional inflation rose slightly in comparison with December 2012. Regional 
NPOUIJOGMBUJPOUP.BZTUPPEBUVQGSPNJO%FDFNCFSBOETMJHIUMZIJHIFSUIBOUIF
posted for the twelve months to May 2012.
The regional situation masks significant differences between countries. In May 2013, the two countries of the 
region with double-digit inflation were Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Argentina. In the former, the significant 
increase in consumer prices was due largely to the impact on domestic prices of the devaluation of the local currency 
in February 2013 and the fact that certain goods were becoming increasingly scarce. In the latter, estimates released 
by statistical institutes in the provinces indicate high rates of inflation. The average rate of inflation reported by the 
provinces that conduct a monthly consumer price index survey (Neuquén, San Luis, Santa Fe and Tierra del Fuego) 
TUPPEBUGPSUIFUXFMWFNPOUITUP"QSJM6SVHVBZBOE)BJUJSFDPSEFEUXFMWFNPOUIJOGMBUJPOSBUFTPG
and 7.3%, respectively, while the lowest inflation rates were recorded in El Salvador (0.1%), Chile (0.9%), Paraguay 
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South America has the highest average inflation, pushed up by rising consumer prices in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela; in Central America and Mexico inflation rates have trended up, albeit with some volatility (see figure I.13).
Figure I.13 
Latin America and the Caribbean: twelve-month variation in the consumer  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.









Latin America: twelve-month variation in the consumer price index by inflation  
component, simple average, January 2007-May 2013
(Percentages)
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Figure I.15 
Latin America: twelve-month variation in the consumer price index, food price index  
and core inflation index, simple average, January 2007-May 2013
(Percentages)






















































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 






consumer price index and food inflation behave very differently, posing serious challenges in terms of distribution 
owing to the regressive impact of rising food prices, which take up a larger share of the budget of low-income 
households (see box 1.1). In Saint Lucia, for example, food inflation is 7.2 percentage points higher than general 






Differential inflation and income distribution: the flip side of improving terms of trade
Surging international demand for raw materials drove a sustained 
upswing in average prices for exports from Latin America and 
the Caribbean and this, reflected in stronger terms of trade for 
the region, boosted the national income (measured in dollars at 
constant prices) of these economies.a This effect is particularly 
evident in the South American countries that are net exporters of 
oil, metals or food, which account for almost a third of the increase 
in disposable income over the past ten years.b Conversely, the 
impact has been zero, or even negative, for most of the Central 
American and Caribbean countries that are net importers of 
these products. 
Irrespective of their status as net exporters or importers of 
raw materials, the countries of the region have to deal with the 
impact of the higher international prices for these products on 
domestic prices. Since food products have a greater weight in 
the typical basket of consumer goods of lower-income strata of 
the population and on average these products have increased 
more steeply in price than other goods and services included 
in the consumption basket, the sharper price rises faced by the 
poorest sectors of the population in these countries are expected 
to have a regressive distributional impact.
In order to assess this impact, the variation in inflation 
was estimated for the different income distribution deciles of 
13 countries in the region: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay in South America, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama in Central America, and Mexico. To this end, data from 
recent household expenditure surveys, where available, and 
disaggregated data on prices of goods and services included in 
the consumer price indices of this set of countries, were used 
to work out the consumption structure of each decile.
As a synthetic indicator of the differential effect of inflation 
based on differences in the composition of the consumer 
baskets per decile, the ratio of the average price increases 
for the baskets of the first four income distribution deciles 
(lowest average income) to those for the baskets of the two 
last deciles (highest average income) was calculated. In 
cumulative terms, the greatest differentials are observed in 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, 
in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, where food inflation 
was the highest in the period under consideration, as shown 
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Box I.1 (continued)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
The figure below shows the variation in differential inflation 
per country and per decile. It indicates a steeper increase in 
prices since 2002 for the lower income distribution strata than 
for the upper strata. This differential began to widen in 2006 and 
peaked in 2007 and 2008 when food prices spiked. This is the 
case in the South American countries as well as in the group 
consisting of Mexico and the countries of Central America.  
Latin America (selected countries): differential between the average variation in consumer  
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Box I.1 (concluded)
On average the price increases for the poorer strata were 
almost 1.5 percentage points higher than for the wealthier strata, 
but in several countries they were more than 2 percentage points 
higher (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile and Uruguay). 
In Central America, average differential inflation topped two 
percentage points. In Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama it even 
approached 3.5% percentage points (in 2008 in the latter two). 
Following a reversal in this trend in 2009 when commodity 
prices fell as a result of the international crisis, in 2010, the same 
regressive bias was observed in the variation in the consumer 
price indices, although it was more muted and more mixed. 
In South America, the average differentials hovered around 
0.6 percentage points between 2010 and 2012. The Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela once again exhibited the most significant 
differentials, followed by Brazil (in 2010 and 2012) Peru (in 2011) 
and Chile (in 2011 and 2012). In Central America and Mexico, the 
average trended downward (by between 0.7 percentage points 
and 0.3 percentage points). Of special note were the differentials 
observed in Nicaragua and Guatemala.
When prices spiked, especially in 2008, the governments 
of the region implemented a series of measures to cushion 
the cost of some basic foods and other goods and services, 
for example, public passenger transport, which account for a 
large share of the consumer basket of the relatively low-income 
population. These measures included consumption subsidies 
and a reduction in the tax burden, including, in some cases, 
lower import duties on specific food products, inventory 
management through State-owned distribution channels, and 
food production incentives, especially in countries where the 
supply depends more on imports. Gradually, these measures 
have tended to be integrated into the strategies that are part 
of a country’s social policies.c Unlike its experience in the past, 
the region was thus able to ride out the international crisis, 
and the repercussions were milder as far as can be gleaned 
from its social indicators. 
Nevertheless, although poverty rates have been diminishing 
continuously since 2002, the pressure of steadily rising food 
prices has pushed up the threshold quite high and it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to reduce indigence rates, which now stand 
at more than 11% of the population. This problem must be closely 
monitored, especially since international demand for food may 
continue to increase in the next few years. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of official figures.
a  For an analysis of the impact of the variation in the terms of trade on national income at constant prices, see Kacef and Manuelito (2008). 
b  Part II, Chapter II, section 2 contains an up-to-date estimate of these impacts. 
c  A review of the measures adopted by the countries in the region to address the escalation in the prices of foods and other essential goods and later to counteract 
the impact of the external crisis appears in ECLAC (2010) and (2012). For an analysis of the specific cases of Brazil, Mexico and Peru, see BCRA/ECLAC (2013).
Figure I.16 
Latin America: variation in the consumer price index and food price index  
in the 12 months to May 2013
(Percentages)


































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of official figures.
a  Twelve months to March 2013. 
b  Twelve months to December 2012.
c  Twelve months to April 2013.
d  Twelve months to February 2013.
e  Twelve months to October 2012
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2. Monetary policy strategies in the region have been diverse
Recent variations in monetary policy benchmark rates in Latin America and the Caribbean (contrary to their 
behaviour over the past two years, which may be described as stable) point to the dilemmas faced by authorities 
in the countries of the region. Growing uncertainty in view of the impact that monetary policy announcements 
in the developed countries (especially the United States) have had on international financial flows, coupled with 
fears that sluggish growth in external demand and mounting inflationary pressures in some economies of the 
region will put a damper on economic activity, have been the focus of attention on the part of the authorities. The 
priority assigned to each of these issues by policy managers has varied and depends on specific aspects of each 
economy; this priority determines the way policy rates and other monetary and exchange-rate policy instruments 
are handled in the region. As a result, a more restrictive policy direction has been adopted in some countries 
(Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay), in contrast with stronger stimulus measures elsewhere (Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Guyana and Mexico), although there are a number of countries in which the monetary policy 
stance has not changed significantly.
In Uruguay, where the main challenge for monetary authorities in recent times has been to avoid more 
intense inflationary spikes, the monetary policy rate has risen steadily since 2012 and at the beginning of 2013 
increased further. In the first half of 2013, authorities in Brazil and Guatemala decided to change their policy 
direction. After implementing a rate-reduction policy in 2012 in an attempt to boost aggregate demand, the 
central banks in both these countries raised the benchmark rate. This change of direction could be due to growing 
concern over inflationary pressures and in the case of Brazil may also point to a greater desire by authorities to 
attract foreign capital at a time when international liquidity levels seem to be on the decline in the short term 
(see figure I.17).9 
Figure I.17 
Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary policy rates of the central banks 













































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data.
Other economies of the region, such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guyana and Mexico, 
lowered their monetary policy rates during the first half of 2013, as authorities were more concerned by the 
slowdown in economic activity. Similarly, this rate reduction shows that monetary authorities in these countries 
have a certain amount of leeway seeing that inflation rates are in line with established targets (see figure I.18).10  
9 This upward trend in rates in Brazil coincides with a relaxation of some measures designed to discourage capital inflows. 
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Figure I.18 
Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary policy rates of the central banks 











































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The rate of growth of the monetary base shows a differentiated pattern. While growth of the base has 
gathered momentum in economies such as Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Peru, a slowdown 
has been seen in Brazil and Chile. The Bahamas has also experienced a slowdown, and during the first quarter 
of the year, growth in the monetary aggregate M1 slowed only in the Central American economies. As in the 
case of the monetary base, Argentina and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were the economies that recorded 
the strongest annualized growth in M1, with average rates of over 30% in the former and over 60% in the latter 
(see figure I.19).
Figure I.19 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): annualized growth 
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3. The pace of lending has slowed overall, except for consumer credit
In the first half of 2013, domestic lending in some economies in the region, such as Brazil and Chile, and to 
a lesser extent Colombia and Peru, has slowed sharply in comparison with 2012 (see figure I.20). A similar 
situation occurred in the rest of South America, where domestic lending cooled except in Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Plurinational State of Bolivia. By contrast, domestic lending picked up in Nicaragua and 
Panama in the first few months of 2013. The most recent data available for the Caribbean indicate that domestic 
lending has recovered except in Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Kitts and Nevis, where it has been contracting 
since mid-2011, and in Bahamas, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, where it expanded more slowly and then 
contracted in the first quarter of 2013.
Figure I.20 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): annualized growth 









































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The pattern of domestic lending described above also resulted in a slowdown in lending for financing commercial, 
industrial and mortgage activities (see figure I.21). This is attributable to slower growth in domestic aggregate demand 
in the region, especially in demand related to capital accumulation. An exception to this regional trend can be seen 
in the economies of the English-speaking Caribbean, where lending has picked up and growth is in the double digits.
Figure I.21 
Latin America and the Caribbean: annualized growth in the credit portfolio for financing consumption 



























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
As for consumer lending, there was, on averag\e for the region, no slowdown in the pace of expansion in the 
first quarter of 2013; rather, the levels were very similar to the second half of 2012 (see figure I.21). Much of this 
regional trend was due to the pattern observed in the Central American countries, where growth in consumer lending 
accelerated and exceeded 20% in some countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). Similarly, in 
some economies of the English-speaking Caribbean, such as Guyana and Jamaica, financing for consumption grew 
at rates in excess of 20%. Among the countries of South America, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was the 
POMZDPVOUSZXIFSFDPOTVNFSDSFEJUFYQBOEFEXJUIBOBOOVBMJ[FEHSPXUISBUFPGDMPTFUPBUUIFFOEPGUIF
first quarter of the year. The ratio of non-performing portfolio to total portfolio in the region, which remained stable 
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4. Exchange rates have been under considerable external pressure
The economic and social scenario in many developed economies and the economic authorities’ efforts to improve 
the situation did much to shape the performance of the currencies of the region in 2012 and the first half of 2013. 
Figure I.22 tracks the currencies of those economies of the region that are more integrated in the financial markets 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) as events unfolded in the international financial markets. During the first 
quarter of 2012, the high level of uncertainty as to the resolution of the crisis in Europe (in particular in Greece) and 
investor expectations of contagion in other countries contributed to the depreciation, to a greater or lesser extent, of 
the currencies of the region.
Figure I.22 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru: nominal exchange rate and external 
financial conditions, July 2010-June 2013
(Index, January 2008=100)












































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Following the announcement of the Greek debt swap, favourable growth prospects for the economies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean plus the worrisome situation in Europe improved the relative risk of the economies 
of the region. This, amid abundant international liquidity, spurred the inflow of capital along with currency 
appreciation in Chile, Mexico and Peru during the third quarter of 2012. However, the Colombian peso and, to a 
greater extent, the Brazilian real behaved differently and depreciated somewhat instead of appreciating. Among 
the contributing factors were announcements in both countries of measures to avoid currency appreciation; these 
were, at least temporarily, successful.
Between the announcement of quantitative easing (QE3) measures in September 2012 and the middle of the 
first quarter of 2013, the factors driving the appreciation of the Chilean peso, the Mexican peso and the Peruvian sol 
grew stronger and fuelled an appreciation trend for the Colombian peso and the Brazilian real as well. Recent United 
States Federal Reserve announcements concerning the scale-back of asset purchases point to a gradual decrease in 
liquidity moving forward. And increasing signs of a slowing Chinese economy have dulled the prospects for further 
increases in commodity prices. These factors fed nominal exchange-rate depreciation in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, Uruguay and Mexico during May and June 2013.
Exchange-rate movements in other countries were mainly attributable to internal factors. In Argentina, the nominal 
exchange rate depreciated throughout 2012-2013 against a backdrop of high inflation and rapid growth in monetary 
aggregates, which translated into a wide gap between the official rate of exchange and the parallel exchange rate 
during the entire period. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the exchange rate for currency obtained through 
UIF'PSFJHO&YDIBOHF"ENJOJTUSBUJPO$PNNJTTJPO	$"%*7*
TMJECZJO'FCSVBSZBGUFSIPMEJOHTUFBEZ
throughout 2012, and the Transaction System for Foreign-Currency Denominated Securities (SITME) was removed. 
In Jamaica, the Jamaican dollar depreciated by an average 11.2% during the first six months of the year amid fiscal 
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The currencies of Paraguay and Uruguay followed a pattern (which could be regarded as volatile) similar to 
the one described for those economies that are more fully integrated financially. However, specific factors, such 
as agricultural export trends in Paraguay and the flow of capital from Argentina to Uruguay, also contributed to 
exchange-rate movements in the period under review (see figure I.23).
Figure I.23 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Paraguay and Uruguay: nominal exchange rate 















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The extraregional real effective exchange rate of Latin America and the Caribbean appreciated by an average 
JODPNQBSFEXJUI"QQSFDJBUJPOXBTHSFBUFS JO4PVUI"NFSJDB 	
 UIBO JO UIFSFTUPG UIF
region, driven especially by real effective appreciation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela owing to its high 
inflation and fixed exchange rate. However, the region’s extraregional effective exchange rate depreciated by 0.8% 
between December 2012 and June 2013 owing to nominal depreciation of the currencies of South America and 
Mexico associated with monetary policy announcements in the United States, in a low inflation context in the 
SFHJPO%FQSFDJBUJPOJO4PVUI"NFSJDBXBTEVSJOHUIFTBNFQFSJPE








Tobago and Guatemala. 
5. Overall, international reserves have not fluctuated as widely
During the first four months of 2013, a significant number of countries of the region built up international reserves 
NPSF TMPXMZ UIBO JO MBUF 	TFF GJHVSF *
 &DPOPNJFT TVDIBT#BIBNBT#SB[JM.FYJDP/JDBSBHVB UIF
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago recorded increases in reserves of less than 3%; in Belize, 
$PMPNCJB 1FSV BOE6SVHVBZ JODSFBTFT SBOHFE CFUXFFO  BOE  *O$PTUB 3JDB%PNJOJDBO 3FQVCMJD
Honduras, Panama and Paraguay, reserves grew by more than 16%; Ecuador topped 90%. But reserves shrank in 
some countries —by less than 3% in Chile and El Salvador and more than 9% in Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Jamaica and Suriname.
The movement of reserves in some countries reflected the decision by monetary or exchange-rate authorities to 
intervene in the market to reduce exchange-rate volatility; the central banks of Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
increased the average amounts of intervention (purchases) to curb volatility. While Brazil and Peru continued to 
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Figure I.24 

















































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Variation in relation to December 2011. The figures for 2013 are for January to April.  
6. Some macroprudential policies became more flexible
Increasing uncertainty in the international financial markets, especially in the context of recent announcements 
by United States Federal Reserve authorities, led the relevant authorities in some countries of the region to 
introduce changes in the regulatory frameworks that govern investment by foreign nationals in domestic bonds. 
Brazil announced more flexible measures to stimulate the flow of resources to its economy and eliminated the tax 
on financial transactions by foreign investors. Peru took a number of measures to facilitate long-term financing, 
raising the amount of long-term deposits in national currency subject to reserve requirements according to each 
institution’s degree of foreign-currency exposure. This step was taken in a context in which reserve requirements 
for foreign-currency deposits had been increased (mid-February 2013). 
7. Tax receipts are expected to slow
A slight cooldown in some of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and the prolonged lack of 
growth in others in the fourth quarter of 2012 and early months of 2013 were reflected in limited growth of the 
components of domestic demand, including private consumption. This, plus falling commodity prices, resulted 
in a contraction or a moderate expansion of tax bases, which has had similar consequences for tax receipts in 
several countries of the region.
In some countries, tax revenues increased very little (Colombia, Mexico and Peru) or declined (Brazil, Chile 
and Ecuador) during the first four months of 2013, perhaps linked to the drop in prices for some of their export 
commodities or to slower economic growth (see table I.7). Some countries saw receipts increase thanks to a 
rise in resources captured by State-owned enterprises (Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Uruguay), tax reforms (Dominican Republic and Guatemala) or a broadening of certain tax bases (Argentina 
and Costa Rica).
As a result, the simple average of the real rates of growth of public revenue for 13 countries over the same 
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Table I.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean (15 countries): cumulative real January to April year-on-year variation 




(cumulative January to April) 
2012
(cumulative January to April) 
2013
(cumulative January to April)  





Argentina b NNFPS 21.0 19.4 21.4 24.8 13.0 12.6 c
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) NFPS 7.5 -6.5 11.9 2.3 20.1 17.0
Brazil d CG 11.0 9.6 6.3 6.6 -2.3 1.4 c
Chile TCG 17.1 -4.9 12.8 10.7 -2.2 6.9
Colombia CNG 14.3 -9.8 20.8 8.2 3.8 26.9
Costa Rica CG -2.3 3.6 7.4 3.7 5.8 7.7
Dominican Republic CG 0.6 -8.4 7.5 40.2 13.8 -20.5 c
Ecuador NFPS 19.3 23.0 15.6 8.6 -4.7 3.6 e
Guatemala CA 10.8 9.4 0.0 -11.6 6.5 15.6
Mexico FG 2.5 8.1 5.3 10.3 2.1 -8.2
Paraguay CG 12.7 8.4 7.3 26.3 … …
Peru CG 13.5 -2.3 4.3 -1.7 1.3 13.2
Trinidad and Tobago CG -0.7 -5.5 -6.0 2.0 14.4 26.4 c
Uruguay NFPS -3.9 1.9 2.8 11.9 18.0 11.2
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) f CG 2.1 5.5 4.6 24.2 … …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a The coverage is as follows: CA: Central administration; CG: Central government; TCG: total central government; FG: Federal government; CNG: Central national 
government; NFPS: Non-financial public sector; NNFPS: National non-financial public sector.
b Revenues include representational contributions. Expenditures include representational expenditures.
c Income and expenditure data for 2013 cover up to March. 
d Includes the federal government and the central bank. The expenditure includes transfers to subnational states and municipalities.
e Income and expenditure for 2013 data cover up to February.
f Refers to quarterly figures and does not include non-recurrent income and expenditure. 
Figure I.25 
Latin America and the Caribbean (simple average for 14 countries): year-on-year real variation 































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  The figures for 2013 are provisional.
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During the same period, the central government of Chile also registered a real 12-month decrease in revenues 
(2.2%), owing to falling copper prices and higher copper production costs that reduced the income tax take from 
the major private mining companies as well as the contribution from Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile 
(CODELCO), the state-owned copper mining and production company.
Brazil announced a number of fiscal measures for promoting economic growth, such as lowering the federal 
tax on automobiles, household appliances and construction materials, along with other exemptions, which could 
total as much as 5% of the tax take in 2014. These measures and the economic slowdown in the last few quarters 
have driven revenue down, especially from taxes linked to production sectors.
Among the countries to see a modest increase in public revenues was Peru. After quarterly year-on-year real 
growth in excess of 10% over the past few years, the trend moderated to an increase of only 1.3% in the first 
four months of 2013. Income tax receipts fell as mineral prices slumped. In Colombia, total revenue increased 
at a steady pace during the first months of the year compared with the same period in 2012. But in the closing 
quarters of 2012 tax revenues declined in real terms in comparison with the previous year (the first decline in 
nine quarters). The 2012 tax reform entered into force on 1 January, which should have a favourable impact on 
receipts and total revenue.
In Mexico the modest increase in total revenue (a cumulative 2.1% from January to April 2013) reflects two 
opposing trends: federal government oil rights fell by more than 16% while non-oil revenue rose by 6.4%. The 
latter includes an increase in income tax receipts, especially the flat-rate business tax (IETU).
Among the countries recording the largest increases in revenue are the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Uruguay, as a result of surpluses generated by public enterprises. In the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, total non-financial public sector revenue, in real terms, jumped 20.1% as oil revenues soared 21.5%. Taxes 
increased 5.0%, slower than the 12%-to-16% year-on-year growth posted over the past few years.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the energy sector accounts for about 60% of the total treasury revenue intake. Thanks 
to a sharp increase in investment and in the output of natural gas and its by-products starting in 2012, receipts 
have recovered substantially following a period of stagnation owing to maintenance work. 
In Uruguay, revenue growth was due mainly to a higher current primary balance at public enterprises 
owing to lower power generation costs. But tax revenue fell in real terms, because higher income tax revenues 
(owing in particular to the favourable personal income tax trend) were nevertheless insufficient to offset fall in 
the excise tax take.
Several countries saw revenue increase as a result of fiscal reforms or a broadening of their tax bases. In the 
Dominican Republic, tax reforms in late 2012 pushed receipts up, owing especially to the VAT hike (from 16% 
to 18%) and the elimination of a number of exemptions, despite a marked decline in private consumption. The 
impact of the tax reform put in place in Guatemala was positive but less striking because of tax administration 
issues at customs offices and the reversal of some of the measures initially approved.
In Argentina, the increase in revenue was due mainly to a year-on-year rise in social security contributions and 
tax revenue, in particular as a result of higher taxes on profits and VAT receipts that offset the substantial decline 
in export duties (triggered by a lower export tax rate on crude oil and the decline in exports). In Costa Rica, as of 
April 2013 revenues were 5.8% higher than for the same period the previous year because of a personal income 
tax hike and good fuel, property and tobacco product tax performance. 
8. Fiscal balances will depend on differentiated public expenditure policies
In some countries, such as Mexico and Ecuador, expenditure is expected to grow at a slower pace as revenue increases 
slightly or declines. Mexico has set a target of returning to a balanced budget this year (according to a definition 
of deficit that does not include State-owned oil company investment as part of expenditure), boosting expenditure 
efficiency and increasing revenue by postponing the planned lowering of the top income tax rate. In Ecuador, 
expenditure grew more slowly than in previous years; the public investment programme was kept, but the amounts 
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In other countries public spending is expected to rise somewhat; in some cases this could lead to higher 
fiscal deficits. In Brazil, the recent Budget Guidelines Law (LDO) authorizes smaller primary surpluses for this 
year; a few priority investment projects and temporary tax exemptions do not figure into the targets. Given the 
uncertainty as to the economic activity trend, the main fiscal policy goal seems to be to play a countercyclical 
role by aligning balance targets with economic performance.
Expenditure has increased in Colombia too, mainly as a result of transfers to disadvantaged groups and the 
marked increase in the cost of capital in the energy sector and for infrastructure in general. In Argentina, the 
growth of expenditures is mainly attributable to the increase in social security benefits (owing to social security 
moratoria and automatic adjustments required by law) and higher wages and current transfers.
The rebound of public spending in Guatemala is attributable to improved investment execution, with the 
CVEHFUQSPWJEJOHGPSZFBSPOZFBSHSPXUIPGJONBJOMZJOSPBETBOETPDJBMJOGSBTUSVDUVSF1VCMJD
investment is also expected to rally in other countries, such as Brazil, Costa Rica, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia.
The direction that public expenditure in the region has taken recently suggests a degree of consensus on the 
part of the authorities to protect or stimulate public investment (see chapter IV of part two of this report, which 
analyses growth) in order to promote demand during temporary contractions and broaden, over the medium 
term, supply and the production capacity of the economy. Yet to be discussed is the kind of tax rules that would 
provide space for this, even when receipts are lower than anticipated.
Countries may be grouped into those that have structural rules or are implementing countercyclical or neutral 
measures (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru) and those whose policies are aimed at fiscal targets 
regardless of the macroeconomic cycle. Even so, national budget data (in some cases, updated in the first few 
months of the year) indicate that in 2013 the region as a whole will post a deficit similar to that of the previous 
year (see figure I.26). This projection could have something of an optimism bias, considering the economic 
slowdown over the past few months.
Figure I.26 






































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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9. Fiscal vulnerability will remain a concern in the Caribbean, primarily in the 
service-exporting countries
As explained below, some Caribbean countries (especially those that export raw materials, such as Belize, Guyana, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) have kept their fiscal deficit and public debt at sustainable levels. But a number 
of service-providing economies (such as Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Jamaica) whose growth rates have 
sagged since the onset of the international financial crisis have, in some cases, seen public revenues drop sharply 
and posted acute fiscal deficits since 2009 (see table I.8).
Table I.8 
The Caribbean (13 countries): overall public balance, 2007-2012a
(Percentages of GDP)
Fiscal year b 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Antigua and Barbuda -5.8 -6.1 -11.0 -1.2 -5.3 -1.4
Bahamas c -1.6 -4.4 -5.1 -2.1 -5.7 -6.2
Barbados -1.4 -4.7 -8.3 -7.8 -5.2 -5.3
Belize 0.2 1.5 -2.9 -1.7 -1.1 -0.5
Dominica -0.9 -2.7 -2.1 -4.9 -8.8 -12.0
Grenada -5.3 -5.0 -4.9 -2.4 -3.2 -3.8
Guyana -4.5 -3.8 -3.7 -2.9 -3.1 -4.7
Jamaica -4.3 -7.6 -11.4 -6.4 -6.5 -5.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis -1.8 -0.2 -1.0 -4.1 2.4 7.2
Saint Lucia -1.9 0.0 -2.1 -0.6 -4.9 -7.2
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -2.5 -0.6 -1.7 -2.9 -2.6 -1.8
Suriname 5.0 1.5 2.1 -2.9 -0.1 -2.6
Trinidad and Tobago 1.4 6.6 -6.1 1.1 -1.3 -1.3
Simple average (13 countries) -1.8 -2.0 -4.5 -3.0 -3.5 -3.4
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  The figures relate to the central government except in the case of Barbados where they relate to the non-financial public sector.
b  The fiscal year varies from country to country. It runs from 1 January to 31 December in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Suriname; from 1 July to 30 June in Bahamas; from 1 April to 31 March in Barbados, Belize and Jamaica; and 
from 1 October to 30 September in Trinidad and Tobago.
c  Preliminary figures.
The English-speaking Caribbean, on average for 13 countries, recorded a deficit of 3.4% of GDP for fiscal 2012. 
While some countries have narrowed their negative balances, indebtedness still exceeds 100% of GDP in Jamaica 
and Saint Kitts and Nevis, whose interest payments equate to 9% of GDP and 6% of GDP, respectively. In view of 
the budgets submitted for fiscal 2013, this scenario is not expected to change much because there are no signs of a 
pickup in domestic demand. With mineral and energy prices trending down, receipts are not expected to improve. 
D. Economic growth, employment and wages
1. Economic growth is slowing in most of the countries
Available indicators for the first few months of 2013 suggest that GDP growth will slow in most of the region’s 
economies, with some posting growth close to or below 3%. As in 2012, rising consumption is expected to be the 
primary driver of aggregate demand and GDP growth during 2013, albeit at a slower pace than in the previous year. 
The contribution of investment will likely decline further and the negative contribution of net exports will widen, 
revealing the growth sustainability challenges faced by most of the economies of the region.
During the first quarter of 2013, regional growth slackened in comparison with the quarterly pace in 2012 and fell 
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Figure I.27 
Latin America: year-on-year change in quarterly GDP, weighted average, January 2008-March 2013
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of expansion than in the second quarter of 2012 (see table I.9). The slowdown has been particularly sharp in the case 







Paraguay was the country in the region that posted the highest rate of growth in the first quarter, as agricultural activity 
rebounded and the construction sector expanded. 
Table I.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): year-on-year quarterly variations in the index 
of economic activity, January 2011-March 2013
(Percentages)
2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Argentina a 9.9 9.1 9.3 7.3 5.2 0.0 0.7 2.1 3.0
Belize a 7.8 0.4 2.4 -1.1 6.1 6.7 4.4 3.7 -0.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 5.6 4.2 5.4 5.5 5.1 4.5 4.6 6.6 6.1
Brazil a 4.2 3.3 2.1 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.9
Chile a 9.8 5.8 3.2 5.0 5.1 5.7 5.8 5.7 4.1
Colombia a 5.7 6.4 7.9 6.6 5.4 4.7 2.8 3.1 2.8
Costa Rica a 2.9 4.3 5.0 5.6 7.7 5.7 3.8 3.4 1.2
Dominican Republic a 4.3 3.6 4.6 5.1 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.9 0.3
Ecuador a 6.8 7.8 8.4 6.8 6.8 5.0 4.1 4.2 …
El Salvador a 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.8 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.4
Guatemala a 4.3 4.5 4.7 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.4 3.1 2.4
Honduras 5.8 5.0 4.5 6.6 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.1 2.0
Jamaica a 1.5 1.9 0.3 1.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -1.3
Mexico a 4.3 2.9 4.4 3.9 4.9 4.5 3.2 3.2 0.8
Nicaragua a 5.3 6.5 4.7 5.3 5.8 2.2 5.6 7.0 3.6
Panama a 9.9 12.2 11.4 10.0 11.4 10.8 10.5 10.0 7.0
Paraguay a 6.9 4.9 3.3 2.6 -2.8 -2.2 2.0 -0.4 14.8
Peru a 8.9 6.9 6.6 5.5 6.0 6.3 6.5 5.9 4.8
Trinidad and Tobago a -2.6 1.8 -1.7 0.4 0.1 -1.6 3.0 -0.4 …
Uruguay a 6.7 5.1 7.7 3.5 4.4 3.7 2.9 4.8 3.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) a 4.8 2.6 4.4 4.9 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.5 0.7
Latin America b 5.3 4.1 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.0 2.7 2.9 1.9
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Quarterly change in GDP. 
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2. Consumption is still the main driver of growth, although it has lost 
some steam
Indices of activity in the commerce sector, which in part reflect consumption trends and soared throughout 2012, 
slowed in the first quarter of 2013. They even contracted in some cases, falling off in Mexico, Panama and the 
Dominican Republic by 1.1%, 0.9% and 1.8%, respectively (see table I.10). Commerce sector activity trends in 
the region reflect the fact that private consumption —which in 2012 accounted for the greater part of regional 
GDP growth— weakened in several countries. However, in Chile and Argentina the sector expanded at a pace 
similar the one posted in 2012.
Table I.10 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): year-on-year quarterly variations 
in indices of commerce sector activity, January 2011-March 2013
(Percentages)
2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Argentina 22.0 17.4 19.0 18.2 12.6 12.2 14.3 10.5 12.6
Belize a 8.9 5.4 6.7 -1.6 2.5 5.3 9.0 11.2 13.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 4.0 3.1 3.5 4.3 3.7 3.7 4.2 4.1 2.6
Brazil 6.8 7.8 6.2 5.9 10.3 7.9 8.6 7.3 3.5
Chile 17.7 11.1 10.6 8.8 9.4 7.2 8.6 9.7 9.1
Colombia 5.8 6.8 6.3 5.3 5.3 4.9 3.3 2.9 2.8
Costa Rica 4.9 5.0 2.8 4.3 5.1 4.3 4.7 4.2 3.6
Dominican Republic  a 4.3 4.2 2.5 6.9 5.7 4.4 3.7 0.8 -1.8
Ecuador a 6.8 7.1 8.2 8.9 5.4 4.7 4.7 2.8 …
El Salvador a 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.1
Guatemala a 3.7 5.4 5.0 1.4 3.0 1.3 1.5 4.6 …
Honduras 6.2 9.2 10.1 10.1 5.0 5.7 6.2 5.2 0.9
Jamaica a 0.8 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.9 1.4 0.9 -0.4 …
Mexico 2.2 3.5 3.5 4.5 5.4 4.5 3.8 1.5 -1.1
Nicaragua 9.9 9.1 3.0 3.6 10.8 7.2 9.6 6.6 …
Panama a 6.0 14.2 19.2 14.7 12.6 9.9 6.9 6.3 -0.9
Paraguay a 7.2 6.5 4.8 5.0 6.7 4.9 7.5 6.3 …
Peru 10.3 8.8 8.6 7.6 7.9 6.4 6.2 6.4 5.0
Trinidad and Tobago a 0.6 -1.8 -1.9 5.0 0.9 -1.9 0.1 1.0 …
Uruguay a 14.1 6.9 10.3 9.0 4.0 3.8 5.3 0.9 0.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) a 5.6 2.5 2.7 2.9 6.1 6.9 7.0 7.3 1.8
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Quarterly change in sector GDP. 
In the first quarter of 2013, construction sector activity indices, which reflect investment trends, had a mixed 
performance. These indicators showed a contraction of 1.3% in Argentina, 1.3% in Brazil, 6.5% in El Salvador, 
7.3% in Honduras, 2.3% in Mexico, 2.9% in the Dominican Republic and 1.2% in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela while recording double-digit growth in Belize (17.9%), Colombia (16.9% ), Panama (26.6%), Paraguay 
(18.1%) and Peru (11.9%) (see table I.11). 
Industrial sector activity, despite a rebound in the fourth quarter of 2012, trended down in the first quarter of 
2013, with sustained monthly declines in the first few months of the year. But some countries (Argentina, Brazil 
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Table I.11 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): year-on-year quarterly variations 
in indices of construction sector activity, January 2011-March 2013
(Percentages)
2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Argentina 9.8 11.2 10.4 4.1 3.5 -4.9 -6.3 -4.5 -1.3
Belize a -16.3 -12.5 7.6 9.7 7.9 17.9 11.8 2.4 17.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 8.1 6.3 7.4 9.4 11.5 9.6 8.6 5.9 6.6
Brazil a 5.5 2.3 3.8 3.1 3.3 1.5 1.2 -0.2 -1.3
Chile a 9.6 5.4 6.0 9.3 8.0 8.2 8.2 7.9 4.5
Colombia a 3.0 8.2 16.8 12.1 -1.5 10.7 -1.1 4.9 16.9
Costa Rica -6.3 -5.8 -3.2 0.1 4.7 6.3 6.3 5.3 5.5
Dominican Republic a 6.6 -7.5 4.6 1.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 2.7 -2.9
Ecuador a 12.9 21.0 26.5 25.1 27.4 17.2 9.2 5.1 …
El Salvador a 4.6 8.0 10.9 12.1 3.7 2.5 1.0 -1.3 -2.0
Guatemala a 1.0 1.9 2.0 2.4 -3.7 -1.8 2.9 3.7 …
Honduras -0.6 -5.0 5.3 14.9 1.2 6.2 8.1 -6.8 -7.3
Jamaica a 0.2 1.7 1.4 0.2 -5.6 -3.4 -3.2 -2.6 …
Mexico a 4.7 3.1 4.5 3.7 5.4 4.9 4.0 -1.0 -2.3
Nicaragua 13.7 -3.9 6.7 9.0 3.3 7.9 -0.6 22.9 …
Panama a 17.4 19.7 24.5 14.8 26.7 29.1 30.3 30.3 26.6
Paraguay a -8.7 -7.9 2.6 21.0 -1.1 -4.2 3.6 3.0 …
Peru 6.0 0.0 2.2 5.4 12.5 16.7 19.3 12.5 11.9
Trinidad and Tobago a -0.5 -6.3 10.6 -1.8 -5.8 -5.7 16.0 -0.8 ….
Uruguay a 7.2 1.5 10.4 6.9 16.9 31.2 14.6 13.2 1.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  a -6.8 -1.8 10.9 12.8 31.4 20.8 11.2 10.0 -1.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Quarterly change in sector GDP. 
Figure I.28 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
Economic activity sector performance was reflected in the behavior of the components of aggregate demand 
(see figure I.29). Private consumption grew by 3% in the first quarter of 2013. This cooldown over the same period 
of the previous year is a result of slower growth in employment, real wages and lending to families. The trend was 
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Figure I.29 
Latin America: quarterly year-on-year change in GDP and the growth contribution 
of the components of aggregate demand, January 2011-March 2013




















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
Gross fixed capital formation rose by 3.3% during the quarter, slightly lower than the 3.7% recorded in 2012 
owing to the construction sector slowdown. The trend in domestic demand was reflected in higher goods and services 
JNQPSUWPMVNFXIJDIXBTGPSUIFSFHJPOBTBXIPMFVQPWFSUIFGJSTURVBSUFSPG(PPETBOETFSWJDFTFYQPSU
volume for the region fell 2.8%. This was the pattern in all of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: 
goods and services export volume slid in seven of the nine economies for which aggregate quarterly national account 
information is available, with the drop ranging from 0.3% in Mexico to 11.1% in Peru. 
Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to see the same rate of growth in 2013 as in 2012, around 3% 
EFTQJUFFBSMJFSFTUJNBUFTJOUIFBSFBPG4BHHJOHFYUFSOBMEFNBOEBOETVQQMZTJEFGBDUPSTJODFSUBJODPVOUSJFT
impacted goods and services exports of several of the economies of the region. Domestic demand is expected to lose 
momentum compared with previous years as employment and real wages post weaker growth, the unemployment 
rate does not improve as much and lending to the private sector cools. The outcome for the region as a whole is due 
in part to the slackening economic recovery in Brazil and low growth in Mexico. In addition, economic activity is 
slowing in a number of countries that had been growing at high rates (Chile, Panama and Peru). The exception to this 
trend is the Paraguay, where the economy is expected to recover nicely in comparison with the figures for 2012, on 
the back of surging agricultural output. 
3. The employment rate does not change significantly
The labour picture during the first few months of the year and the outlook for economic growth in 2013 as a whole 
suggest that the employment rate will not change significantly over 2012 even though the pace of economic growth 
XJMMCFTJNJMBSUPMBTUZFBSTXIFOUIFFNQMPZNFOUSBUFSPTFCZQFSDFOUBHFQPJOUT5IJTEJWFSHFODFCFUXFFOUIF
two periods could be due to slightly above-trend job creation in 2012, so that the decline in job creation in 2013 
could be interpreted as a correction of that deviation. This could, in particular, be the result of weaker job growth 
JO#SB[JMJOXIJDITUBOETJODPOUSBTUUPUIFQSFWJPVTZFBSTQFSDFOUBHFQPJOUSJTFJOUIFFNQMPZNFOUSBUF
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Figure I.30 
Latin America and the Caribbean (10 countries): year-on-year variation 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.  
Job creation dropped off sharply in Latin America and the Caribbean in the first quarter of 2013, maintaining 
(and to some extent deepening) the trend that ran throughout 2012. The year-on-year increase in the employment rate 
GPSUIFDPVOUSJFTBTBXIPMFGFMMGSPNQFSDFOUBHFQPJOUTJOUIFGJSTURVBSUFSPGUPQFSDFOUBHFQPJOUT
in the closing quarter of the year and 0.1 percentage points in the first quarter of 2013. Several countries (Argentina, 
Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay) even posted a year-on-year decline in the employment rate. The partial data for the 
second quarter point to a deepening trend and a slight year-on-year decline in the employment rate. 
Like the employment rate, the overall labour-force participation rate (which reflects the labour supply) slowed 
in the first quarter. While in these 10 countries as a whole the global participation rate increased by an average of 
some 0.2 percentage points in 2012, it flattened in the first quarter of 2013. This labour supply slowdown pushed the 
unemployment rate down again, to 6.7% in the first quarter against 6.9% for the same period of 2012. If the labour 
supply trend has been similar to the previous year’s, the unemployment rate would not have decreased. 
In the first quarter, the slight year-on-year decline in unemployment was once again concentrated among 
women. However, unlike 2012, this is due mainly to a reduction in labour-force participation rather than rising 
demand and employment.
While job creation has slowed, it is still concentrated in wage employment. In five of the seven countries with 
information available for the first quarter or for the period between January and April 2013 (the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) wage employment outpaced employment overall and increased 
its share of total employment. The exceptions were Brazil (where both rates were very similar in the first four-month 
periods of 2012 and 2013) and Argentina, where there was half-percentage-point drop in the ratio of wage workers to 
total workers. The fact that other occupation categories did not grow much overall despite weaker wage employment 
creation suggests that supply pressure in the countries (for which updated employment data are available) is relatively 
limited because of buoyant job creation in previous years. 
4. Formal employment continues to grow, albeit more slowly, and real wages post 
modest gains
The slowdown in job creation is seen in formal wage employment too. With few exceptions, all of the countries with 
available data show year-on-year growth rates that are significantly lower than in the first quarters of 2011 and 2012. 
But these rates continue to be positive in all of the countries, except for Argentina (see figure I.31), where formal private 
employment declined throughout 2012 and inched up in the first quarter of 2013 compared with the last quarter 
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Figure I.31 
Latin America (selected countries): year-on-year variation in formal employment, 
















































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Note:  The data refer to formal employment records, except for Argentina, Panama and Peru, where they come from surveys of private-sector establishments. 




or higher inflation in some cases (see figure I.32). The main exceptions were Chile and Colombia, where real wages 
grew more than in 2012 as inflation eased. 
Figure I.32 
Latin America (9 countries): year-on-year variation in nominal wages, consumer 











Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.  
Sagging job creation and smaller increases in real wages in 2013 will likely curb labour income growth overall 
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E. Risks and challenges
1. Latin America and the Caribbean still face serious risks in an adverse global 
economic climate
The world economy could gradually start to recover but remains vulnerable to a range of factors. Growth in 
2013 is projected to be similar to 2012. The outlook for 2014 is for overall growth of 3.1% as the pace of global 
economic growth rallies, with the exception of China. But there are still risks that could impact growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
One of the factors that could destabilize the economies, especially in the eurozone, is the case brought before 
Germany’s Constitutional Court in June 2013 concerning the authority of the European Central Bank in financial 
matters. If the appeal is won, the German court could impose conditions on German participation in the outright 
monetary transactions programme. This could spark uncertainty, not only in the German markets but also in the other 
eurozone markets and the rest of the world. Moreover, the eurozone continues to show signs of vulnerability in view 
of political uncertainty in Italy and the recent bailout of Cyprus. One of the main consequences of slower growth 
has been high unemployment rates in the eurozone, particularly in Spain and Portugal. With banks not boosting their 
capital levels and continuing to have weak balance sheets, the supply of credit will continue to be tight and will in 
some way act as a drag on consumption and investment. Meanwhile, consumption will remain constrained by fiscal 
adjustments and high levels of unemployment.
Looking ahead, different forecasts point to a drop in commodity prices, although there is still room for them 
to remain at record high levels. Among the factors are the prospects for a protracted easing of the rate of growth 
of the Chinese economy, in addition to a greater shift of spending in China towards consumption and away from 
investment. In the coming years, this could slow China’s demand for raw materials and boost demand for semi- or 
finished products.
The short- and medium-term risk that the United States economy could pose to the world hinges primarily on 
its fiscal and monetary policies. On the one hand, fiscal adjustments continue to be an issue and have held back 
the expansion of consumption in the United States. On the other hand, monetary policy has helped to mitigate the 
contraction of demand and contributed to the expansion of liquidity in the world, although it has been a source of 
instability in the international financial markets and a factor in exchange rate-volatility in the region.
The economic slowdown in the eurozone and China affected trade in several countries of the region, widening 
their current account deficits. But expansionary policies in the developed countries that held interest rates very low 
sent foreign capital flooding into some Latin American countries, enabling them to easily fund their deficits. Countries 
rich in natural resources also benefited from higher raw materials prices starting in 2003. Both factors contributed 
to a significant accumulation of international reserves. If the United States were to wind down its monetary stimulus 
programme or if there were a surge in current account deficits in conjunction with a sudden and substantial decrease 
in global liquidity, the countries of the region would be better prepared to deal with the situation than on previous 
occasions, given the amount of international reserves that many of them now hold. However, this also depends on 
the magnitude of capital outflows and the current account deficit to be funded.
A lingering recession in the eurozone would curb the growth of exports from several countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. As table I.12 shows, the countries less exposed to the economic slowdown in the eurozone 
would be the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, because their share of exports to that market is smaller than the regional 
average of 12.6%.
The countries benefiting the most from the economic recovery in the United States would be the countries of 
Central America, along with Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
As table I.12 shows, faster economic growth in Japan would bring the most trade benefits for Chile and Peru. If the 
cooldown in China continues, the countries with the most exposure would be Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru and the 
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Table I.12 
Latin America and the Caribbean: goods exports by principal destination, 2011
(Percentages)
Latin America and 
the Caribbean United States
European 
Union Japan China Rest of Asia Others
Argentina 40.6 5.1 16.9 1.0 7.4 7.7 21.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 59.9 9.6 8.7 5.9 3.7 4.9 7.3
Brazil 21.7 10.1 20.7 3.7 17.3 8.9 17.6
Chile 18.1 11.1 17.7 11.1 22.8 12.6 6.7
Colombia 17.3 38.1 15.6 0.9 3.5 2.2 22.5
Costa Rica 29.0 36.6 17.9 0.8 1.9 9.0 4.7
Cuba a 19.8 0.0 21.5 0.4 24.9 0.8 32.6
Dominican Republic 24.9 54.5 8.0 0.6 5.4 1.4 5.2
Ecuador 35.7 43.7 12.0 1.6 0.9 1.5 4.6
El Salvador 43.3 46.0 6.0 0.9 0.0 1.7 1.9
Guatemala 40.8 41.4 6.8 2.0 0.3 1.6 7.1
Honduras b 28.2 32.8 27.6 0.2 1.7 4.1 5.4
Mexico 7.5 78.7 5.5 0.6 1.7 2.0 4.0
Nicaragua b 41.2 28.7 12.1 0.0 0.0 5.3 12.7
Panama 66.4 26.3 1.5 2.0 0.3 0.7 2.8
Paraguay c 65.7 2.7 9.1 0.9 0.5 2.9 18.0
Peru 18.1 12.7 18.2 4.8 15.3 6.7 24.3
Uruguay 41.9 3.1 14.9 0.1 6.8 3.6 29.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 12.7 46.7 6.1 0.0 10.5 9.0 14.9
CARICOM 27.7 39.6 13.0 1.2 1.5 8.7 8.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 19.4 38.9 12.6 2.4 8.8 5.9 12.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Estimates using mirror statistics on imports for the countries of the region, as well as EUROSTAT.
b  Does not include maquila exports.
c  Does not include unrecorded trade.
Another way to analyze the countries’ exposure to an uncertain external scenario is by means of the weighted 
average of GDP growth rates of their trading partners as a proxy indicator for a country’s external demand. Growth 
rates are weighted using the export destination mix for 2010.11 This exercise shows that GDP growth in the trading 
partners of the countries of Latin America has been losing momentum (see table I.13), going from 4.7% in 2007 to a 
1.6% contraction in 2009 (the low point during the global financial crisis), climbing to 3.8% in 2011 and dropping 
back to 2.5% in 2013. GDP growth seems to be recovering in the trading partners of the countries of the Caribbean, 
going from 1.5% in 2012 to 1.7% in 2013. 
Table I.13 
Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth in trading partners by export 
destination in 2010, weighted average, 2007-2013 
(Percentages)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Latin America
Argentina 5.1 3.1 -1.0 5.0 3.5 2.5 2.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 5.6 3.7 -1.0 5.4 3.6 2.1 2.6
Brazil 5.6 3.0 -0.8 4.9 4.1 2.8 2.9
Chile 6.3 3.5 0.2 5.7 4.1 3.3 3.3
Colombia 4.0 1.9 -1.8 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.4
Costa Rica 3.8 1.4 -2.2 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.2
Cuba 6.7 3.8 -2.1 2.3 3.8 3.4 1.9
Dominican Republic 3.0 0.5 -1.7 1.4 2.8 2.2 2.6
Ecuador 5.2 3.1 -1.7 3.9 4.1 3.8 2.9
El Salvador 4.6 2.2 -1.8 3.1 3.4 3.1 2.7
Guatemala 4.2 1.9 -2.5 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.5
Honduras 3.5 1.0 -2.6 2.9 2.5 2.0 1.8
Mexico 2.5 0.3 -2.7 2.8 2.2 2.3 1.9
Nicaragua 4.2 1.6 -2.8 2.3 2.8 2.7 1.8
Panama 3.5 0.8 -2.6 3.2 2.6 2.1 1.8
Paraguay 5.8 4.6 -0.7 6.1 4.7 2.8 3.0
Peru 5.1 2.7 -0.7 4.4 3.6 2.8 2.6
Uruguay 5.6 3.5 -1.6 5.1 3.7 2.0 2.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 4.1 1.6 -1.1 3.8 3.1 2.8 2.7
Subtotal 4.7 2.3 -1.6 3.8 3.4 2.7 2.5
The Caribbean
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Antigua and Barbuda 4.0 1.9 -2.2 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.2
Bahamas 2.3 0.0 -2.9 2.5 2.0 2.1 1.8
Barbados 3.3 0.8 -2.8 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8
Belize 2.5 0.1 -3.1 2.5 1.9 2.2 1.8
Dominica 3.6 1.6 -4.4 -0.6 0.8 0.6 1.7
Grenada 3.4 2.5 -3.0 0.8 1.0 0.5 1.5
Guyana 3.0 0.7 -3.0 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.4
Jamaica 2.6 0.3 -3.3 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.5
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia 3.3 0.7 -3.3 1.2 0.6 1.4 1.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3.7 2.2 -3.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.9
Suriname 2.8 0.8 -2.8 2.5 2.1 1.4 1.3
Trinidad and Tobago 3.0 0.7 -2.3 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9
Subtotal 3.1 1.0 -3.0 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
2. The fiscal space for facing the threat of a negative international economic scenario 
has expanded in many countries
As ECLAC has documented, during the 2008 crisis Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole announced an 
expansion of public spending, especially social spending and public investment. The available data show that the timing 
and scope of these announcements were different (see table I.14). In 2009, on average, the spread between primary 
public expenditure and GDP growth rates was very positive (6.5 basis points) but varied widely. In Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay and Peru, the spread was significantly higher than the average. In 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama, this indicator showed 
a spending response that was more procyclical or neutral. 
Table I.14 
Latin America: spread between real growth rates of primary spending and GDP, 2009-2012
(Basis points)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina 18.0 9.1 5.4 3.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 4.2 -12.3 12.9 0.5
Brazil 1.5 3.6 -3.1 4.8
Chile 15.8 -6.3 -3.1 -0.3
Colombia 9.9 -9.2 4.0 2.1
Costa Rica 13.1 14.7 -5.4 1.4
Cuba -3.3 -10.0 -0.1 -15.1
Dominican Republic -17.1 -4.3 -1.7 19.4
Ecuador 0.9 22.1 -2.6 12.0
El Salvador 12.2 2.2 0.7 0.2
Guatemala 4.0 2.2 1.0 -4.1
Haiti 8.5 7.8 -12.8 15.6
Honduras 5.7 -8.3 -9.9 -1.5
Mexico 1.5 -1.1 0.4 -1.6
Nicaragua 0.9 -3.5 -0.4 2.6
Panama 3.8 10.5 0.0 -13.1
Paraguay 33.7 -13.0 6.3 26.2
Peru 8.0 0.0 0.0 -1.3
Uruguay 5.2 1.1 -3.8 4.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2.9 -14.4 13.8 -18.4
Latin America 6.5 -0.5 0.1 1.9
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The international financial crisis that began in 2008 marked a break with the traditional procyclical behaviour of 
fiscal policy in that impacts from the international environment (such as the terms-of-trade decline and the reversal 
of capital flows) were felt heavily in public spending and turned the public sector into a sounding board for external 
fluctuations. Although the countries have withdrawn fiscal stimulus measures in different ways and to different extents, 
the pace of growth in expenditure began to slow in 2010 as the economies of the region recovered. 
In 2013, the potential for a very negative external scenario resulting from financial volatility or a new external 
shock (sparked by the announcement of an eventual withdrawal of monetary stimulus in the United States and the 
economic slowdown in China) that could reverse financial flows and put an end to favourable commodity prices 
again raised the dilemma of fiscal policy direction. 
The still-moderate decline in commodity prices presages very negative effects on public revenues in some countries. 
Three kinds of measures have been implemented to address this situation: (a) counteract by cutting spending (in a 
zero-deficit approach); (b) increase certain domestic tax rates; and (c) accept the resulting deficit (allowing automatic 
stabilizers to operate freely). So far, and considering that these fluctuations are rather modest, the countries have 
responded with a combination of measures that could potentially work against primary balance targets, tax activism 
in several countries and expenditure containment in others. In countries where growth has slackened the most, there 
has been a fourth kind of measure involving announcements of increased public spending in investment and tax 
exemptions aimed at stimulating economic growth. 
The capacity to respond to a negative scenario depends critically on whether the downturn is considered temporary 
or permanent and on the available fiscal space. If the drop in commodity prices is considered permanent, reforms 
must be structural (and aimed at diversifying the production system in order to reduce external dependence on the 
price of a handful of products) and fiscal policy should be geared towards changing sources of tax revenue to regain 
balance in the medium term while fostering structural change that boosts productivity and production diversification, 
as highlighted in Part II of this report. In other words, if the lower prices are permanent there would be little room for 
countercyclical policies such as increasing the deficit and public debt for a limited period. 
There would be much more fiscal space, though, if the slowdown is considered temporary. In this regard, it 
is useful to examine the current fiscal situation taking 2007 (the last year of the previous terms-of-trade boom) as 
the baseline. It is often said that fiscal space has shrunk since then, but as table I.15 shows, the situation varies 
depending on the country.
In South America and Mexico, total revenue rose by an average of one percentage point between 2007 and 2012 
while total expenditure increased by an average of 3.3 percentage points. In Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia there has been a significant increase in both revenue and expenditure. The pattern has 
been different in other countries, with revenue falling (sharply in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Chile and 
less so in Peru and Uruguay) or inching up (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico). In several countries, the jump in expenditure 
in 2009 was followed by periods of withdrawal of fiscal stimulus measures. 
While the overall balance decreased by 2.3 percentage points between 2007 and 2012, public debt decreased 
by 3.4 percentage points. This apparent contradiction is due primarily to a positive spread between the economic 
growth rate and interest rates paid on the public debt (which lightens the debt burden), as well as national-currency 
appreciation during the period (which reduces the local-currency value of external public debt and its ratio to GDP). 
The picture is different in Central America, where total revenue slid 0.8 percentage points and expenditure rose 
by 1 percentage point, with the overall balance deteriorating by 1.9 percentage points. The downturn in revenue 
has been particularly marked in the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Panama; the increase in expenditure was 
steepest Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama. This subregion saw a modest increase in 
public debt as a percentage of GDP.
In the Caribbean revenue fell slightly, by an average 0.2 percentage points, although the situation varied widely 
among the 13 countries (revenue rose in seven countries and fell in the rest). Expenditure was up by 1.4 percentage 
points. As a result, the deficit widened by 1.6 percentage points and the overall balance was equivalent to 3.4% of 
GDP in 2012. In general (except in Belize and Dominica), the debt-to-GDP ratio rose, although debt remains low in 
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Table I.15 
Latin America and the Caribbean: central government fiscal balance, 2007 and 2012
(Percentages of GDP) 
  Total revenue Total expenditure Overall balance Public debt
  2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012
South America and Mexico            
Argentina 18.2 23.3 17.5 25.7 0.6 -2.4 55.7 38.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 32.7 35.1 30.5 33.3 2.3 1.8 37.1 31.3
Brazil 23.2 24.3 25.1 26.3 -1.9 -2.0 58.0 59.3
Chile 25.6 21.9 17.8 21.4 7.8 0.6 3.9 10.2
Colombia 15.0 16.1 17.7 18.4 -2.7 -2.3 32.9 32.1
Ecuador 16.6 23.1 16.8 25.1 -0.1 -2.0 24.7 22.0
Mexico 15.2 15.9 17.1 18.5 -1.9 -2.7 20.9 28.8
Paraguay 15.6 18.8 14.8 21.5 0.9 -2.7 16.5 10.9
Peru 18.2 18.1 16.6 16.9 1.6 1.2 26.2 17.7
Uruguay 21.0 20.5 22.6 22.5 -1.6 -2.0 50.0 39.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 28.6 23.4 25.6 28.3 3.0 -4.8 17.8 15.7
Average (11 countries) 20.9 21.9 20.2 23.4 0.7 -1.6 31.2 27.8
Central America, Haiti and Dominican Republic              
Costa Rica 15.5 14.4 14.9 18.8 0.6 -4.4 27.6 35.3
Dominican Republic 17.7 14.0 17.6 19.3 0.1 -5.4 18.3 33.3
El Salvador 14.8 15.8 15.0 17.5 -0.2 -1.7 34.9 45.7
Guatemala 12.8 11.6 14.3 14.0 -1.4 -2.4 21.3 24.3
Haiti 11.3 13.3 12.9 14.2 -1.6 -1.0 33.6 28.2
Honduras 19.1 17.1 22.2 20.0 -3.1 -2.9 17.4 33.5
Nicaragua 17.8 17.7 17.5 15.9 0.3 1.7 32.4 31.4
Panama 19.2 17.7 18.0 21.2 1.2 -3.5 52.3 38.4
Average (8 countries) 16.0 15.2 16.6 17.6 -0.5 -2.4 29.7 33.8
The Caribbean              
Antigua and Barbuda 21.5 20.4 27.3 21.8 -5.8 -1.4 81.1 89.4
Bahamas 18.2 18.4 19.9 24.7 -1.6 -6.2 36.9 54.5
Barbados 27.2 29.2 28.6 34.5 -1.4 -5.3 51.7 78.7
Belize 30.6 26.6 30.4 27.1 0.2 -0.5 83.6 77.6
Dominica 33.2 27.2 34.1 39.2 -0.9 -12.0 81.2 72.7
Grenada 21.9 22.8 27.2 26.6 -5.3 -3.8 82.9 88.6
Guyana 26.0 24.7 30.5 29.4 -4.5 -4.7 60.0 62.0
Jamaica 29.0 26.1 33.2 31.2 -4.3 -5.1 113.0 133.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 31.4 37.2 33.2 29.9 -1.8 7.2 134.6 129.3
Saint Lucia 23.3 26.2 25.2 33.4 -1.9 -7.2 64.7 71.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 25.2 25.4 27.6 27.3 -2.5 -1.8 55.5 67.0
Suriname 29.4 26.9 24.3 29.5 5.0 -2.6 23.0 30.0
Trinidad and Tobago 28.9 31.8 27.5 33.1 1.4 -1.3 28.8 39.8
Average (13 countries) 26.6 26.4 28.4 29.8 -1.8 -3.4 69.0 76.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
In short, while the public balance has, on average, deteriorated from the high point in 2007 (see figure I.33), in 
many Latin American countries public debt is at lower levels than in previous crises (see figure I.34). Gross debt as a 
percentage of GDP declined between 2007 and 2012 in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay (by 10 points or more in some cases). By contrast, 
public debt has inched up in Chile, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic.12 The same happened in 10 of the 13 countries of the Caribbean, but the starting point was much higher 
(see figures I.34 and I.35).
It would seem that the ability to fund these deficits and debts is more important than their absolute values; this 
is where the largest differences between countries (and compared with 2007) lie. This ability depends, in part, on 
the extent of financial integration of the economies, which has benefitted new countries. In a number of countries 
the rates paid on bond issues have fallen drastically, and some have reached record lows (in others, sovereign bonds 
have been issued for the first time). In view of all of this it can be said that, in a number of economies, the starting 
point is better than in the 2008 crisis and the fiscal space has expanded.
12 Although few countries have information on the net financial asset (debt) position of the public sector, in Brazil it rose from 45% GDP 
in 2007 to 34% of GDP in 2012. Chile went from a negative 9.6% to a positive 0.6%. These and other countries have significant 
financial assets deposited in the central bank in Brazil and sovereign wealth funds in Chile. In Peru, the Fiscal Stabilization Fund has 
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Figure I.33 
































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Figure I.34 






































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Figure I.35 
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Figure I.36 

































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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Growth in Latin America and 
the Caribbean between 1980 
and 2012: stylized facts
Chapter I
A. Between 1980 and 2012: gains —though uneven and insufficient— in economic growth and equality
B. The growing role of external variability as a growth determinant
C. Insufficient and variable capital accumulation and financing
D. Gradual strengthening of the fiscal accounts
E. Lower inflation and flexible exchange-rate regimes





This chapter gives an account of the main stylized facts regarding growth and inequality over the past three 
decades (1980-2012) in Latin America and the Caribbean. Dramatic changes have occurred in policies, 
institutions and economic and social performance over this period. The changing patterns of GDP and 
inequality are examined, contrasting the more favourable performance over the past decade with that of 
the two before, and changes in the way external constraints or variables have shaped growth are analysed. 
Attention is given, as well, to the region’s inadequate capital formation and sources of financing, especially 
public and private domestic saving, again with an emphasis on developments over the past decade. Next, 
progress in reducing inflation and strengthening the fiscal accounts is reviewed, along with the main 
changes in the way the region’s economies engage with the global economy, through trade, remittances, 
finance and investment.
A. Between 1980 and 2012: gains —though uneven and  
 insufficient— in economic growth and equality
The region’s external environment began to change rapidly in the first decade of the 2000s, producing periods of 
sustained growth for a number of countries. Taking a long-term view, however, the growth performance of the Latin 
American and Caribbean region in the past 32 years has not been so encouraging. Table I.1 shows how per capita 
GDP has evolved, with the countries ranked by the average growth in this indicator in the last five-year period 
(2008-2012) compared with the average for the 1980s. The first observation is that the region has performed very 
poorly in these three decades, at least from the perspective of much of the Latin American and Caribbean population, 
since the average annual gain in per capita GDP during these 32 years has been less than 2% for 91.7% of the 
population, and less than 1% for 32.0%. 
The second observation is that for a large number of countries (those shaded in table I.1) —in fact, representing 
76.7% of the region’s population in 2010— economic growth was insufficient to produce convergence with the 
per capita GDP of the developed countries (see table I.2). These countries also show cumulative growth below the 
regional average (54.1%) between the 1980s average and 2008-2012. The countries representing the remaining 
23.3% of the population did manage to narrow the gap with the developed countries, but even the fastest-growing 
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Table I.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean: indicators of per capita GDP growth, 1980-2012a
(Dollars at constant 2005 prices)
Per capita GDP Percentage variation 
between averages for 
1980-1989 and 2008-2012
(percentages)
Coefficient of variation of 











Countries with cumulative annual per capita GDP growth of 1% or less (32.0% of the region’s population at 2010)
Haiti 698 519 467 455 -34.8 2.8
Nicaragua 1 236 933 1 125 1 267 2.4 139.4
Bahamas 20 880 20 651 24 106 22 240 6.5 6.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 5 714 5 559 5 290 6 256 9.5 245.5
Paraguay 1 438 1 555 1 480 1 682 17.0 4.8
Barbados 12 425 12 495 14 205 14 971 20.5 4.9
Jamaica 3 370 4 117 4 154 4 108 21.9 6.6
Guatemala 1 808 1 909 2 148 2 293 26.8 4.9
Suriname 2 802 2 467 2 681 3 559 27.0 7.7
Mexico 6 532 6 863 7 898 8 333 27.6 3.4
Countries with cumulative annual per capita GDP growth of 1% - 2% (59.7% of the region’s population at 2010) 
Cuba 3 793 2 776 3 543 4 930 30.0 4.9
Ecuador 2 653 2 702 2 918 3 483 31.3 3.2
Honduras 1 156 1 200 1 359 1 542 33.4 3.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 890 916 1 018 1 206 35.6 5.0
Brazil 4 047 4 172 4 635 5 539 36.9 2.8
Peru 2 586 2 248 2 751 3 854 49.0 4.0
Colombia 2 550 3 060 3 305 3 995 56.6 1.3
Argentina 3 948 4 230 4 534 6 312 59.9 3.9
Countries with cumulative annual per capita GDP growth of 2% - 3% (3.6% of the region’s population at 2010)
El Salvador 1 799 2 177 2 742 2 976 65.4 5.7
Guyana 1 262 1 485 1 815 2 171 72.1 2.9
Saint Lucia 3 508 5 066 5 506 6 156 75.5 1.8
Costa Rica 3 029 3 619 4 503 5 404 78.4 2.1
Uruguay 3 779 4 647 4 979 6 779 79.4 2.4
Antigua and Barbuda 6 569 10 392 11 753 11 950 81.9 2.0
Belice 2 221 2 959 3 798 4 068 83.1 1.9
Panama 3 520 3 789 4 677 6 856 94.8 1.7
Trinidad and Tobago 7 170 6 364 11 176 14 190 97.9 3.0
Caribbean with cumulative annual per capita GDP growth of over 3% (4.7% of the region’s population at 2010)
Dominican Republic 2 199 2 589 3 573 4 722 114.7 1.3
Dominica 2 816 4 179 5 151 6 366 126.0 0.9
Grenada 2 889 4 047 6 109 6 559 127.1 1.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2 258 3 470 4 828 5 521 144.5 0.8
Chile 3 493 5 458 7 238 8 760 150.8 1.4
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4 257 7 640 10 382 10 817 154.1 1.3
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 3 918 4 432 5 329 6 040 54.1 1.2
Latin America 2 820 3 046 3 509 4 332 53.6 2.3
The Caribbean 5 681 6 474 7 940 8 488 49.4 1.8
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  The shading indicates those countries whose economic growth was insufficient to bring about convergence with the per capita GDP of developed countries.
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Table I.2 
Selected countries: indicators of per capita GDP growth, 1981-2012
(Dollars at constant 2005 prices)
Per capita GDP Percentage variation between averages for 
1980-1989 and 2008-2012
(percentages)
Coefficient of variation 
of annual growth rates, 
1980-2012 
(absolute values) aAverage 1981-1989 Average 2008-2011
United States 28 276 42 159 49.1 1.2
European Union (15 countries) 20 529 30 865 50.3 1.0
Spain 16 500 27 320 65.6 1.0
Portugal 12 917 21 652 67.6 1.4
Republic of Korea 7 354 26 238 256.8 0.6
China 806 6 230 672.9 0.3
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).
a  Calculated as the absolute value of the ratio between the standard deviation of growth rates between 1980 and 2012, and the average of those rates. 
Figure I.1 shows the per capita GDP performances of Latin America and emerging Asia as percentages of United 
States per capita GDP. During much of the period 1980-2010, Latin America’s per capita GDP fell as a percentage of 
that of the United States. And although it began to pick up slightly in 2002, the region’s per capita GDP still represented 
less of the United States figure than it had in the early twentieth century. By contrast, China and the Republic of Korea 
have seen much more rapid convergence in recent decades.
Figure I.1 
Latin America, Republic of Korea and China: per capita GDP compared with 












































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “The First Update of the Maddison 
Project: Re-Estimating Growth Before 1820”, 2013.
The third observation is that there is no common pattern, a priori, in terms of production of export specialization, 
size or geographical location by which to identify types of countries that achieve a better long-term performance. The 
better- and worse- performing economies include the full range of exporters: of natural resources, manufactures, services 
and agricultural goods. None of the larger and more diversified economies is among the fastest-growing, but this does 
not amount to a systematic pattern in itself because many other major differences exist between these economies.
Fourth, the coefficient of variation for GDP growth1 throughout the period 1980-2012 throws up another stylized 
fact: as the coefficient falls (that is, the less variable growth is) the better the long-term performance. This holds even 
for those countries which achieved greater convergence with the developed countries (see table I.2). This would 
seem to suggest that, since structural factors act as key determinants of economic performance, other factors, like 
institutionality and policy style, are involved in explaining differences between countries. 
1 The coefficient of variation for GDP growth is used here as a measure of growth variability. It is estimated by measuring the absolute 
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The fifth observation is that the growth rates of the region’s countries initially became more disparate, then 
converged somewhat in the last decade. The various critical episodes the region has traversed in these three decades 
affected the countries in very different ways. The great disparity between countries in terms of per capita GDP in the 
1980s began to ease only with the onset of the hesitant recovery in the early 1990s. This process was then cut short 
CZUIFWBSJPVTDSJTFTXIJDIIJUUIFSFHJPOGSPNPOBOEEJTQBSJUZCFUXFFODPVOUSJFTTIBSQFOFEBHBJO"GUFS
2000, especially during the commodity price booms which supported higher growth rates for several years running 
in a number of countries, the disparity narrowed significantly (see figure I.2).
Figure I.2  
Latin America: disparity between countries in per capita GDP, in dollars at constant 2005 prices, 1980-2012












































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Calculated as the absolute value of the ratio between the standard deviation of growth rates between 1980 and 2012, and the average of those rates.
Sixth, income inequality —measured by the Gini coefficient— and poverty first rose but then began to improve 
in most of the countries in the last decade. Figure I.3 shows how income concentration evolved in 18 countries 
of the region between 1980 and 2011. Although the information is not uniformly available for the whole period, 
there are certain patterns. Distribution worsened overall in the 1980s and 1990s, when income concentration rose 
in 12 countries, including in the region’s three largest economies. As will be discussed in the next section, this was 
a period of crisis, unstable growth and high inflation and unemployment. Starting in 1998, then more firmly after 
2000, income concentration eased and the Gini coefficient fell in 13 countries between 2000 and 2011. Over this 
period several of the region’s countries enjoyed surges in disposable national income, thanks to terms-of-trade gains 
(as discussed in chapter II), steadily higher rates of growth and employment, and falling inflation. 
The potential of terms-of-trade gains to improve income distribution by generating higher income is illustrated 
by the downtrend in the Gini coefficient in hydrocarbons-exporting countries starting in 2000 (see figure I.3). But, 
as the figure also illustrates, this may not be enough. Colombia and Chile, whose terms of trade rose considerably, 
enjoyed high rates of economic growth and single-digit inflation, but showed no clear improvement in income 
concentration over that period. 
Lastly, trends in income distribution and poverty reduction in 2003-2011 were shaped, albeit with variations 
between countries, by developments in the labour market, transfers to households and institutional changes. In 
particular, quality employment increased, as did average wages, and these two things benefited lower-income 
households more, proportionally, than higher-income households. A breakdown of income by ECLAC shows that in 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, labour income variations 
BDDPVOUFEGPSBUMFBTUPGUPUBMJODPNFWBSJBUJPOQFSBEVMU#VUPGUIFSFEVDUJPOJOJODPNFJOFRVBMJUZJO
$IJMFUIF%PNJOJDBO3FQVCMJD&DVBEPS1BSBHVBZBOE6SVHVBZBOEJO"SHFOUJOBBOE#SB[JMXFSFBUUSJCVUBCMF
to distributive changes in non-labour income (ECLAC, 2011a). Wage trends per employee in this period may have 
reflected the increasing supply of skilled workers and the rising demand for unskilled workers associated with the 
expansion of the non-tradables sector (Gasparini and others, 2011; Lustig and others, 2011). This, together with policies 
of transfers to low-income households and institutional changes such as minimum wage policies and promotion of 
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Figure I.3 


































































































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and O. Altimir, “Indicadores de desigualdad de mediano 
plazo en América Latina”, Santiago, Chile, 2013, unpublished.
Nevertheless, the region continues to be highly unequal, distributively speaking. In Latin America, the richest 10% 
PGUIFQPQVMBUJPODBQUVSFTPGUPUBMJODPNFXIJMFUIFQPPSFTUSFDFJWFTPOMZ	&$-"$
*OFRVBMJUZ
levels are lower in the Caribbean, however (Rosado, 2013). Distributive improvements contributed to one of the 
more important recent achievements in Latin America and the Caribbean: the fall in poverty rates, which occurred 
across the board in the region, although not to the same extent in all the countries. Poverty trends have fluctuated in 
the region over the past few decades, heavily tracking the business cycle. As well as the impact of the business cycle 
on poverty rates, this reflects the varying scopes of policies adopted during those cycles.
The 1980s was the lost decade in the region not only in economic terms, but also as regards poverty. By the end 
PGUIFEFDBEFUIFQPWFSUZSBUFJO-BUJO"NFSJDBIBESJTFOGSPNUPJOPUIFSXPSETBMNPTUPOFJOUXP
Latin Americans was poor. The indigence rate rose from 18.6% to 22.6% in that period (see table I.3). In absolute 
UFSNT UIFQPPSOVNCFSFENJMMJPO JOBOE UIF JOEJHFOUNJMMJPOPSNPSF UIBO JO"NJE
declining well-being, the policy of fiscal restraint adopted in response to the debt crisis worsened the social situation.
Poverty rates receded slightly in the period 1990-2002, thanks to somewhat higher economic growth than in the 
1980s. But growth was unstable and buffeted by severe crises in the region’s larger countries. In 2002-2008, with 
disposable national income rising on the back of a boom on export prices, poverty and indigence levels fell in most 
of the region’s countries. The economic growth in this period boosted employment levels and this, together with a 
slight rise in real labour income, helped to reduce poverty and indigence, aided further by policies of transfers to the 
poorest households. Economic growth was the most important factor in reducing poverty in Argentina, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador (urban areas), Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua, which also 
achieved the largest reductions in poverty and indigence in the period analysed. Distributive improvements played 
their part too, however, accounting for over half of the fall in poverty and indigence in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Panama and the Plurinational State of Bolivia (ECLAC, 2013). Together, these factors led to a drop of almost 
JOQPWFSUZBOEJOJOEJHFODFJO-BUJO"NFSJDB*OCPUIDBTFTUIFSBUFTXFSFMPXFSJOUIBOJO
Much of the reduction in poverty and indigence in this period occurred in urban areas, reversing the rise in urban 
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Table I.3 
Latin America: poverty and indigence, 1980-2012 a
(Percentages of the population under the poverty and indigence lines)
Total poverty Total indigence Urban poverty Rural poverty Urban indigence Rural indigence
1980 40.5 18.6 29.8 59.8 10.6 32.7
1986 43.3 20.7 35.5 59.9 13.5 36.0
1990 48.4 22.6 41.4 65.2 15.3 40.1
1994 45.8 20.9 38.8 64.4 13.7 40.1
1997 43.5 19.0 36.4 63.8 12.2 38.3
1999 43.8 18.6 37.1 64.1 12.0 38.7
2002 43.9 19.3 38.3 62.4 13.4 38.4
2005 39.7 15.4 34.0 59.8 10.3 33.3
2006 36.2 13.3 30.9 55.2 8.5 30.4
2007 34.0 12.5 28.8 53.0 8.0 28.9
2008 33.5 12.9 27.7 55.0 8.1 31.0
2009 32.8 13.0 27.2 54.3 8.3 31.0
2010 31.0 12.1 25.5 52.4 7.6 29.5
2011 29.4 11.5 24.2 49.8 7.2 28.8
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a  Estimate for 18 Latin American countries plus Haiti.
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 hurt economic growth, but thanks to a number of factors (including 
rising real wages, countercyclical policies adopted in several countries and a rapid resumption of growth) 
poverty did not rise in this period, and in the following years resumed its downtrend to reach 28.8% in 2012 
(ECLAC, 2013).
In the English-speaking Caribbean, comparative analysis of poverty levels presents some difficulties, because of 
the lack of standardized information in the subregion. The highest rates, of around 40%, occur in Belize and Grenada, 
with rates of around 30% in Saint Lucia, Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis. Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin 
Islands, Trinidad and Tobago and, especially, Anguilla and the Cayman Islands have poverty rates below the Latin 
American average (Rosado, 2013).
B. The growing role of external variability as a growth determinant
1. The 1980s: debt crisis 
The 1980s, often referred to as the lost decade in terms of the region’s growth, were marked by the outbreak 
of the debt crisis that began in Mexico in 1982. Several of the region’s countries had run up large public and 
private external debts with international banks, especially in the United States, within a short period of time. 
This had been preceded by growing financial account liberalization in the framework of fixed or managed 
exchange-rate regimes, which facilitated overindebtedness by creating implicit guarantees. What was, in 
retrospect, over-exposure of international commercial banks, particularly those of the United States, to Latin 
American debt, led to several of the region’s countries being unable to service their debt when United States 
interest rates rose amid international recession (1979) and the region’s terms of trade deteriorated (Devlin 1989). 
Changing global financial conditions following the interest rate rise in the United States triggered a sharp capital 
flow reversal, and thus the solvency crisis which several countries were already experiencing was compounded 
by an external liquidity crisis. 
The sudden dry-up of voluntary external financing, the conditionalities associated with external debt 
negotiations —reflected in stabilization and structural adjustment processes— and the liabilities arising from 
temporary payment suspensions and renegotiations of external debt led to massive devaluations, with the resulting 
impact on inflation and real income. Around 6% of the region’s GDP per year was transferred outside the region 
for much of the decade. The reduction in imports needed to generate a trade surplus, together with the general 
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consumption, and productivity and much longer-term growth capacity (potential GDP) deteriorated seriously in 
most of the countries. Several of the region’s economies contracted heavily in the early part of the 1980s, leading 
to high unemployment and climbing poverty rates.2
As terms of trade declined and the region became perceived as financially unstable in the 1980s, access to 
external private financing became problematic even for countries which did not have difficulties in servicing their 
external debt, including some Central American countries, Colombia and Paraguay. In Central America net resource 
flows remained positive, thanks to official bilateral or multilateral financial cooperation.3 Other countries, including 
Chile and Colombia, also had access to such flows, and in the latter case this helped to prevent macroeconomic 
performance from turning as negative as in other cases. The English-speaking, services-exporting Caribbean countries 
experienced slow growth owing to the global recession, although they suffered no setbacks as regards terms of 
trade or access to external financing.
The second part of the 1980s was slightly more benign than the critical first part, thanks in part to a relative 
upturn in the United States and other developed regions, which contributed to a slight, albeit hesitant, recovery 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. As a result of these shocks, in the 1980s annual GDP growth averaged just 
1.8% in Latin America, and 1.5% in the Caribbean. 
2. The 1990s: unstable growth amid external financial shocks and  
internal disequilibria
The region regained access to voluntary financing starting with the implementation of the Brady Plan in 1989. This 
aided economic recovery, but also set in motion a new expansionary financial cycle which lasted from 1990 until 
the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997. Between 1993 and 1997 the region also benefited from improving terms of 
trade, and it began to receive increasing investment flows in the form of both portfolio investment and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), both associated with the privatization of State enterprises, external debt securitization and, in some 
countries, the onset of a new cycle of investment in commodity-exporting sectors. 
But the region’s growth from the second half of the 1990s up to 2002 was buffeted by powerful external and 
internal shocks. On the external front, the Asian crisis of 1997 was followed, in 1998, by the Russian moratorium 
and the Turkish crisis. These all affected the region heavily, through the channels of finance (Brazil was badly hit by 
the Russian and Turkish crises) and trade (the Asian crisis affected South America). However, some major shocks 
originated within the region. First, several of the financial crises between 1995 and 2001 (Mexico in 1994-1995, Brazil 
in 1998-1999, and Argentina in 2001-2002) were caused by capital inflows combined with open and inadequately 
regulated financial systems, especially in the larger economies, and with relatively inflexible exchange rates, which 
were used as anchors against inflation but led to overvaluation of the currency in real terms. The effects of these 
inflows were compounded by procyclical monetary and fiscal policies which sharpened the boom and bust phases 
of the cycle (Ffrench-Davis, 2005, pp. 75 and 83; Frenkel and Rapetti 2009). 
Debt levels fell under the Brady Plan, but in most cases not enough to steadily reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Starting in the mid-1990s, the crises mentioned above and the resulting sluggish growth increased the burden of debt 
servicing and pushed up the debt-to-GDP ratio in some countries. 
This was in addition, in the case of Ecuador, to deteriorating prices for its main export products, the climatic 
effects of the El Niño phenomenon, high inflation and a deep domestic political crisis, which led to the first default 
on Brady bonds in 1998. Unlike in the case of other countries which had faced difficulties previously (Mexico, Brazil 
and Argentina, for example), this time neither the International Monetary Fund (IMF) not the United States Treasury 
Department put forward any scheme to avert default. Ecuador’s default was followed in 2001 by that of Argentina, 
which was rooted in earlier crises. All in all, the 1990s brought a small improvement on the previous decade, and 
GDP growth averaged 2.7% in Latin America and 2.3% in the Caribbean.
2 For example, in 1981 Argentina’s GDP shrank 5.4%, and in 1982 Chile’s shrank 13.6%, Guyana’s 10.4%, Uruguay’s 9.4%, and Brazil’s 
4.3%. Then in 1983 GDP contracted by a further 2.8% in Chile, 5.9% in Uruguay, 4.2% in Mexico and 12.6% in Peru. 
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3. 2000 to the present: an improved but still variable external context
Starting in 2003, improving terms of trade in most of the countries of the region ushered in a new stage of higher 
growth and greater stability. Price cycles have lasted longer than previous cycles, on average, thanks mainly to greater 
demand from Asia and supply side constraints, while prices have risen more sharply, on average, as well. In addition, 
prices have risen simultaneously in a larger number of markets. These terms-of-trade gains and growing remittances 
from migrant workers have been reflected in a surge in disposable income in the region, which has boosted saving, 
as will be discussed later.
Looking at GDP growth by countries’ size and export composition,4 the group which grew the most in the period 
from 2003 to 2012, and especially during the boom of 2003-2008, were the exporters of hydrocarbons (6.1%) and of 
minerals and metals (5.6%). These were precisely the categories of goods for which prices rose the most during this period.
Table I.4 
Latin America and the Caribbean: average annual GDP growth of country groupings  
(simple average) classified by economic specialization and size, 1970-2012
(Percentages)
Country groupings 1980-2012 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1996 1997-2002 2003-2008 2009-2012
Exporters of minerals and metals 3.3 3.0 1.1 3.5 2.7 5.6 4.8
Exporters of hydrocarbons 2.8 5.9 0.8 3.4 2.6 6.1 2.7
Exporters of services 3.2 3.0 3.9 3.3 3.0 4.2 3.3
Large, diversified economies 2.7 5.9 1.5 3.1 1.5 4.1 2.6
Exporters of agricultural and agro-industrial products 2.7 5.1 1.3 3.3 2.6 4.9 3.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.9 4.8 2.2 3.1 2.7 4.6 2.9
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Next in the ranking by GDP growth are the exporters of agricultural and agro-industrial products, i.e. the Central 
American countries (not including Panama), the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Paraguay and Haiti). As a group, they grew 
4.9% between 2003 and 2008, driven especially by exports of food-related agricultural products and tropical beverages and 
grains, whose prices rose considerably. In some cases, being net food importers (especially of grains) offset the impact of the 
terms-of-trade gain or even reversed it outright (especially in 2008), but this is not to deny the favourable impact of rising 
export prices. The deterioration was worse in countries with a limited range of agricultural exports, and those with serious 
environmental sustainability problems, such as El Salvador and Haiti, which were among the slowest-growing countries.
Growth in services-exporting economies —mainly the Caribbean islands— was driven largely by shifts in demand 
from the developed countries, which by the end of the first decade of the 2000s were experiencing sharp contractions 
in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
The mixed performance of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which are classified here as large, diversified economies, 
may be attributed in large part to their export structure. The GDP performance of Argentina (with growth of 8.5%, 
the highest in the region between 2003 and 2008) was partly associated with the export of foodstuffs (soybeans) and 
other products that benefited from the currency devaluation of 2002. Brazil, with slightly slower growth (4.2%) in 
that period, also benefited from high prices for its exports of agricultural goods and minerals, while Mexico, which 
exports mostly manufactures, expanded only 3.1%. 
The surge in the region’s output growth between 2003 and mid-2008 was cut short by the outbreak of the 
global financial crisis originating in the financial systems of the developed countries. Growth in Latin America and 
the Caribbean averaged 4.6% per year between 2003-2008, then dropped sharply to -1.9% in 2009, that is, a slide 
of 6 GDP percentage points in a single year. In the two years following, the region recovered significantly, showing 
notable resilience to the crisis and expanding 5.9% in 2010 and 4.3% in 2011. This occurred against a backdrop 
of still-variable external conditions and sluggish growth in the developed economies, while the eurozone slid into 
4 By these criteria, the countries are grouped as follows: those specializing in export of minerals and metals: Chile, Peru and Suriname; 
those specializing in export of hydrocarbons: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Plurinational State of Bolivia, and 
Trinidad and Tobago; those specializing in export of services: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Jamaica, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Lucia; large, diversified economies: Argentina, 
Mexico and Brazil; and economies specializing in the export of agricultural and agro-industrial products: Costa Rica, Dominican 










Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean t3
recession amid failure to find a route out of the crisis. The harsh external conditions also contributed to a slowdown 
in some of the region’s major external markets, such as China, which also began to feel the need for structural 
adjustments in its sources of growth. So Latin America’s growth remained positive, though clearly slowing, between 
2010 and 2012, while in the Caribbean, especially in the services-exporting countries (given the impact of the 
developed countries on their exports, in addition to domestic problems in some of the region’s larger economies) 
GDP contractions were even sharper.
Another driver of economic growth volatility in the region, and one that has become more significant in recent 
decades, is natural disasters. The countries of Central America and the Caribbean have suffered many hurricanes and 
other natural phenomena that have destroyed large chunks of their production capacity, often setting back growth 
and undermining living standards (see box I.1). 
Box I.1 
Natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean
The effects of natural disasters are intensely debated and the 
evidence on them is still mixed and even contradictory. Much 
depends on specific national and local conditions and on how the 
short-, medium- and long-term impacts are classified. However, 
generally speaking, natural disasters are agreed to have a negative 
and basically short-term effect on well-being, but not necessarily 
a direct impact on GDP trends. There is also evidence that 
regions such as Central America and the Caribbean are especially 
vulnerable to natural disasters (Martine and Guzman, 2002). 
On the whole, the short-term impact of natural disasters 
is negative. Medium-term effects are weak or difficult to 
identify, and higher levels of activity can even be expected 
in this period.a These impacts depend on factors that include 
the severity and type of disaster, the specific sector affected,b 
the structure and make-up of the economy, and levels of per 
capita income. In this last instance, evidence indicates that 
developing countries are worse impacted by natural disasters 
than developed countries.
There are also economic side effects. Natural disasters tend 
to reduce fiscal revenues and increase public spending, which has 
a bearing on the public deficit and short-term public debt. They 
also affect infrastructure, cause loss of property and changes 
to ways of living, and disrupt transport and international trade.
Natural disasters affect social conditions, as well, with 
vulnerable populations normally feeling the biggest impact. 
This is because the poor usually depend on a single source of 
income, have a lower level of training, have no assets or savings 
to use as a cushion, and lack credit and insurance, among other 
factors. In addition, children and the elderly are more vulnerable 
to disasters and even to weather events.
The available evidence on the impact of disasters in Latin 
America and the Caribbean remains complex and highly uncertain 
(see the figure below). Nevertheless, an order of magnitude of 
these impacts suggests that the cumulative cost of damages 
and losses caused by natural disasters in the region since 1972 
was approximately US$ 213 billion.c
Latin America and the Caribbean: natural disasters 
and victims, 1970-2010





















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the EM-DAT International Disaster Database.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of F. Caselli and P. Malhotra, “Natural disasters and growth: from 
thought experiment to natural experiment”, Working Paper, Harvard University, 2004; S. Hochrainer, Macroeconomic Risk Management Against Natural 
Disasters: analysis focused on governments in developing countries, December 2006; N. Loayza and others, Natural Disasters And Growth . Going 
Beyond the Averages, Washington, D.C., World Bank, July 2009; G. Martine and J.M. Guzmán, “Population, poverty, and vulnerability: mitigating the 
effects of natural disasters”, 2002 [online].
a  Hochrainer (2006), taking a sample of 225 major disasters over 45 years, concludes that there is a negative effect on GDP, while Caselli and Malhotra (2004) 
find that disasters do not reduce GDP in the short and medium terms.
b  For example, in some regions floods may boost agricultural productivity (Loayza and others, 2009).
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In sum, growth in Latin America and the Caribbean in the past three decades shows the heavy influence of external 
conditions: long periods of limited access to external financial resources, crises in large economies in the region and 
beyond, and negative turns of events in export markets leading to terms-of-trade deterioration, have almost always 
TMPXFEHSPXUIBOEJODFSUBJOJOTUBODFTIBWFMFEPVUQVUUPGBMMPVUSJHIU	TFFGJHVSF*
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significant resilience during the global financial crisis, thanks to its capacity to implement countercyclical policies 
and rapidly regain access to international financial markets, external variability continued to act as a drag on growth.
Figure I.4 



























































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
C. Insufficient and variable capital accumulation and financing
1. Investment still below 1980s levels, as a proportion of GDP
The macroeconomic adjustments made in response to the debt crisis led to a heavy fall in investment (gross fixed 
capital formation), which dropped steadily as a percentage of GDP in the first half of the 1980s and remained below 




Latin America: gross fixed capital formation, 1980-2012










































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ECLAC, “América Latina y el Caribe: series históricas de estadísticas 
económicas 1950-2008”, Cuadernos Estadísticos series, No. 37 (LC/G.2415-P), Santiago, Chile, 2009; and Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin 
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These results contrast with those seen in other emerging economies, as in Asia, which have posted high growth 
rates in recent decades. China and India stand out among the Asian economies for their high rates of investment in 
this period: around 45% and 35% of GDP, respectively. They are followed by the Republic of Korea and Thailand 
with rates of around 25%. Except for the last two years, Latin America’s investment levels are systematically lower. 
Tables I.5 and I.6 and show rates of investment5 for 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries for which information 
is available for the period 1980-2010, including its public and private components.
 Table I.5 
Latin America: gross fixed capital formation, 1980-2012
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of national currency at constant prices)
 
Gross fixed capital formation
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2010
Argentina 19.3 18.4 16.0 20.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 12.1 16.0 16.6 14.8
Brazil 18.5 18.1 15.9 17.3
Chile 17.6 26.4 23.0 24.7
Colombia 16.6 20.0 13.7 21.5
Costa Rica 19.7 20.9 20.9 21.8
Cuba 25.5 14.8 11.8 11.5
Dominican Republic 18.8 19.0 23.1 19.1
Ecuador 18.4 24.9 22.7 27.0
El Salvador 12.5 17.8 19.2 18.1
Guatemala 9.7 10.4 15.6 17.3
Honduras 16.7 21.8 24.9 24.8
Mexico 18.9 17.9 20.0 21.1
Nicaragua 18.4 18.6 25.3 21.7
Panama 18.2 20.9 18.5 20.9
Paraguay 21.9 22.9 16.6 17.9
Peru 20.5 20.6 19.0 22.5
Uruguay 12.7 14.5 13.0 16.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 20.9 17.7 24.4 27.3
Latin America a 17.7 19.0 19.0 20.4
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, various years.
a  Simple average for the countries included.
Table I.6 
Latin America: gross fixed capital formation, public and private, 1980-2012
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of national currency at constant prices)
 
 
Public investment Private investment
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2010 1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2010
Argentina 1.7 1.5 1.2 2.4 17.6 16.9 14.8 17.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 8.0 7.4 5.3 7.4 4.1 8.6 11.4 7.4
Brazil 2.2 2.7 1.7 1.8 16.4 15.4 14.2 15.5
Chile 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 15.2 24.2 20.5 22.4
Colombia 7.6 4.7 3.2 3.7 9.0 15.2 10.5 17.8
Costa Rica 6.1 4.6 2.9 1.9 13.6 16.3 18.0 19.9
Cuba   7.1 6.8 9.1   4.7 5.0 2.4
Dominican Republic 4.1 3.3 2.3 1.5 14.7 15.6 20.7 17.7
Ecuador 5.7 4.2 5.1 7.3 12.6 20.7 17.6 19.7
El Salvador 2.0 3.4 3.0 2.3 10.4 14.4 16.3 15.9
Guatemala 3.5 3.0 3.4 2.6 6.1 7.4 12.2 14.7
Honduras 7.7 7.7 5.1 3.9 9.0 14.1 19.8 20.8
Mexico 7.1 3.7 3.3 4.8 11.8 14.2 16.7 16.4
Nicaragua 10.8 7.2 6.1 4.0 7.6 11.4 19.2 17.7
Panama 5.6 3.7 5.0 5.8 12.6 17.3 13.5 15.1
Paraguay 5.2 3.8 2.7 3.0 16.7 19.2 13.9 13.1
Peru 5.4 4.3 3.7 3.9 15.1 16.3 15.3 18.6
Uruguay 4.6 3.6 3.3 4.0 8.1 10.9 9.8 12.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 11.4 9.6 9.0 15.7 9.5 8.1 15.4 12.0
Latin America a 5.6 4.6 4.0 4.6 11.7 14.3 15.0 15.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and S. Manuelito and L.F. Jiménez, “Rasgos estilizados 
de la relación entre inversión y crecimiento en América Latina y el Caribe 1980-2012”, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished.
a  Simple average for the countries included. 
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Four stylized facts arise from the analysis of tables I.5 and I.6. First, in 8 of 19 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay) total investment (public and private) 
remained below 20% of GDP for long stretches of time. Second, compared with the 1980s, public investment fell 
in relation to GDP in 15 of 19 countries in 1990-1998 and, in some cases, into the period 1999-2002 as well. An 
upturn in investment began to take shape starting in 2003 in some countries (8 of 19).6 However, in 13 of them, 
public investment remained below 1980s levels in GDP terms. Third, by contrast with the performance of public 
investment, in the 1990s private investment rose in most of the countries (14 of 19). Fourth, in 2003-2010 total 
investment figures rose again, although unevenly. 
2. Investment boosted by higher national saving, as conditions became less vulnerable 
in the past decade
By the second half of 2003, several countries were reporting a large rise in gross national disposable income, which 
boosted national saving, public and private alike (see table I.7). In most cases, this was attributable to steeply climbing 
terms of trade on the back of rising international prices for raw materials. 
Table I.7 
Latin America: national saving, 1980-2010
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of current dollars)
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2010
Argentina 17.9 15.8 15.4 24.1
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 15.4 9.8 10.3 21.8
Brazil 20.1 17.2 13.6 17.7
Chile 11.8 22.3 20.7 22.9
Colombia 18.5 20.6 15.4 19.8
Costa Rica 16.1 14.5 13.3 16.8
Cuba 10.9
Dominican Republic 15.7 16.5 18.9 15.0
Ecuador 17.3 22.2 22.1
El Salvador 14.9 14.3 11.6
Guatemala 9.5 11.0 12.9 15.0
Honduras 4.5 18.3 17.2 20.0
Mexico 21.7 19.1 19.4 24.0
Nicaragua 3.6 2.0 10.3 13.1
Panama 24.7 24.7 18.4 20.0
Paraguay 19.8 21.5 18.5 18.5
Peru 21.3 15.5 17.3 21.4
Uruguay 11.7 13.8 11.9 16.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 22.7 23.1 30.6 34.3
América Latina a 15.9 16.5 16.7 19.2
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of S. Manuelito and L.F. Jiménez, “Rasgos estilizados de la relación entre 
inversión y crecimiento en América Latina y el Caribe 1980-2012”, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished.
a  Simple average for the countries included.
Although the data are not available evenly throughout the period,7 table I.8 shows that in both periods 
in which investment rates rose, so did public saving, both in relation to the previous period and compared to 
1980-1989. Public saving rose most in the second period, especially in countries whose public revenues come 
in large proportion from natural resources (Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Peru 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), with the exception of Mexico.8 There are a number of reasons for this 
pattern in public saving. One common factor is a rise in national income from steadily improving terms of trade. 
6 Public investment refers to investment by the general government, i.e. it excludes investment by State enterprises, which is included 
in private investment.
7 A breakdown of variation in national saving into its public and private components reveals certain comparability issues, because some 
countries calculate saving in net terms (i.e. net of capital consumption) and others in gross terms. Comparisons between the two types 
of data are imprecise, but their performance over time nevertheless sheds light on macroeconomic aspects of investment financing. 
Tables I.8 and I.9 show variations in public and private savings as reported by the countries.
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But, as well, during this period governments gradually began to adopt fiscal policies aimed at building up public 
finance sustainability over the entire commodity price cycle, even as these prices were climbing strongly.9 In 
other cases, the rise in public savings had to do with restricted access to external financing, as fallout from the 
balance-of-payments crisis.
Table I.8 
Latin America: public saving, 1980-2010 a 
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of current dollars)
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2010
Countries which report public saving gross
Argentina -0.2 -1.5 2.4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) -3.5 2.6 -1.7 5.8
Brazil 1.7 1.3 0.5
Colombia 2.5 3.6 -1.6 -0.3
Cuba 2.2
Dominican Republic 3.7 3.4 2.1
El Salvador 1.3 0.2 0.0
Guatemala 1.8 2.4 2.7
Nicaragua 2.3 0.3 1.1
Uruguay -0.2 3.3 -2.3 -0.5
Average b -0.4 2.2 0.1 1.6
Countries which report public saving net
Chile 4.4 0.8 5.5
Costa Rica 3.2 2.4 2.6 3.7
Ecuador 0.0 4.9 3.5 7.9
Honduras 1.0 2.6 0.0
México 4.1 1.6 2.0
Panama -2.8 3.0 0.7 1.0
Paraguay 1.2 2.6 1.4 4.4
Peru -1.7 0.6 -0.3 2.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 9.2 1.4 4.9
Average b 0.0 3.6 1.6 3.5
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of S. Manuelito and L.F. Jiménez, “Rasgos estilizados de la relación entre 
inversión y crecimiento en América Latina y el Caribe 1980-2012”, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished.
a  The information is presented as gross saving or net saving (i.e. net of capital consumption), depending on the way the various countries calculate saving. 
b  Simple average for the countries included.
Private saving, too, increased considerably as a percentage of GDP (see table I.9), most intensively during 
the second investment surge. This performance was also related to the rise in national income between 2003 
and 2011 (this is analysed in more detail in chapter II) and occurred in two thirds of the countries included in 
tables I.8 and I.9.10 
Trends in public and private saving help to explain the rise in national saving seen in 1990-1997 and especially 
in 2003-2008, the years in which the investment ratio rose. In several countries, national savings increased at a 
higher rate than investment, which substantially reduced external saving in more than half of the countries examined 
(see table I.10). What is more, comparing 2003-2008 with 1999-2002, in 8 of the 19 countries, public saving rose 
more than private saving11 in GDP terms. These larger rises in public saving were not matched by similar rises in 
public investment, however.12 
9 See box I.1 in part II of Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010-2011 (ECLAC, 2011b), which discusses the 
adoption of fiscal rules in the region starting in 2000. Table III.1 describes the main features of funds aimed at softening the impact 
of public revenue fluctuations associated with primary goods specialization and box III.2 discusses the Trinidad and Tobago Heritage 
and Stabilization Fund (HSF).
10 Note that private saving includes individuals and firms and, given that public saving refers to the general government, the figures for 
private saving in table I.6 include savings by public enterprises not transferred to the general government.
11 Or public saving fell less than private saving.
12 Equivalent data are not available to compare private and public saving but, given the sharp rise in domestic private saving, the demand 
response of private investment may be supposed to have lagged somewhat. To this must be added business expectations or perceptions 
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Table I.9 
Latin America: private saving, 1980-2010 a
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of current dollars)
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2010
Countries which report private saving gross
Argentina 16.8 16.9 21.6
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 18.9 7.2 12.0 16.0
Brasil 11.6 12.3 17.2
Colombia 16.1 17.0 17.0 20.3
Cuba
Dominican Republic 12.7 15.6 12.9
El Salvador 13.6 14.1 11.7
Guatemala 9.2 10.6 11.9
Nicaragua 0.8 10.0 12.0
Uruguay 11.9 10.5 14.1 15.4
Average b 15.6 11.1 13.6 15.5
Countries which report private saving net
Chile 7.3 6.7 5.8
Costa Rica 9.6 6.8 4.9 7.9
Ecuador -3.1 11.6 16.8 14.0
Honduras 17.3 14.7 15.5
Mexico 5.2 8.1 12.9
Panama 20.6 14.7 9.6 10.0
Paraguay 8.2 14.1 13.1 11.4
Peru 17.2 8.4 10.4 12.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 7.2 23.1 24.0
Average b 10.5 10.3 11.9 12.6
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “Rasgos estilizados de la relación entre 
inversión y crecimiento en América Latina y el Caribe 1980-2012”, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished.
a  The information is presented as gross saving or net saving (i.e. net of capital consumption), depending on the way the various countries calculate saving. 
b  Simple average for the countries included.
Table I.10 
Latin America: external saving, 1980-2010
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of current dollars)
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2010
Argentina 2.1 2.7 0.1 -2.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) -1.4 6.9 6.6 -7.0
Brazil 2.1 1.8 3.6 0.3
Chile 7.1 3.2 0.9 -1.6
Colombia 1.3 1.1 0.2 1.8
Costa Rica 9.5 5.5 5.9 6.1
Cuba 1.0
Dominican Republic 5.6 1.8 3.2 3.0
Ecuador 4.4 -0.8 2.1
El Salvador 2.2 2.3 3.9
Guatemala 3.8 3.4 5.9 4.8
Honduras 6.8 5.6 5.7 6.7
Mexico 0.5 3.8 2.8 0.7
Nicaragua 17.0 23.2 20.6 16.0
Panama -6.7 -0.1 2.5 1.2
Paraguay 5.0 2.8 0.9 0.0
Peru 3.6 5.9 2.3 0.1
Uruguay 2.1 1.3 1.7 2.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -2.0 -3.3 -5.8 -9.9
Latin America a 3.5 4.0 3.3 1.5
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of S. Manuelito and L.F. Jiménez, “Rasgos estilizados de la relación entre 
inversión y crecimiento en América Latina y el Caribe 1980-2012”, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished.
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It may be concluded, then, that as well as exogenous factors boosting gross disposable national income in 
the most recent period (higher commodity export prices, increasing migrant remittances, smaller debt servicing 
burdens), policies geared towards public finance sustainability and sound international reserve management 
also played a role in the lesser recourse to external saving. As a counterpart to this lesser use of external saving, 
external indebtedness decreased as a proportion of GDP, net international reserve accumulated considerably 
and public savings build up in sovereign funds.13
What most set the period 2003-2010 apart from 1990-1998 was, therefore, the larger proportion of national 
saving in financing regional investment in the more recent of the two periods. This represented a shift towards 
more sustainable growth and a lessening of vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the external financial markets. 
When the crisis of 2008-2009 broke out, several of the countries were able to adopt countercyclical policy 
stances thanks to their more limited use of external saving and greater national saving in the preceding years, 
and the region as a whole was thus much better placed to weather the crisis, and with fewer losses in terms of 
growth, than on previous occasions.
In the case of the Caribbean, the analysis is somewhat limited by the availability of data, and comparison with 
the Latin America countries is difficult.14 Nevertheless, some patterns can be discerned. As shown in table I.11, 
investment rates in the Caribbean subregion were fairly stable throughout the period examined, which is likely 
related to the large amounts of FDI (in GDP terms) going to sectors exporting services and natural resources (see 
figure I.10). This type of investment is often found to be fairly stable, because it is directed towards long-term 
growth prospects and is not limited by the availability of funding from the financial systems of destination countries. 
Table I.11 
The Caribbean: gross fixed capital formation, 1990-2011
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of prices in current dollars)
1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2008 2009-2011
Antigua and Barbuda 22.3 25.3 33.0 35.5
Bahamas 22.4 25.3 25.6 26.0
Barbados 12.7 17.5 19.0 14.7
Belize 23.1 26.2 20.9
Dominica 22.1 17.5 18.9 21.3
Grenada 31.1 32.4 36.0 22.0
Guyana 29.4 24.1 23.2 25.3
Jamaica 24.1 24.5 26.5 20.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis 49.2 53.4 45.0 37.7
Saint Lucia 27.1 25.6 29.2 32.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 25.2 24.9 27.6 25.0
Suriname 30.3
Trinidad and Tobago 20.8 21.8 22.7 a
The Caribbean b 26.1 26.5 27.3 26.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Refers to 2003-2006.
b  Simple average for the countries included.
As a counterpart to this situation, both national and external saving are relatively unstable (see table I.12). The 
Caribbean economies are, with few exceptions, highly reliant on external financing and national saving can be 
very low. And with the developed countries, the Caribbean subregion’s main trading partners, still returning low 
rates of growth in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, national saving has plummeted in some cases, 
increasing dependence on external saving and therefore vulnerability.
13 It will also be recalled that during this period Argentina and Brazil prepaid their liabilities to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Chile also prepaid loans owed to multilateral institutions between 2004 and 2006 and, like other countries redeemed some of its 
external bonds. 
14 The figures for the Caribbean in table I.11 and I.12 were prepared on the basis of statistics in current dollars, whereas those for Latin 
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Table I.12 
The Caribbean: national and external saving, 1990-2011
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of prices in current dollars)
National saving (percentages of GDP)
1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2008 2009-2011
Antigua and Barbuda 18.3 18.6 25.3 22.4
Bahamas 17.8 17.4 15.1 14.3
Barbados 13.8 11.8 11.6 6.2
Belize 18.6 9.0 10.3
Dominica 8.5 2.6 10.2 3.0
Grenada 16.5 14.6 19.1 -3.5
Guyana 19.8 17.8 12.9 13.2
Jamaica 21.5 18.1 15.0 10.5
Saint Kitts and Nevis 34.1 32.6 36.8 17.9
Saint Lucia 16.9 11.4 19.4 15.8
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 9.2 14.6 15.6 -4.7
Suriname 30.0
Trinidad and Tobago 21.3 25.0 44.0 a
The Caribbean  b 18.9 16.1 19.6 9.5
External saving (percentages of GDP)
1990-1998 1999-2002 2003-2008 2009-2011
Antigua and Barbuda 4.0 6.7 7.7 13.1
Bahamas 4.6 7.8 10.5 11.6
Barbados -1.2 5.7 7.3 8.4
Belize 4.5 17.2 10.6
Dominica 13.5 15.0 8.7 18.2
Grenada 14.6 17.8 17.0 25.4
Guyana 9.6 6.3 10.3 12.1
Jamaica 2.6 6.5 11.5 10.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 15.1 20.8 8.2 19.8
Saint Lucia 10.2 14.3 9.8 16.1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 16.0 10.3 12.0 29.7
Suriname 0.3
Trinidad and Tobago -0.5 -3.2 -21.3 a
The Caribbean b 2.8 5.2 -2.3 1.2
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Refers to 2003-2006.
b  Simple average for the countries included.
D. Gradual strengthening of the fiscal accounts
A gradual shift came about in the macroeconomic regimes of many countries in the region after the turn of the century. 
This was sparked by varying degrees of response to harsh recessionary adjustments after the external over-borrowing 
that led to the debt crisis of the 1980s, fluctuations in international capital during the 1990s, successive crises in 
the region’s countries and a very critical view of the conditionalities imposed by multilateral funding agencies on 
crisis-response financing.15 Since 2000, several countries have gradually adopted institutional frameworks and fiscal 
policies with a greater emphasis on balancing the public finances in the medium and long terms, as discussed in more 
detail in chapter IV.16 Some countries were thus able to build up countercyclical fiscal capacities and bring down 
their deficits (see figure I.6) and public debt. These increases in public savings, in turn, boosted public investment, 
thereby helping to sustain growth.
15 The conditionalities imposed on some Asian countries in 1997 as part of their crisis exit strategy provoked sharp criticism and were 
instrumental in prompting an internal review at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Frankel, 2002; Grenville, 2004). 
16 See box I.1 in the second part of Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2010-2011 (ECLAC, 2011b), which outlines 
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Figure I.6 





















































Source:  Oxford Latin American Economic History Database (OxLAD), for 1980-1989; for 1990-2012: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
However, this positive overall picture is primarily a reflection of the situation in South America because fiscal 
fragility persists in Central America and especially in the Caribbean, where unfavourable terms of trade and the global 
economic cycle have taken a toll. 
E. Lower inflation and flexible exchange-rate regimes
Countries in the region have adopted very different monetary and exchange-rate policies over the years, in response 
to the internal and external crises that have occurred during each decade; nevertheless, overall, there has been a 
gradual move towards stronger monetary policy. Countries have taken different approaches to achieving that end, as 
discussed in more detail in chapter IV. Thus, from the mid-1990s, and to an even greater extent from the year 2000, 
exchange-rate and monetary policies have shifted noticeably towards a greater emphasis on inflation control, with 
explicit inflation targets or objectives in some cases. This has helped to bring inflation down over the course of the 
three decades under consideration, and especially since the 2000s (see table I.13). Between 1980 and 1999, several 
countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, endured extremely high 
inflation amid economic and political crises. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay 
recorded inflation rates above 30%. In both groups this was due to the heavy exchange-rate adjustments required to 
correct previous imbalances caused by a spending overheat supported, in turn, by borrowing abroad and spurred by 
real currency appreciations under fixed exchange-rate regimes.
In the other countries in the region, inflation held steady at lower levels during those years, in large part because 
they did not experience exchange-rate crises. In the 2000s, bouts of high inflation became less frequent and more 
economies were able to keep inflation in single digits. Along with the reorientation of monetary policy, more countries 
opted for relatively flexible exchange-rate regimes, although in several the monetary authority intervenes frequently, 
as discussed in chapter IV.
In short, the region, and especially Latin America, transitioned from a scenario of high inflation and nominal 
variability in the 1980s, to one of greater stability at the start of this century. At the same time, monetary policy has 
increasingly focused on inflation and several countries have adopted regimes with explicit inflation targets. This is not 
to say that other variables, such as growth and unemployment, are not taken into account in policy decisions. In the 
recent period (2009-2012), monetary authorities have tended to incorporate a larger number of variables, such as the 
two mentioned, in their policies, as they explain in the statements issued to enumerate the criteria underpinning their 
decisions. Furthermore, with the exception of several Caribbean countries, Honduras and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, exchange-rate regimes have been made more flexible, with fewer interventions by the authorities. 
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Table I.13 
Latin America and the Caribbean: annual average inflation, 1980-2011
(Percentages)
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2011
Argentina 565.7 252.9 8.6 9.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1 383.1 10.4 5.0 6.0
Brazil 383.1 847.7 6.9 5.6
Chile 21.4 11.8 3.5 2.2
Colombia 23.5 22.1 6.3 2.7
Costa Rica 27.1 16.9 10.9 5.2
Cuba 2.2 1.3
Dominican Republic 25.3 15.3 13.1 7.2
Ecuador 33.6 39.0 17.8 3.8
El Salvador 18.6 10.2 3.6 2.9
Guatemala 11.5 15.3 7.0 4.8
Haiti 6.7 20.8 15.0 6.8
Honduras 7.4 19.7 8.2 5.6
Mexico 69.0 20.4 5.2 3.6
Nicaragua 1 379.3 1 053.8 8.9 6.8
Panama 3.2 1.1 2.4 4.4
Paraguay 20.5 16.5 8.3 6.4
Peru 761.8 2.6 2.4
Uruguay 59.8 48.9 8.6 7.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 23.1 47.4 21.2 26.8
Latin America a 221.4 170.1 8.3 6.1
Bahamas 5.7 2.8 2.3 1.4
Barbados 7.3 2.9 3.8 6.9
Jamaica 15.6 27.8 10.5 10.0
Saint Lucia 3.6 3.4 3.0 0.8
Suriname 20.0 96.3 20.8 10.9
Trinidad and Tobago 11.9 6.2 6.3 7.3
The Caribbean  a 10.7 23.3 7.2 6.2
Latin America and the Caribbean a 175.1 134.9 8.1 6.1
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Simple average for the countries included.
F. A dramatic change in the region’s international 
 macroeconomic position
The engagement of Latin America and the Caribbean, especially the larger economies, in the world markets has 
evolved considerably from a macroeconomic point of view since the crisis of the 1980s. As the evidence amply 
demonstrates, the larger economies tend to have a more diversified production structure. Consequently, larger 
economies tend to achieve lower scores in relation to one commonly used indicator of trade openness —the sum 
of exports and imports of goods and services as a proportion of GDP— than smaller economies, which rely more 
heavily on international trade to meet their needs for consumer goods, capital and inputs for production.
As shown in table I.14, the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP has risen 
significantly over the last three decades, particularly among the larger economies, which were relatively closed 
in the early 1980s. In all the large and several of the midsize economies, the impact of trade on GDP has at least 
doubled in the last three decades. This may be attributed to the conditionalities attached to the financial support 
packages provided to help countries in the region to exit the crises they suffered between 1980 and 1995, and to 
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Table I.14 
Latin America: degree of trade openness, 1980-2011
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of figures in dollars at constant 2005 prices)
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2011
Argentina 17.3 32.4 42.3 47.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 37.8 52.4 62.4 65.2
Brazil 12.5 18.6 26.3 34.2
Chile 38.9 49.6 67.6 78.4
Colombia 19.1 29.5 35.6 40.9
Costa Rica 53.0 78.9 96.6 95.1
Cuba   29.7 34.6  
Dominican Republic 54.0 66.8 64.4 53.6
Ecuador 44.0 43.6 53.7 56.7
El Salvador 31.2 46.4 70.0 72.2
Guatemala 43.7 59.0 66.6 62.1
Haiti 23.2 25.2 55.2 71.1
Honduras 128.7 121.1 126.5 111.9
Mexico 14.2 31.0 54.7 65.1
Nicaragua 39.3 49.1 71.5 86.7
Panama 175.7 185.4 147.2 150.4
Paraguay 37.2 96.0 94.3 106.8
Peru 22.9 31.9 42.0 48.2
Uruguay 34.9 46.8 57.2 66.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 41.7 53.1 58.6 47.6
Latin America a 45.8 57.3 66.4 71.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Simple average for the countries included.
As shown in table I.15, the countries of the Caribbean score highly for trade openness and, although the share 
of the external sector in the economy seems to fall, since these calculations are based on figures in nominal dollars, 
this may reflect local currency appreciation in recent years rather than a real reduction in the share of exports and 
imports in GDP.
Table I.15 
The Caribbean: degree of trade openness, 1990-2011
(Percentages of GDP, on the basis of figures in dollars at current prices)
1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2011
Antigua and Barbuda 148.0 119.1 105.0
Bahamas 88.5 90.6 95.8
Barbados 86.2 91.8 99.1
Belize 103.8 120.9
Dominica 100.7 89.2 89.9
Grenada 88.9 83.1 70.2
Guatemala 62.9 66.4 63.6
Jamaica 93.5 92.6 82.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis 101.8 87.6 79.4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 107.4 88.8 84.1
Saint Lucia 123.8 109.6 115.2
Suriname 124.9
Trinidad and Tobago 89.2 100.9 a
The Caribbean b 101.3 94.6 88.5
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Refers to 2000-2006.
b  Simple average for the countries included.
In addition to the expansion in imports that came with greater trade openness, there was also a significant change 
in the composition of export values (which are examined in more detail in chapter II) as a result of rising prices for 
major export commodities after 2003. In particular, in the context of limited variations in international prices for 
manufactures, higher export prices and larger export volumes, exports gained greater purchasing power in 2003-2010 
(see figure I.7). This occurred particularly in the South American economies, owing to their greater specialization in 
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Figure I.7 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT database.
Note:  The average for Latin America is the weighted regional average. Each country is weighted by its relative share in regional exports. The average for each of 
the subregions is a simple average.  
Remittance flows account for a large proportion of income in several of the region’s countries, particularly some 
of those with lower per capita GDP (see table I.16). In the early 1980s, only a few countries, mainly in the Caribbean, 
received remittances representing more than 2% of GDP; but thereafter the number of countries in that bracket and 
the amounts remitted shot up. At first, the sharpest rise was seen in the amounts coming to the Caribbean, but over the 
past decade remittances began to decline in relation to GDP in several countries of that subregion. At the same time, in 
Central America and in some South American countries remittances rose significantly, reaching about 10% of GDP in 
some cases in 2011. In the countries that receive larger amounts, remittances have driven up consumption (including 
spending on health and education) and have helped to bring down poverty and extreme poverty.
Table I.16 
Latin America and the Caribbean: remittances received from abroad  
(personal transfers and employee remuneration), 1980-2011a
(Percentages of GDP)
1980 1990 2000 2011
Colombia 0.3 1.2 1.6 1.3
Costa Rica 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.3
Panama 1.7 2.1 0.1 1.4
Peru - 0.3 1.3 1.5
Antigua and Barbuda - 3.2 2.6 1.8
Mexico 0.5 1.2 1.3 2.0
Barbados 1.1 2.2 4.5 2.2
Saint Lucia - 4.1 3.5 2.3
Grenada - 8.1 8.9 3.5
Paraguay 1.1 0.6 3.9 3.7
Ecuador - 0.5 8.3 4.1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - 7.9 5.7 4.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.0 0.1 1.5 4.4
Dominica 14.6 8.4 5.0 4.8
Belize - 4.5 3.2 5.2
Dominican Republic 2.8 4.5 7.7 6.6
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1.7 12.1 6.5 6.8
Guatemala 0.3 1.6 3.1 9.6
Nicaragua - - 6.3 9.8
Guyana - - 3.8 14.5
Jamaica 3.6 5.0 9.9 14.6
El Salvador 1.4 7.6 13.4 15.9 
Haiti … … 15.8 21.1 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the World Bank.
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A third significant change has occurred in the composition of income flows. In particular, the external debt 
burden eased as the economies resumed growth after the crisis in the early 1980s and also as a result of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative. This, in turn, lowered debt servicing in relation to GDP over the long 
term. The subregions did not experience this improvement in equal measure, however, and the Caribbean (except for 
Trinidad and Tobago), still shouldered a significant burden until almost the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (see figure I.8).
Figure I.8 

















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
As FDI and portfolio investment inflows increased, so did the payments of the income earned on those investments. 
The Caribbean subregion (excluding Trinidad and Tobago) was an exception, paying out fewer earnings than the rest 
of the region, despite experiencing a significant rise in FDI inflows.17 The prices for South American exports, which 
have risen substantially since 2003, are associated with higher returns and payments abroad (see figure I.9). 
Figure I.9 













































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
17 These figures refer to accrued earnings, not the amount repatriated abroad, since depending on the circumstances, a substantial 
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As privatization schemes advanced and the region opened up to external markets as part of the deleveraging 
process, foreign investment in the region, both FDI and portfolio investment, expanded considerably. While in absolute 
terms net FDI flows go mainly towards large and midsize countries, their impact on financing as a proportion of GDP 
has been greater in Central America and the Caribbean (see figure I.10). 
Figure I.10 

















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The region’s participation in external financial markets has also undergone significant changes. While both 
inward and outward portfolio investment flows have risen in global markets, in the region that form of investment 
was initially concentrated in a small number of countries, which has expanded more recently. Two types of country 
have experienced significant portfolio investment flows in both directions: those with a fairly developed domestic 
financial market (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and those that have issued sovereign bonds in the 
international markets (Argentina, Jamaica, Uruguay in the first wave and later some Central American countries and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia) (see table I.17).
Improvements in financial regulation and macroeconomic policy in the region helped to propel these changes 
in external financing and improved access to the international capital markets. These changes began in the 1990s 
when FDI replaced commercial banks as the primary source of net capital flows in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and continued during the 2000s, when bond issues (sovereign and corporate) overtook commercial bank loans as 
the second most common source of financing. 
Although the region’s integration into external capital markets has been quite recent (see table I.17), as bonds 
gradually gained ground as a funding source, institutional investors (pension funds and insurance firms) also became 
increasingly important buyers of bonds, substituting the short-term or highly leveraged investors of the recent past. 
Corporate bonds, too, have gained ground, and exceeded sovereign bonds in value in 2011. Meanwhile, the terms 
and issue conditions of sovereign bonds have also improved, as exemplified by the issue of bonds in national currency 
JO3FDFOUMZ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Table I.17 
Latin America and the Caribbean: total portfolio investment, 1980-2012a
(Percentages of GDP)
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2012
Argentina 0.6 5.3 3.4 1.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.9
Brazil 0.1 2.4 1.3 2.0
Chile 0.1 2.9 6.3 8.6
Colombia 0.1 1.3 2.6 2.6
Costa Rica 0.3 0.6 1.6 2.1
Cuba … … …
Dominican Republic 0.0 0.3 1.7 0.4
Ecuador 0.0 0.1 4.3 0.4
El Salvador 0.0 0.6 2.5 3.2
Guatemala 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8
Haiti 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Honduras 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3
Mexico 0.5 3.2 1.3 5.2
Nicaragua 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
Panama 9.8 5.3 6.5 3.0
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Peru 0.0 0.6 2.7 1.4
Uruguay 1.5 0.9 4.3 4.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.7 5.5 2.5 1.1
Latin America b 0.3 1.4 2.0 2.0
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.7
Bahamas 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3
Barbados 0.6 1.5 2.7 0.0
Belize 0.1 1.3 5.5 0.6
Dominica 0.1 2.0 1.2 0.8
Grenada 0.0 0.1 4.4 1.2
Guyana 0.0 0.7 1.9 …
Jamaica 0.0 0.0 12.6 8.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.0 1.3 3.9 2.4
Santa Lucía 0.0 0.2 3.1 2.9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0 0.2 2.6 0.4
Suriname 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0 0.3 1.8 0.1
El Caribe c 0.1 0.6 3.1 1.5
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Defined as the sum of the absolute value of outflows and inflows as a percentage of GDP.
b  Simple average of the countries, excluding Panama.
c  Simple average of the countries included.
Conclusions
The region’s countries have experienced uneven growth in per capita GDP over the past 32 years and, despite higher 
growth rates in the last decade, overall growth rates have been generally low, with only a few countries managing 
to reduce the gap with more developed countries. And even the best performing countries fell far short of the rapid 
growth achieved by the Asian countries. The differences cannot be attributed a priori to specialization, geography or 
size, since both the high-performance and low-growth countries include cases of a very diverse nature. 
The inequality both between and within countries, as well as the incidence of poverty, reflect the ups and downs 
that the region has experienced over the last 32 years. During the lost decade of the 1980s inequality and poverty 
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began to improve, on the back of higher growth, a better labour market and the implementation of social policies. 
Nevertheless, high levels of inequality and poverty persist in several countries. 
A look at growth in each decade has highlighted the impact of external constraints on performance. In the 1980s, 
adjustment programmes were adopted to reduce internal and external imbalances that had become unsustainable 
amid limited access to external resources. Debt reduction efforts were undertaken in the 1990s, starting with the 
Brady Plan, but the shortcomings of this approach and the adoption of macroeconomic strategies that perpetuated 
imbalances, coupled with shocks from outside the region, resulted in low and unstable growth. The third period 
analysed (the 2000s) showed the impact of rising commodity prices, which boosted disposable income and growth 
in several countries in the region. In this period, external growth constraints lost their impact or ceased to apply 
in many countries. This stood the region in good stead when the financial crisis hit at the end of the decade, and 
many countries were able to draw upon countercyclical policy capabilities to restore growth more quickly.
Major changes have been made to macroeconomic regimes in the region over the past three decades, with the 
scope of the changes varying from one country to another. In particular, countries have strengthened monetary and 
fiscal policies (this is discussed in more detail in chapter IV), which has helped to reduce inflation and improve 
the fiscal accounts. Coupled with other factors, such as the policies adopted by third countries, especially the 
United States, these measures helped the region to recover relatively quickly in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. However, not all of the changes introduced have fostered growth.
With regard to investment and saving, gross fixed capital formation languished at below 20% of GDP for long 
periods. This reflected the limited public investment following the adjustment programmes of the 1980s as well 
as weak private investment stimulus amid the instability of the 1990s, although private investment did pick up 
somewhat from the low levels of the 1980s. After 2000, rising national disposable income, in some cases thanks 
to higher export prices, and improved growth expectations fuelled by higher spending in developed countries and 
China’s growth, helped drive up investment and saving. In particular, national saving outpaced investment, thereby 
reducing external saving and significantly mitigating several countries’ vulnerability to external shocks associated 
with the global financial crisis. 
Along with these domestic changes, the external macroeconomic position has shifted significantly. Foreign 
trade and FDI have risen for most of the region’s countries, evidencing greater production exchanges with the rest 
of the world than 30 years ago. Those changes, together with the external deleveraging process, have lowered 
the debt servicing burden and led to higher FDI income payments, although much of FDI income is reinvested. 
Remittances have also become an important source of income for the region, first for the countries of the Caribbean 
and later for Central and South America.
By the end of the three decades under review, portfolio investment flows accounted for a smaller degree 
of financial integration, overall, than trade or FDI. But portfolio flows are substantial for one group of countries 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia 
and Uruguay)18 and thus represent another channel through which external fluctuations can be transmitted to 
the region.
In short, following low growth for the first two decades under review and a more robust performance in 
the third, the region has seen some major shifts in its macroeconomic regime. These changes have not been as 
far-reaching in all countries and in many cases are too recent to judge their long-term effectiveness. However, 
to gauge by the region’s response to the 2008 financial crisis and the aftermath of global instability, it would 
appear that some countries have succeeded in modifying the macroeconomic strategies that led to recurring crises 
in the past. The challenge remains of boosting growth by increasing investment and embedding technological 
progress, supported by higher domestic savings and sustainable use of natural resources, while advancing 
towards greater equality.
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Chapter II
Income and aggregate demand  
over the past three decades
Introduction
A. Over the past decade, gross domestic income growth tripled and the operating surplus share increased
B. The terms of trade contribution to disposable income surged in most of the countries
C. Private consumption has become increasingly important as a determinant factor of growth
D. Greater trade openness coincided with a growing (net) export component of GDP
E. There was a positive correlation between capacity use and investment 
F. There has been a positive correlation between growth and investment





This chapter tracks economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past three decades from the 
perspective of aggregate demand. It starts by describing the path that growth and functional income distribution 
have followed in the region and then explains the impact that changes in the terms of trade have had on 
the growth of gross national disposable income, stressing how they have shaped that economic growth in a 
number of countries over the past decade. It goes on to discuss the growing contributions that consumption 
and net exports are making to GDP expansion in a context of trade openness. The chapter concludes with an 
assessment of investment, highlighting its relationship with installed capacity utilization and, in particular, 
with income growth, noting its substantial accelerator effect in the region.
A. Over the past decade, gross domestic income growth  
 tripled and the operating surplus share increased
Between 1980 and 2012 gross national income in Latin America and the Caribbean, measured in current dollars, 
grew almost six-fold. But the pattern was not uniform throughout the period. Between 1980 and 1990, income 
climbed by 37%; it surged by 60% between 1990 and 2002. As a result, regional gross domestic income barely 
doubled over a 22-year span. In contrast, in the past 10 years income growth has sped up substantially, as seen in 
the slightly more than three-fold increase of this aggregate between 2002 and 2012. 
A look at primary income distribution shows the make-up of income generation within an economy from a 
factor income perspective, that is, how it breaks down between compensation of employees (a proxy variable 
for household income), operating surplus (a proxy variable for enterprise savings), net taxes and mixed income.1 
An analysis of the data in table II.1 yields some stylized facts. First, between 1980 and 2010 operating surplus 
as a percentage of GDP increased in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. For the region as a whole, 
the operating surplus increased from an annual average of 43% during the 1980s to an annual average of 47% in 
1990-2002 and an annual average of 51% in 2003-2010. 
Second, the increase in operating surplus as a percentage of GDP is more widespread in the most recent period. 
In some countries that are essentially specialized in the production of mining or agricultural commodities (Chile, Peru 
and Uruguay), the operating surplus as a percentage of GDP, in annual average terms, rose between 4 percentage 
points and 6 percentage points in 2002-2010 compared with 1990-2002. However, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama 
also saw a significant increase in the operating surplus share of GDP between 1990-2002 and 2003-2010. In the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, while the average annual operating surplus 
as a percentage of GDP remained at similar levels in both periods, it is high, at around 54% and 53%, respectively.
1 For the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the available information covers a limited number of years and countries and 
varies over time; accordingly, the statistics that are available are not homogeneous. Statistics available for the countries of the region 
for 1980-2010 were compiled, seeking country comparability to the extent possible. These figures were used to track compensation 
of employees, operating surplus and net taxes, all as a percentage of GDP, for three periods: 1980-1989, 1990-2002 and 2003-2010. 
For each period, the average annual share of each of the components was calculated, as was the regional average, based on the simple 
average of figures for individual countries. The period under review was divided into three subperiods as a means to identify the changes 
which occurred. This subdivision took into account the available information in terms of number of countries and years, as well as the 
fact that 1990 and 2003 saw significant changes. While 1990 marked the end of the lost decade and the launch, in many countries of 
the region, of sweeping economic reforms, 2003 brought the beginning of the rise in international prices of raw materials that fuelled 
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Table II.1 
Latin America: components of gross domestic income, 1980-2010a
(Percentage of GDP in local currency at current prices)
Compensation of employees Operating surplus Taxes net of subsidies
1980-1989 1990-2002 2003-2010 1980-1989 1990-2002 2003-2010 1980-1989 1990-2002 2003-2010
Argentina ... 35.5 32.0 ... 52.8 52.3 ... 11.7 15.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 35.5 34.8 28.9 55.8 53.1 53.2 8.7 12.1 18.1
Brazil 36.6 42.0 40.9 53.9 44.3 43.7 10.2 13.7 15.3
Chile 35.9 37.6 37.4 40.0 38.3 43.8 13.5 13.3 11.1
Colombia 40.8 37.9 32.5 49.3 54.6 57.1 10.0 9.9 10.4
Costa Rica 45.7 46.0 47.8 37.9 42.2 40.1 13.1 11.7 12.1
Ecuador 23.6 ... 32.5 52.9 ... 49.8 10.2 ... 7.9
Guatemala ... 32.9 31.3 ... 58.7 60.9 ... 8.4 7.6
Honduras 48.6 43.9 45.3 34.0 36.9 43.4 10.7 12.8 10.0
Jamaicab 32.6 34.7 ... 27.1 26.3 ... ... ... ...
Mexico 30.8 31.6 29.1 49.8 49.9 52.1 8.3 8.7 9.6
Nicaragua … 32.7 35.9 ... 58.9 53.9 ... 10.1 10.7
Panama 50.5 43.1 32.9 33.6 41.1 52.3 8.9 8.5 8.1
Paraguay 31.5 33.7 32.8 52.5 56.2 52.8 5.6 8.6 10.3
Peru ... 25.4 22.5 ... 57.8 61.5 ... 10.1 9.1
Suriname 57.0 42.6 ... 21.2 39.5 … 11.1 7.1 ...
Trinidad and Tobago 55.3 46.8 ... 36.3 34.7 … -0.2 7.7 ...
Uruguay 35.1 40.0 33.7 48.4 46.3 50.7 14.5 13.7 15.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 38.3 32.7 30.9 49.5 53.7 54.3 4.5 6.9 9.1
Latin America 39.8 37.4 34.2 42.8 47.0 51.4 9.2 10.3 11.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Does not include data for Cuba, the Dominican Republic or El Salvador, since information for these countries is not available for the whole period. 
b  There are no available data on net taxes.
Third, the increase in operating surplus as a percentage of GDP in most of these countries was to the 
detriment of the compensation of employees share, which declined by a similar magnitude between the two 
periods. One exception was Honduras, where the rise in the operating surplus share of GDP was at the expense 
of the net tax share. 
While the operating surplus could be regarded as a proxy variable for private enterprise savings, the increase 
in its GDP share is not all due to a jump in this type of savings because in a number of countries (Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), the public sector is involved 
in the production of raw materials. As a matter of fact, the rise of the operating surplus in 2003-2010 in these 
countries is also linked to the rise of public savings owing to a combination of three factors: systematic primary 
surpluses (underpinned by enhanced tax systems and extraordinary revenue from commodity exports); self-
insurance mechanisms (such as stabilization funds and debt prepayment schemes during booms or periods of 
falling interest rates) and improved management of public assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, burgeoning government resources fed by State-owned enterprise rents and income from soaring 
natural resource export prices and by higher tax receipts associated with faster growth and improvements in tax 
legislation and administration (ECLAC, 2013a) made it possible to implement redistributive fiscal policies aimed 
at offsetting the concentrator effect of the higher operating surplus share of GDP. These fiscal policies (reflected 
above all in transfers and other redistributive costs), together with lower labour income concentration as a 
result of improved labour qualifications that narrowed the income gap attributable to differences in education, 
helped to reduce income concentration overall ((Lustig, López-Calva and Ortiz-Juárez, 2013). This was reflected 
in the decline in income concentration ratios (Gini coefficient) in most of the countries during the past decade 
(ECLAC, 2013b).
In some cases, the increase in government revenues made it possible to reduce the public debt and implement 
countercyclical policies during the economic crisis of 2008-2009. Not only did total public debt decline in 
the span of a few years (between 2003 and 2008), but its composition changed significantly, shifting towards 
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the percentage in local currency. Accordingly, since 2010 domestic debt has accounted for a larger share of 
total public indebtedness than external debt.2
In Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the trend has been different. The operating surplus share of GDP declined 
between 1990-2002 and 2003-2010 while the compensation of employees share rose. In Costa Rica, the latter 
went from an annual average of 46% in 1990-2002 to an annual average of 48% 2003-2010. In Nicaragua, it rose 
from 33% to 36% between the two periods. The operating surplus share of GDP declined by the same magnitude 
in both countries. 
In Brazil, these aggregates tended to hold steady in 1990-2002 and 2003-2010, although there were significant 
changes in comparison with 1980-1989. Between that period and 1990-2002, the compensation of employees’ 
share of GDP expanded from an annual average of 37% to an annual average of 42%, while the operating surplus 
share shrank from an annual average of 54% to an annual average of 44% per cent. The larger decline of the latter 
aggregate was reflected in a similar increase in the net tax share of total income. 
B. The terms of trade contribution to disposable income 
 surged in most of the countries
Analyzing how improving terms of trade contribute to GDP growth poses two challenges. One is conceptual and 
the other is methodological. Conceptually, faster growth associated with improving terms of trade in Latin America 
and the Caribbean since 2003 contrasts with the focus in the past on the negative impact of deteriorating terms 
of trade on long-term growth when the deterioration is prolonged, and, especially, when the terms of trade are 
volatile (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 2003). 
A prolonged improvement in the terms of trade can, however, spur an increase in income and savings. This can 
encourage investment but can have negative impacts too. On the one hand, favourable export price trends entail 
the risk (owing to exchange-rate appreciation) that the additional savings generated by higher disposable income 
will continue to be invested in the sector that generated them, thus reinforcing the existing pattern of specialization 
instead of diversification and industrialization (Palma, 2013). On the other hand, increasing export concentration 
in natural resources makes a country’s terms of trade more volatile and acts as a drag on long-term growth. There 
is evidence that this has happened in Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of the surge in China’s demand 
for raw materials (Fung, Garcia-Herrero and Nigrinis, 2013). Greater specialization in natural resources, then, 
produces contradictory effects.3 One reason why it is hard to reach clear conclusions about the probable impact 
of the so-called Dutch disease on growth could be that the benefits of commodity-based wealth more than offset 
the costs of greater export concentration (World Bank, 2012).
The methodological challenge in assessing the contribution that improving terms of trade makes to growth 
arises from the way in which GDP is calculated: since GDP changes are measured in real terms, price variations 
are not taken into account.4 One way to overcome this challenge is to assess the direct impact of the terms of 
trade on gross national disposable income, which, unlike GDP, takes into account the impact of the gain resulting 
from changes in the terms of trade.
The macroeconomic aggregates of the countries of the region, as measured by ECLAC in current and constant 
prices, include gross national disposable income in dollar terms. While the academic discussion as to whether 
national income should be in gross or net terms continues, ECLAC calculates it in gross terms because most of 
the countries do not estimate consumption of fixed capital. In addition, not all of the countries prepare national 
2 For the region as a whole, public debt fell from an average of 60% of GDP in 2003 to 32% of GDP in 2008. External public debt 
fell to levels close to 16% of GDP. Much of this decrease took place in 2003-2007. Despite the deteriorating primary balance 
from 2008 on, the debt ratio has been rather consistent. This public debt trend has been more characteristic of the countries of 
South America, because most of the countries of Central America and the Caribbean still have high levels of public debt as a 
percentage of GDP.
3 Some studies suggest that lasting terms-of-trade improvements can have a positive impact on growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
But there is also evidence that specialization in commodity production can be a factor in a slow-growth path (Sala-i-Martin, 1997).
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accounts on the basis of institutional sectors, making it necessary to identify transactions with the rest of the 
world on the basis of balance of payments records (Kacef and Manuelito, 2008).




GNDP = Gross national disposable income
GDP = Gross domestic product
ToT  = Terms of trade impact
NFP  = Net factor payments abroad
NCT  = Net current transfers from abroad
The terms of trade impact is determined by multiplying goods and services export value at constant prices by 




ToT = Terms of trade impact 
Qx = Goods and services exports at constant prices
Px = Unit value index of goods and services exports
Pm = Unit value index of goods and services imports
Equation 1 yields a log breakdown of gross national disposable income per capita and identifies four impacts 
(see equation 3): the impact of net transfers from abroad, measured as the ratio of gross national disposable income 
to gross domestic income (     ); the terms of trade impact, measured as the ratio of gross domestic income to 
gross domestic product (     ); the impact of labour productivity, measured as the ratio of gross domestic income 
to total hours worked (     ); and the impact of the labour participation rate, measured as the ratio of number of 
hours worked to total population (     ).
Equation 3: 
This breakdown was used to examine the growth of per capita gross national disposable income over the 
past three decades (see table II.2). The findings for Latin America as a whole show the negative terms of trade 
contribution and the loss of labour productivity during the 1980s as a result of low commodity prices and the 
sharp contraction during the period (a scenario that reversed somewhat in the 1990s). But it was between 2003 
and 2011 that the average annual growth rate of gross national disposable income per capita increased more than 
threefold compared with the prior period, owing both to increased labour productivity and to the significant terms 
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Table II.2 
Latin America (17 countries): drivers of the growth of per capita gross national  



































1981-1989 -2.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -3.1 1981-1989 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.3 -0.1
1990-2002 0.9 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.7 1990-2002 -0.1 0.7 0.4 0.7 1.6
2003-2011 4.3 2.7 0.9 0.0 7.9 2003-2011 1.8 0.1 -0.1 0.7 2.6
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Mexico
1981-1989 -2.4 0.0 -0.6 0.4 -2.7 1981-1989 -2.1 1.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.9
1990-2002 0.8 0.5 -0.5 0.3 1.2 1990-2002 0.4 1.1 0.2 0.1 1.8
2003-2011 1.3 1.0 2.5 0.0 4.8 2003-2011 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.1 1.6
Brazil Nicaragua
1981-1989 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 1981-1989 -4.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 -3.6
1990-2002 -0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 1990-2002 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 2.3
2003-2011 1.2 1.7 0.8 -0.1 3.5 2003-2011 0.6 1.3 -0.1 0.5 2.3
Chile Panama
1981-1989 -0.1 1.7 0.1 -0.2 1.5 1981-1989 -1.2 0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.8
1990-2002 4.1 0.5 -0.7 0.0 3.9 1990-2002 1.1 1.5 0.1 0.2 2.9
2003-2011 2.3 1.2 3.0 -0.7 5.7 2003-2011 4.4 2.2 -1.1 -0.8 4.7
Colombia Paraguay
1981-1989 0.2 1.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.7 1981-1989 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5
1990-2002 0.4 0.6 -0.1 0.1 1.0 1990-2002 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.4
2003-2011 1.4 1.8 1.1 -0.5 3.8 2003-2011 0.3 2.2 1.1 0.1 3.7
Costa Rica Peru
1981-1989 -1.3 1.0 -0.4 0.2 -0.6 1981-1989 -3.5 0.8 0.0 -0.1 -2.9
1990-2002 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 2.5 1990-2002 0.3 1.2 -0.2 0.2 1.5
2003-2011 2.1 1.1 -0.6 0.1 2.7 2003-2011 4.2 1.2 1.5 -0.8 6.1
Dominican Republic Uruguay
1981-1989 1.8 -0.7 -0.2 0.2 1.1 1981-1989 -0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.3 0.2
1990-2002 2.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 3.6 1990-2002 1.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.4 0.7
2003-2011 1.5 2.6 -0.6 -0.1 3.4 2003-2011 3.9 2.2 0.2 -0.8 5.4
Ecuador Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
1981-1989 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -1.1 1981-1989 -3.7 0.7 -1.6 -0.2 -4.8
1990-2002 -0.7 1.2 0.1 0.5 1.2 1990-2002 -0.8 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1
2003-2011 2.0 0.9 1.2 0.1 4.3 2003-2011 1.1 2.1 4.7 -0.1 7.8
Guatemala Latin America
1981-1989 -1.1 -0.5 -0.9 0.0 -2.6 1981-1989 -1.3 0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -1.2
1990-2002 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 2.4 1990-2002 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 1.0
2003-2011 -0.5 1.3 -0.1 0.0 0.7 2003-2011 1.2 1.5 0.9 -0.1 3.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Ratio of gross domestic product to total hours worked.
b Ratio of number of hours worked to total population.
c Ratio of gross domestic income to gross domestic product.
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Figure II.1 
Latin America: change in and contributions to the growth of per capita 













Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The terms of trade impact was more marked in South America, where the average annual growth of gross 
national disposable income increased from a rate of 0.6% in 1990-2002 to a pace that was almost eight times higher 
in 2003-2011. Nearly a third (29%) of this increase can be attributed to the terms of trade impact; the rest is due to 
increases in labour productivity and the labour participation rate (see figure II.2). 
Figure II.2 
South America: change in and contributions to the growth of per capita 















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.















terms of trade impact was negative. Unlike the previous period (1990-2002), nor was the contribution of net current 
transfers (most of which relate to remittances from emigrants) significant in these countries between 2003 and 2011, 
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Figure II.3 
Central America: change in and contributions to the growth of per capita 












Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Rising gross national disposable income can boost economic growth to the extent that it contributes to an 
increase in aggregate demand. A first approach to the topic suggests that there is a positive correlation between the 
growth of per capita gross national disposable income (arising from increasing terms of trade) and a higher national 
TBWJOHTSBUFUIJTSFMBUJPOTIJQXBTNPSFNBSLFEJO	TFFGJHVSF**
5IFJODSFBTFEMFWFMPGTBWJOHT
made it possible to fund the increase in investment and thus in the stock of capital, with the resulting increase 
in production capacity. The relationship between consumption and gains in per capita gross disposable national 
income associated with changes in the terms of trade is positive only during 2003-2009, and it is influenced by the 
negative-to-positive shift in the public consumption ratio owing to the sharp increase in tax revenues as a result 
of improved terms of trade and expanding economic activity. 
C. Private consumption has become increasingly important  
 as a determinant factor of growth
For the region as a whole and unlike the 1980s (when public and private consumption fell), consumption was the 
component of demand that contributed the most to growth between 1990 and 2012, especially during 2003-2008 
BOE	TFFGJHVSF**
5ISFFNBJOGBDUPSTBSFCFIJOEUIFTVSHFJODPOTVNQUJPO
First, while the contribution of public consumption increased considerably in the 1990s compared with the 
1980s, it did not accelerate until 2002. As tax revenues increased thanks to the jump in income associated with 
booming international prices for commodities exported by the countries of the region and burgeoning economic 
activity, public expenditure in a number of countries rose. Accordingly, the contribution of public consumption to 
growth remained relatively constant, in annual average terms, between 2002 and 2012.
Second, investment behaved procyclically during most of the period under review. In the 1980s, the contribution 
of investment to growth was very negative. It turned positive between 1990 and 2002, when it reached its highest 
level for the period. Although investment surged between 2003 and 2008, its contribution to growth in annual 
average terms fell in comparison with the previous period because consumption was a significant driver of regional 
GDP growth during those years. It continued to ebb in 2009-2012, albeit with significant differences between 
countries, largely as a result of plummeting investment in 2009. Investment patterns between 1980 and 2012 show 
that volatility has tended to be higher during contractions because that is when financial constraints on investment 
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Figure II.4 
Latin America: change in per capita gross national disposable income (GNDI) associated  
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Figure II.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP variation and contribution to the growth  

















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Statistics Division national accounts database [online] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/madt.asp.
Third, since the 1990s the contribution of net exports to growth has been, with some exceptions, persistently 
negative. This attribute of the impact of regional aggregate demand is one of the main differences between growth 
in Latin America and growth in Asia (De la Torre and others, 2013). 
The negative contribution of net exports to GDP growth was more marked in the countries of South America, and, 
in average annual terms, it heightened between 2009 and 2012. The trend in Mexico and the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean differed somewhat in that the contribution of net exports to GDP growth (while negative 
in 2003-2008) was positive in 2009-2012 owing in part to the significant contraction of imports in 2009. 
In short, economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean has been associated primarily with the expansion 
of domestic demand and, to a greater extent, with the expansion of private consumption. The contribution to growth 
made by the other components of aggregate demand (investment, public consumption and net exports) has been 
subject to slower growth and/or greater volatility and has therefore been limited and uneven; this has kept the region 
from pursuing a relatively high, stable and sustained growth path.
D. Greater trade openness coincided with a growing (net)  
 export component of GDP
On the macroeconomic front there is ample empirical literature showing mixed findings on the link between trade and 
growth. These studies usually focus on the correlation between a measure of international integration or trade openness 
and GDP or per capita income growth. In the 1990s, several empirical studies concluded that economies that were 
NPSFPQFOUPUSBEFHSFXGBTUFS	%PMMBS4BDITBOE8BSOFS,SVFHFS&EXBSET
)PXFWFSJOUIF
period following the Washington Consensus new studies criticized those earlier ones for using unsuitable indicators of 
openness (some highly correlated with other variables that affect growth), for underestimating geographical factors and 
for being inconclusive in determining causation (Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000). More recent studies suggest a positive 
relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2001; 
Kim, 2011; Giordano and Li, 2012) if openness is accompanied by complementary policies to stimulate investment and 
UFDIOPMPHJDBMQSPHSFTTBOECZNBDSPFDPOPNJDBOEJOTUJUVUJPOBMTUBCJMJUZ	1BOBHBSJZB6MBTBO

The degree of openness to international trade can be measured from different perspectives. Expressed as the 
export and import share of GDP, the trade openness of Latin America and the Caribbean increased from 23% in 1980 
 In the 1980s the profound adjustment that had to be carried out in the economies of the region was reflected in the fact that net exports 
















and the other countries of South America have lower levels of openness according to this measure, although the 
indicator has increased significantly since 1980 (see figure II.6.A). 
Another way to measure trade openness is through import tariffs. The data in figure II.6.B show that average 
tariffs in Latin America declined significantly over the past decade but remain significantly above the world average. 
Tariffs came down in all of the subregions, especially so in Mexico. However, this indicator does not take account 
of non-tariff barriers, which can also affect the external trade of an economy. 
Figure II.6 





































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank.
Lastly, the relative importance of foreign trade can also be measured in terms of the weight of the export sector 
in the economy, expressed as the export share of GDP. This indicator does not take account of the fact that imported 
inputs make up part of export value, so a better way to gauge the contribution of the export sector is to subtract 
import content from net exports.7 Accordingly, net exports from Latin America (excluding import content) increased 
GSPNPG(%1JOUPPG(%1JO'PSHSPTTFYQPSUTUIFDIBOHFXBTJOBOEJO
(see figure II.7). The difference between gross and net exports is even greater in the countries of Central America, 
where the export sector has always been more import-intensive and was made more so by the maquila industry and 
PUIFSOPOUSBEJUJPOBMJOEVTUSJBMFYQPSUT*OUIJTTVCSFHJPOOFUFYQPSUTBTBQFSDFOUBHFPG(%1XFOUGSPNJO
6 The trend was similar to that of world trade, whose global GDP share more than doubled in the period, from 27% in 1980 to 62% in 2010.
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UIFJNQPSUDPOUFOUPG
exports began to climb in the mid-1990s, with gross exports jumping from 10% of GDP in 1990 to 32% of GDP in 
2010 while net exports rose from 9% of GDP to 23% of GDP during the same period.
Figure II.7 
Latin America (17 countries): GDP share of gross and net exports, 1990-2010




































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE), United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and information provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) of Mexico.
During the period between 1990 and 2010, net exports from Latin America rose at an annual average pace of 
XIJMFOPOFYQPSU(%1JODSFBTFECZBOBOOVBMBWFSBHFPG	TFFUBCMF**
)PXFWFSEVFUPUIFMPXFS
share of export GDP in total GDP, the export sector’s contribution to economic growth was on average one-fifth of the 
non-export GDP contribution. Average annual growth of total GDP was similar during 1990-1999 and 2000-2010, 
whereas net exports rose much more quickly in the first subperiod. However, because of its greater share of the total, 
non-export GDP contributed slightly more to growth during 2000-2010. The pattern is the same in the subregions, 
with net exports rising faster in the first period and being more of a factor in GDP growth in the second. 
Table II.3 
Latin America (17 countries): annual average variation in total GDP, gross 
and net exports and non-export GDP, 1990-2010 a
(Percentages)
Total GDP Gross exports Net exports Non-export GDP
Latin America
1990-1999 3.1 7.9 7.1 2.4
(13.6) (86.4)
2000-2010 3.3 4.9 4.2 3.1
(18.5) (81.5)
1990-2010 3.2 6.3 5.5 2.8
(16.3) (83.7)
South America
1990-1999 3.0 5.8 5.3 2.6
(13.6) (86.4)
2000-2010 3.8 4.4 3.8 3.8
(17.2) (82.8)
1990-2010 3.4 5.1 4.5 3.3
(15.6) (84.4)
Central America
1990-1999 4.6 4.9 5.9 4.2
(23.8) (76.2)
2000-2010 3.8 4.8 5.2 3.3
(27.6) (72.4)
1990-2010 4.1 4.9 5.5 3.7
(25.9) (74.1)
Mexico
1990-1999 3.2 13.3 11.5 2.1
(12.4) (87.6)
2000-2010 2.3 5.8 4.7 1.7
(19.9) (80.1)
1990-2010 2.7 9.2 7.8 1.9
(16.5) (83.5)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE), United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and information provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) of Mexico.
a  The figures in parentheses denote the contributions to total growth of the economy of export GDP (net exports) and non-export GDP, in percentages, based on the 
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Input-output matrices provide a more accurate calculation of the net exports-to-GDP ratio by making it possible 
to pinpoint the imported input content of exported goods and services. Calculations for five countries of the region 
that have input-output matrices showed that the GDP share of gross and net exports, respectively, is 15% and 13% 
in Brazil (2005); 39% and 31% in Chile (2003); 17% and 15% in Colombia (2005); 25% and 16% in Mexico (2003); 
and 30% and 22% in Uruguay (2005).8
E. There was a positive correlation between capacity use 
 and investment 
The relationship between economic growth and investment has been extensively discussed in the literature. From 
a long-term perspective, economic theory suggests that capital accumulation and technical progress, together with 
population growth, labour force qualifications and, according to certain approaches (such as the one taken by ECLAC), 
production structure characteristics play a fundamental role in achieving a certain level of activity. On the other 
hand, the empirical literature confirms that investment is necessary for growth, although it is not the only relevant 
factor. Sala-i-Martin (1997) used sound estimation methods to identify investment as positively correlated to growth. 
Real exchange rate distortions and the spread between the official exchange rate and the informal market rate have 
also been identified as negatively correlated with growth. Recent studies look at the impact of public investment 
and foreign direct investment on growth and assign a positive impact to both (Toulaboe, Terry and Johansen, 2009; 
Cullison, 1993; Bukhari, Ali and Saddaqat, 2007).
Over the long term, investment is essential for growth, mainly because it impacts supply and helps define the 
economic structure. In addition to making it possible to expand production capacity, investment is a good way to 
incorporate technical progress that will subsequently boost capital productivity and, in turn, growth. Investment is 
also a vehicle for structural change, since it reallocates resources towards more dynamic sectors of the economy and 
consolidates production linkages; both factors spark gains in efficiency, productivity and systemic competitiveness 
of the economic structure. Public investment in infrastructure is special in that it complements private investment 
by generating the externalities needed to make private projects profitable. The lack of adequate infrastructure limits 
the growth of private investment and biases it in favour of enclave sectors (that is, sectors that have limited linkages 
to the rest of the economy).
From a short- and medium-term perspective, the level of economic activity and the pace of growth are viewed 
as the outcome of levels of aggregate demand, key relative prices and supply constraints. Investment spurs aggregate 
demand (multiplier effect) and has a lot to do with the level of investment —especially the kind that has a high impact 
on employment. At the same time, growth expectations drive investment (accelerator effect). Owing to the nature of 
long-term investment decisions, profitability and growth expectations are very high-impact factors. For this reason, 
good current performance in a framework of sustainable growth (in other words, economic performance that is not 
subject to marked and prolonged imbalances) helps generate positive expectations that favour present decisions on 
future investments and enhance the growth path. 
In the case of Latin America, there is evidence of a direct correlation between the degree of installed capacity 
utilization and investment growth, taking the gap between actual GDP and estimated potential GDP as a proxy 
variable for idle installed capacity (ECLAC, 2010, p. 68; Ffrench Davis, 2010). For just two countries (Ecuador 
and the (Plurinational State of Bolivia) no significant correlation was found between investment and the output 
gap (see table II.4).9 This suggests justification for aggregate demand management policies aimed at ensuring that 
it helps an economy operate close to the production frontier, thus promoting (private) investment. The differences 
between correlation coefficients (which are higher in Argentina and Mexico and lower in Brazil and Peru) point to the 
existence of other determinants of investment and the need to tailor aggregate demand management to the specific 
circumstances of each country.
8 See ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, various years.
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Table II.4 
Latin America: correlation between output gap and investment growth 
(Correlation coefficients)
Argentina Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Brazil Chile
Correlation coefficient -0.827 -0.151 -0.377 -0.496
P-value 0.000 0.402 0.031 0.003
Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Guatemala
Correlation coefficient -0.692 -0.382 -0.029 -0.521
P-value 0.000 0.028 0.873 0.002
Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama
Correlation coefficient -0.415 -0.725 -0.434 -0.701
P-value 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.000
Peru Paraguay Uruguay Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Correlation coefficient -0.299 -0.695 -0.605 -0.578




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of the LA-KLEMS project [online]. 
However, a number of empirical studies suggest that in the short to medium term the causalities between 
economic growth and investment can be mutual (Blomström, Lipsey and Zehjan, 1993; Peltonen, Sousa and 
Vansteenkiste, 2011; Cheung, Dooley and Sushko, 2012). Increasing investment, then, helps boost economic 
activity by means of a positive impact on demand. In turn, economic growth spurs investment by reducing idle 
capacity and improving expectations of future profitability.
F. There has been a positive correlation between growth 
 and investment
The causal relationship between growth and investment is a subject of discussion in the literature. The findings are 
not conclusive and depend a good deal on the period under review, the subject economy and considerations such as 
the number of lags and the estimation method. Beyond the theoretical relationship between the two variables, these 
exercises are hampered by the fact that, ex post, the relation between these variables falls within national accounting 
identity relationships, which poses problems of simultaneity between variables and makes it difficult to prove the 
existence of causalities in either direction. 
In an initial examination of the data, the correlations between GDP growth rate and investment rates (measured 
as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP) were calculated, as were the correlations between GDP 
growth rate and public and private investment rates in Latin America between 1980 and 2010.10 For each of the 
countries, the correlations between the GDP growth rate and the prior-period investment rate (t-1) were calculated 
for the same period (t) and the subsequent period (t+1). The correlations between GDP growth rate and regional 
investment rates were also calculated, taking into account all available observations, that is, including all years 
and all countries. The same exercise was conducted to calculate the correlations between GDP growth rates and 
public and private investment rates, as well as the correlations between GDP growth rate and construction and 
machinery and equipment investment rates.
In the analysis set out in table II.5 it can be seen that, in the great majority of the countries and the region as 
a whole, GDP growth rate was positively and significantly correlated with the investment rate in the subsequent 
period. In the case of Brazil, the correlation between the two variables, although not statistically significant, 
was positive. In this regard, the empirical evidence suggests that an increase in present economic activity has a 
positive impact on the investment rate in the subsequent period. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
10 The exercise was conducted for 18 countries, which were included depending on data availability. Haiti and the English- and Dutch-
speaking countries of the Caribbean were not included because the requisite information was not available. For a number of countries the 
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that investment in the subject period responded to expectations of future growth based on present performance 
and changes in installed capacity utilization and in aggregate demand, that is to say, an essentially short-term 
approach prevailed. This finding is important because, with GDP growth positively and significantly correlated 
with the investment rate in the subsequent period, declining activity levels had a negative impact on the levels of 
investment and growth in subsequent periods. 
Table II.5 
Latin America: correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient) between annual GDP growth  
and gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 1980-2010a
(Percentages)
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)
GFCF(t-1) GFCF(t) GFCF(t+1)
Argentina -22.3 33.0* 59.3****
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 25.8 47.4*** 55.5***
Brazil -41.6** 27.4 23.6
Chile 14.6 44.5** 47.0***
Colombia 8.5 38.2** 50.7***
Costa Rica -23.3 35.8** 53.5***
Dominican Republic -18.1 29.2 41.4**
Ecuador 23.1 25.8 36.8**
El Salvador 34.3* 53.2*** 66.5****
Guatemala 16.0 30.4* 38.9**
Honduras -7.8 20.7 38.4**
Mexico -22.8 39.0** 45.3**
Nicaragua 24.7 46.0*** 57.4****
Panama -18.8 31.7* 67.4****
Paraguay 0.0 39.8** 59.5****
Peru -8.1 29.3 41.5**
Uruguay -14.9 18.4 51.9***
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -30.3* 7.8 30.7*
Latin America -1.1 26.4**** 39.3****
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito 
and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el crecimiento y elementos de una estrategia 
para fortalecer su financiamiento”, Macroeconomía del Desarrollo series, Nº 129 (LC/L.3603), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013.
a  The values at which the p-value starts to be significant are as follows: * the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 10%, n = 31: p-value= 0.3009; n = 558: 
p-value = 0.0697; ** the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 5%, n = 31: p-value = 0.3550; n = 558: p-value = 0.0830; *** the correlation is significant 
with a confidence level < 1%, n = 31: p-value = 0.4556; n = 558: p-value= 0.1090; **** the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 0.1%, n = 31: 
p-value = 0.5620; n = 558: p-value = 0.1389. 
The correlations between the GDP growth rate in t and public and private investment rates in t-1, t and t+1 yield 
interesting findings (see table II.6). First, the number of cases in which the correlations are statistically significant is 
far lower than for total investment. The correlation between GDP growth rate in t and public investment rate in t-1 
is significant only for some countries; the correlation coefficient has mixed signs. This may be due to the fact that in 
countries where the sign is negative, the increase in public investment took place in a context of low sustainability 
of public finances, so higher spending would have led to fiscal imbalances whose subsequent correction negatively 
impacted the GDP growth rate. In turn, in the few cases where the correlation between GDP growth rate and public 
investment rate in t and t+1 is significant, the sign is positive. 
Second, the findings for private investment are quite similar to those for total investment. GDP growth rate was 
positively and significantly correlated with the private investment rate for the subsequent period in a large number 
of countries and for the region as a whole. This indicates that an increase in this type of investment would primarily 
be due to elements linked to aggregate demand, trends in expectations and the utilization of installed capacity). 
Third, the findings for construction investment reveal a somewhat mixed pattern. However, for the region as 
a whole the correlations between GDP growth rate and construction investment rates in the same period and the 
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Table II.6 
Latin America: correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient) between annual GDP growth and public  
and private gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 1980-2010a
(Percentages)
Public gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) Private gross fixed capital formation (CFCF)
PUB(t-1) PUB(t) PUB(t+1) PRIV(t-1) PRIV(t) PRIV(t+1)
Argentina 13.5 43.7** 58.9**** -28.3 29.4 56.7****
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 8.5 -3.7 0.2 17.8 40.5** 45.5**
Brazil -6.4 0.7 7.9 -43.7** 29.9 23.5
Chile 12.1 -0.2 -17.8 13.8 44.8** 48.6***
Colombia -5.3 -3.6 4.0 10.0 32.2* 38.2**
Costa Rica -37.1** -23.9 -12.5 6.9 40.5** 46.9***
Dominican Republic -46.2*** -10.3 9.5 5.9 33.9* 36.1**
Ecuador 16.2 16.2 18.6 16.3 19.3 30.0
El Salvador 47.9*** 54.6*** 61.3**** 27.6 47.6*** 61.2****
Guatemala -62.8**** -28.6 7.7 30.9* 37.1** 36.5**
Honduras -20.3 -17.9 -20.6 2.0 24.3 39.8**
Mexico -23.7 10.0 26.4 -4.3 36.2** 28.1
Nicaragua -50.7*** -34.9* -32.7* 43.4** 49.0*** 55.3***
Panama 6.5 31.9* 45.9*** -25.3 23.3 59.5****
Paraguay 10.1 10.6 26.4 -4.2 39.4** 54.6***
Peru -17.7 -8.8 0.1 -2.3 38.4** 49.3***
Uruguay -35.2* -23.4 17.3 -4.0 29.4 52.6***
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -21.4 1.4 24.5 -26.8 10.8 23.9
Latin America -14.1**** -6.1 -0.4 7.5 29.4**** 38.6****
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el 
crecimiento y elementos de una estrategia para fortalecer su financiamiento”, Macroeconomía del Desarrollo series, Nº 129 (LC/L.3603), Santiago, Chile, 
ECLAC, 2013.
a  The values at which the p-value starts to be significant are as follows: * the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 10%, n = 31: p-value= 0.3009; n = 558: 
p-value = 0.0697; ** the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 5%, n = 31: p-value = 0.3550; n = 558: p-value = 0.0830; *** the correlation is significant with 
a confidence level < 1%, n = 31: p-value = 0.4556; n = 558: p-value= 0.1090; **** the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 0.1%, n = 31: p-value = 0.5620; 
n = 558: p-value = 0.1389.
Fourth, correlations between GDP growth rate and the machinery and equipment investment rate presented a 
pattern quite similar to the one seen in the findings for private investment. Accordingly, in a substantial number of 
countries and in the region as a whole GDP growth rate was positively and significantly correlated with the machinery 
and equipment investment rate for the same period and, more broadly, the subsequent period (see table II.7).
Table II.7 
Latin America: correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient) between annual GDP growth and gross fixed  
capital formation in construction and machinery and equipment as a percentage of GDP, 1980-2010a
(Percentages)
Construction Machinery and equipment
CONST(t-1) CONST(t) CONST(t+1) MAQ(t-1) MAQ(t) MAQ(t+1)
Argentina -30.4* 21.0 1.0** -11.2 40.1** 64.4****
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 37.5** 55.3*** 0.3*** 11.0 29.9 44.2**
Brazil -33.2* 5.7 58.4 -22.3 36.9** 24.5
Chile -6.7 10.3 8.6* 24.4 54.8*** 44.7**
Colombia 21.4 40.3** 2.8** -16.1 25.0 50.1***
Costa Rica -46.2*** -13.1 37.5 -0.5 51.2*** 56.5****
Dominican Republic -25.9 14.0 3.3** 1.2 34.9* 24.8
Ecuador 36.7** 19.6 15.3 3.2 25.9 38.7**
El Salvador 46.6*** 51.7*** 0.0**** 22.5 45.2** 58.6****
Guatemala 37.3** 58.6**** 0.0**** 64.0**** 74.7**** 62.6****
Honduras -24.1 -21.1 62.0 2.7 26.6 37.4**
Mexico -19.9 8.7 44.1 -14.0 49.7*** 53.8***
Nicaragua 45.1** 50.9*** 1.6** -9.5 18.0 44.4**
Panama -29.7 19.3 0.1**** 3.8 32.9* 49.1***
Paraguay -12.0 11.3 1.3** 13.0 48.5*** 43.3**
Peru -37.1** -8.3 39.8 8.2 42.8** 46.7***
Uruguay -33.1* -10.6 5.0* 2.0 37.3** 54.9***
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -53.9*** -13.2 25.3 -20.0 18.1 36.5**
Latin America -2.2 16.4**** 31.3**** 0.7 24.4**** 30.0****
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el 
crecimiento y elementos de una estrategia para fortalecer su financiamiento”, Macroeconomía del Desarrollo series, Nº 129 (LC/L.3603), Santiago, Chile, 
ECLAC, 2013.
a  The values at which the p-value starts to be significant are as follows: * the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 10%, n = 31: p-value= 0.3009; n = 558: 
p-value = 0.0697; ** the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 5%, n = 31: p-value = 0.3550; n = 558: p-value = 0.0830; *** the correlation is significant 
with a confidence level < 1%, n = 31: p-value = 0.4556; n = 558: p-value= 0.1090; **** the correlation is significant with a confidence level < 0.1%, n = 31: 
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G. GDP growth tended to have a positive impact on investment 
 (accelerator effect)
In view of the findings and bearing in mind the constraints described, the next step was to look for causality relationships 
(in Granger’s sense) between GDP growth rate and investment rate. Exercises were performed with a greater number 
of lags, but significant findings were obtained for a greater number of countries using first-order lags.11 
Figure II.8 summarizes the findings. For presentation purposes, the value in the vertical axis of the figures 
corresponds to 1-p value. The higher this value, the higher the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. Two null 
hypotheses were tested: 
tNull hypothesis 1: the investment rate (in Granger’s sense) does not cause the GDP growth rate. Rejection of 
null hypothesis 1 can be interpreted to mean that changes in the investment rate precede changes in the GDP 
growth rate.
tNull hypothesis 2: the GDP growth rate (in Granger’s sense) does not cause the investment rate. Rejection of 
null hypothesis 2 can be interpreted to mean that changes in the GDP growth rate precede changes in the 
investment rate.
Figure II.8 
Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate and 































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el 
crecimiento y elementos de una estrategia para fortalecer su financiamiento”, Macroeconomía del Desarrollo series, Nº 129 (LC/L.3603), Santiago, Chile, 
ECLAC, 2013.
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According to the findings, in general null hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected but null hypothesis 2 can, confirming 
the findings of the correlation tests. This provides evidence that changes in GDP growth rate preceded and were 
positively correlated with changes in the investment rate during the period under review. Exceptions to this finding 
are Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama. For Argentina, Costa Rica and Panama, both hypotheses can 
be rejected, so the causality between the two variables (in Granger’s sense) is two-way. For Brazil, the findings make 
it possible to reject null hypothesis 1 but not null hypothesis 2, which would seem to indicate that, contrary to what 
occurs in most of the other countries, in Brazil changes in the investment rate precede changes in the GDP growth 
rate. With Mexico, neither hypothesis can be rejected. This would seem to mean that there is no causality between 
the two variables. However, the value of 1-p value is greater in the case of null hypothesis 1, so for Mexico it is more 
likely that changes in the investment rate precede changes in the GDP growth rate rather than the other way round. 
Nor was it possible to reject either of the hypotheses in the cases of Chile, Ecuador and Guatemala, although in these 
three countries the value of 1-p value is higher in null hypothesis 1 than in null hypothesis 2. Accordingly, it is more 
likely that a change in the GDP growth rate precedes changes in investment rates. 
Figure II.9 presents the findings of the causality tests (in Granger’s sense) between GDP growth rate and the public 
investment rate; Figure II.10 shows the findings taking private investment rate into account. These findings indicate 
greater heterogeneity than those discussed above. In the first case (see figure II.9), in most of the countries neither 
of the null hypotheses could be rejected. In contrast, in the second case (see figure II.10) null hypothesis 2 can be 
rejected in a significant number of countries. The findings therefore lead to a conclusion similar to the one for the 
overall investment rate: that the GDP growth rate precedes the private investment rate.
Figure II.9 
Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate 































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el 
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Figure II.10 
Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate  































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el 
crecimiento y elementos de una estrategia para fortalecer su financiamiento”, Macroeconomía del Desarrollo series, Nº 129 (LC/L.3603), Santiago, Chile, 
ECLAC, 2013.
Lastly, the same exercise was performed to test for causality (in Granger’s sense) between GDP growth rate 
and the construction investment rate (see figure II.11) and then between GDP growth rate and the machinery and 
equipment investment rate (see figure II.12). The findings are equally useful. Causality between GDP growth rate 
and the construction investment rate is two-way in a number of countries. And while GDP growth rate precedes the 
construction investment rate in a larger number of countries, the causality is inverse in a substantial number of countries.
Figure II.11 
Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate  










































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el 
crecimiento y elementos de una estrategia para fortalecer su financiamiento”, Macroeconomía del Desarrollo series, Nº 129 (LC/L.3603), Santiago, Chile, 
ECLAC, 2013.
Figure II.12 
Latin America: findings of (Granger) causality tests between GDP growth rate 































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures, ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, various years; and S. Manuelito and F. Jiménez, “La inversión y el ahorro en América Latina: nuevos rasgos estilizados, requerimientos para el 
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The causality relationship between GDP growth rate and the machinery and equipment investment rate is 
different. In countries where the findings are significant, null hypothesis 2 can be rejected. This would seem to 
indicate that changes in the GDP growth rate precede changes in the machinery and equipment investment rate. 
Exceptions to this are Argentina and Colombia, where the findings show that causality is two-way.
The findings suggest that in the period under review, rising investment rates have in most cases been linked to 
aggregate demand pressures (expectations of demand growth or an effective increase in demand). At the regional level, 
aggregate demand trends and their drivers provide some insight into this outcome. The increase in external demand 
has been mainly due to higher demand for commodities and energy products.12 And domestic demand has grown 
largely on the strength of steadily rising household consumption in response to improving labour market indicators 
(falling unemployment, higher employment rates and rising real wages) and stepped-up bank lending to families.
Another factor behind the surge in household consumption is the substantial expansion of the consumption base 
in most of the countries as poverty recedes. This is not a minor factor, because consumption propensity in population 
segments that gain access to goods and services consumption is very high (generally, equal or close to 1), so rising 
family income translates almost entirely into higher consumption.13 Between 2002 and 2011 the poverty rate in Latin 
America and the Caribbean dropped from 43.9% to 29.4%. While poverty in the region remains high and bringing 
it down is one of the region’s major challenges, this 14.4 percentage-point decrease in a 10-year span is substantial 
(ECLAC, 2013b). The expansion of the consumption base owing to this set of factors has therefore been one of the 
key drivers of rising investment in the commerce sector in a number of the economies of Latin America.
Conclusions
The rise in income in Latin America and the Caribbean gathered momentum over the past decade as the operating 
surplus share rose at the expense, in most countries, of the compensation of employees share. However, in a number 
of countries of the region the rising operating surplus share pushed public savings up as government revenues climbed 
thanks to booming international raw materials prices. This enabled these countries to implement redistributive public 
policies aimed at partially offsetting the concentrator effect of the higher operating surplus share. 
The terms of trade contribution to income growth changed throughout the period reviewed. This contribution was 
negative during the 1980s (as was labour productivity’s contribution), but it partially recovered during the 1990s and 
increased significantly from 2004, especially in economies that are more specialized in the production and export 
of raw materials. Income growth fuelled a surge in regional domestic demand in the past decade, with consumption 
being the component of demand that contributed the most to growth. The three main drivers here were a stronger 
contribution of public consumption, procyclical changes in investment and the persistent negative contribution of 
exports net of imports. In fact, the contribution to non-export GDP growth was somewhat larger in the past decade 
than in the previous period. 
Lastly, an examination of 16 countries of Latin America yields evidence of a negative correlation between the 
GDP gap and the growth of investment in the region. And the analysis of the correlations between GDP growth rate 
and investment rate makes it possible to conclude that GDP growth rate is correlated positively and significantly 
with the investment rate in the subsequent period. The findings of a causality analysis (in Granger’s sense) indicate 
that changes in the GDP growth rate precede changes in investment rates. The findings suggest that throughout the 
period under review, increases in the investment rate have been linked to aggregate demand pressures and that the 
accelerator effect —i.e. where investment rises a result of accelerating GDP growth— has been crucial. 
12 While for the vast majority of countries, there are no statistics on gross fixed capital formation by investment target sector, partial data 
from the countries themselves and information from other sources make it possible to estimate that in commodity producing and 
exporting countries the largest investment share has gone to projects related to mining and the energy sector. In addition, a simple 
correlation exercise between the total investment ratio and the level of international raw materials prices shows that in several countries 
the investment ratio was positively and significantly correlated with the level of international prices for the major commodities in their 
export basket (Manuelito and Jiménez, 2013). 
13 The connection between rising consumption and the increase in the investment ratio is reflected in the strong correlation between the 
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Chapter III
Three decades of labour productivity 
and structural change
Introduction
A. A slow recovery for labour productivity
B. Heterogeneous patterns in labour productivity
C. A skilled labour force and capital accumulation as drivers of productivity
D. The main trends have been tertiarization and investment in non-tradable sectors
E. Structural change as a weak source of labour productivity
F. The economic cycle and the negative impact of structural heterogeneity on productivity





This chapter looks at how labour productivity has evolved in the region and analyses how it ties into investment, 
population growth, workforce skills and structural change, in addition to its link with foreign trade. The findings 
of the analysis are summarized at the end of the chapter.
A. A slow recovery for labour productivity
During the 1980s, the combination of slow economic growth and higher employment, owing mainly to population 




in Latin America and the Caribbean picked up speed somewhat to an annual rate of 1.1% in the 2000s. This helped 
to reduce the gap with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, although other 
regions, above all East Asia, posted much stronger growth (ECLAC/ILO, 2012).
The recovery of labour productivity was uneven across the region. By around 2002 few countries (notably Chile 
and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Colombia, Costa Rica and Guatemala) recorded average productivity above the 
level registered in 1980 (Fuentes, Aravena and Iberti, 2013), but in subsequent years that upswing continued to gain 
momentum and extended to more countries. The six South American countries with information available accumulated 
BOJODSFBTFPGNPSFUIBOJOPVUQVUQFSXPSLFSXJUIFTQFDJBMMZMBSHFJODSFBTFTJO&DVBEPSBOE1FSV*OUIFGJWF
countries in the north of the region with data available, the improvement in labour productivity was less marked, with 
POMZ$PTUB3JDBBOE1BOBNBFYDFFEJOHUIFUISFTIPME	8FMMFSBOE,BMEFXFJ
#ZPGUIF-BUJO
American countries included in the study had clearly surpassed the 1980 level. Only in Nicaragua, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Mexico, and Paraguay did average labour productivity fall short of the levels recorded in 1980.
B. Heterogeneous patterns in labour productivity
Despite the modest increase in average productivity for the region as a whole, there are still major differences in 
productivity levels between the countries of the region (see figure III.1). 
Figure III.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean (25 countries): average labour productivity, 2012































































































































































Source: J. Weller and C. Kaldewei, “Empleo, crecimiento sostenible e igualdad”, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2013, unpublished.
a Data from 2011.
b Data from 2010. 
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The countries with the highest levels of labour productivity include some Caribbean countries with service-based 
economies, such as the Bahamas and Barbados. At the other end of the spectrum are countries such as Nicaragua 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
Productivity trends have also differed between industries; two sectors in particular have shown opposite patterns 
(see figure III.2). Agriculture saw the largest rise in output per worker as the absolute number of persons employed in 
the sector expanded by very little. This is attributable to the relative contraction of the peasant economy caused by 
restricted access to production resources, which encourages the rural population, especially young people, to change 
to a different economic activity or to migrate abroad. Furthermore, in several countries changes in the agri-business 
sector contributed to a substantial increase in production, often export-oriented, and led to significant increases in 
output per worker (Sotomayor, Rodríguez and Rodrigues, 2011).
Figure III.2 
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Source: J. Weller and C. Kaldewei, “Empleo, crecimiento sostenible e igualdad”, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2013, unpublished.
Output per worker fell markedly in the mining sector, owing, principally, to the sharp rise in the number of 
people employed in the industry possibly on account of high mineral prices in recent years. These prices have brought 
into production, sometimes informally, marginal deposits that would be unprofitable if prices were lower. The lower 
productivity of these mines has brought down the sector’s average labour productivity.1 
Output per worker in most other industries recorded moderate increases until 2009 and resumed this uptrend 
in 2010 or 2011. For the period as a whole, noteworthy productivity increases were seen in basic services (public 
utilities and transport, storage and communications), commerce, restaurants and hotels, and manufacturing. Labour 
productivity patterns in the construction sector were similar to those in the manufacturing industry until 2008, and 
only started to pick up once more in 2011. Productivity in community, social and personal services did not change 
much, while the financial services, real estate and business services sector posted the weakest figures, after mining.2
C. A skilled labour force and capital accumulation as drivers  
 of productivity
Improvements in labour productivity have depended primarily on the skills level of the labour force, and on investment 
and the technical progress it brings. Formal education levels are key for explaining workforce contribution to productivity 
1 Since labour productivity is measured in constant terms, it does not take into account variations in output that may result from changes 
in prices, especially for export products. This is the case for the mining sector, where, while investment might have increased, it has 
been in lower-grade mines, leading to lower productivity in constant terms but higher productivity in nominal terms owing to rising 
mineral prices. The opposite is true for agriculture, where falling prices can result in larger productivity increases at constant prices 
than at current prices.
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and economic growth (Buonomo and Yanes, 2013). While it has been difficult to quantify the contribution of education 
to economic growth at the global level,3 figure III.3 establishes a clear positive correlation between education level 
and per capita GDP for the countries of the region. This obviously does not imply a simple causal relationship, but 
rather the existence of virtuous and vicious circles, since higher education levels help to boost economic growth and 
wealthier societies have more possibilities for investing in education, which in turn drives education levels up faster. 
The opposite is also true: lower education levels are associated with lower levels of wealth. 
Figure III.3 
Latin America: per capita GDP and education level of the urban economically active population, late 2000s



















Source:  J. Weller and C. Kaldewei, “Empleo, crecimiento sostenible e igualdad”, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2013, unpublished.




average of four countries) (ECLAC, 2000). Between around 1990 and around 2010, the average number of years of 
TDIPPMJOHPGUIFFDPOPNJDBMMZBDUJWFQPQVMBUJPOJODPVOUSJFTSPTFGSPNZFBSTUPZFBSTJOVSCBOBSFBTBOE
GSPNZFBSTUPZFBSTJOSVSBMBSFBT Consequently, the changes in labour productivity in the region —especially 
the decline in the 1980s and virtual stagnation in the 1990s in many countries— cannot be attributed to changes 
(improvements) in labour force skill levels. Rather, it can be assumed that for a large part of the past decades this 
growing potential was underutilized. 
One explanation for the decline in labour productivity during the 1980s and its subsequent weak recovery is 
the pattern in gross capital formation per worker, combined with other causes relating to the characteristics of labour 
supply. Gross capital formation per worker fell in 1980 and has not yet regained its previous level, although it has 
CFFOUSFOEJOHVQTJODF	TFFGJHVSF***

The theoretical debate on the process of economic growth has highlighted that capital accumulation and technical 
progress are closely interlinked, and that the former is a prerequisite for the latter.6 The rate at which technical progress 
is incorporated depends largely on investment (especially in machinery and equipment) and on increased growth in 
output associated with higher returns on investment (economies of scale and learning), known as the Kaldor-Verdoon 
effect (Ocampo, Rada and Taylor, 2009; and Taylor, 2011).7
3  See a brief discussion of this challenge in Acemoglu (2009, chap. 10). Galor (2011) discusses the historical impact of differences in 
human capital formation on the dynamics of development and economic growth.
 Calculated on the basis of ECLAC (2011).
 Raising the average education level of the labour force in the region is not without its challenges, especially with regard to coverage, 
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Figure III.4  
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): gross capital 
formation per worker, simple average, 1980-2011







































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and information provided by the World Bank.
To test the hypothesis that there is a direct relationship between investment and the incorporation of technical 
progress, reflected in changes in labour productivity, an empirical analysis was conducted using vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models including investment in machinery and equipment, GDP and labour productivity, measured as GDP 
per hour worked. Investment, through Keynesian multipliers, was expected to affect production, which, in turn, 
would have an impact on labour productivity. VAR models were estimated for these three variables using annual 
data for 16 Latin American countries for the period 1980-2011.8 
The variance decomposition shows what proportion of the change in a particular variable is attributable to 
or the result of a simultaneous change in all the variables in the model. Theoretically, owing to the nature of the 




Latin America (16 countries): variance decomposition of labour 


































































































Source: J.A. Fuentes, C. Aravena and G Iberti, “Tres décadas de crecimiento inestable”, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2013, unpublished.











Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean t3
0WFSBMMUIFSFTVMUTJOEJDBUFUIBUGPSIBMGPGUIFDPVOUSJFTTUVEJFENPSFUIBOPGUIF7"3NPEFMQSFEJDUJPO
errors in relation to labour productivity can be explained by investment (as high as around 80% for Argentina and 
Peru), while for six countries that percentage is only about 10%. This suggests that investment may be one of the 
main sources of change in labour productivity, which, in turn, can be used as an indicator of technological progress 
due to investment. However, it also suggests that total investment in machinery and equipment, on the whole, is 
not necessarily the main driver of productivity in all countries, and that other factors could have a fundamental 
role, such as investment composition and target sector, demographic trends, and the long-term uptrend in women’s 
labour-market participation and the resulting boost to labour supply. It is noteworthy that several of the countries 
where investment is not one of the main factors determining labour productivity have high population growth, such 
as the Plurinational State of Bolivia and some Central American countries.
D. The main trends have been tertiarization and investment 
 in non-tradable sectors
Agriculture, manufacturing and the construction sector saw their share of GDP fall during the past three decades for 
the region as a whole. In the case of manufacturing and construction, this pattern was in stark contrast to previous 
decades (see figure III.6). Meanwhile, mining appears to have increased its share of GDP, as has the service sector, 
in line with global trends and with other research on Latin America that has shown that tertiarization is a major trend 
in the region, in part perhaps reflecting the new ways in which industrial production is carried out in an increasingly 
globalized world (De la Torre, Pienknagura and Levy Yeyati, 2013).
Figure III.6 














































































































































































































































































































As can be seen in Figure III.7B, these trends broadly continued into subsequent decades, with agriculture’s share 
of employment falling quickly both in the 1990s and in the 2000s while that of manufacturing decreased at a more 
moderate pace and the share of the working population employed in the tertiary sector and construction expanded, 
though at different rates. 
Figure III.7 




























































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT database and official information provided by the respective countries.
5IFSFMBUJWFQSFNBUVSFEFJOEVTUSJBMJ[BUJPO	1BMNBBOE
UIBUTUBSUFEJOUIFTJTBTTPDJBUFEXJUI
the profound changes in economic policy regimes and, more recently, with the reorientation of many economies in 
the region towards natural resource-producing sectors in the context of high international prices (Dutch disease) and 
exchange rates that tend to favour non-tradable sectors.
A breakdown between tradable and non-tradable goods-producing sectors in four countries in the region showed 
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sectors, while this increase was less marked in the tradable sectors (see table III.1).9 With the exception of Brazil, 
where the differential impact of the exchange rate is not positive but there is no inverse correlation either, the positive 
correlation between real exchange rate depreciation and the increased ratio of tradable to non-tradable investment 
(last column of the table) supports the hypothesis that real exchange rate appreciation has been more favourable to 
investment in non-tradable sectors than in tradable sectors.
Table III.1 
Latin America (selected countries): growth in investment in tradable and non-tradable sectors 
and correlation to the exchange rate 
(Percentages)
Average growth in investment by sector Coefficient of correlation 
between GCF ratio a  
and REER c
1993-2002 2003-2009
Tradable Non-tradable REER b Tradable Non-tradable REER
Argentina -2.9 -6.2 12.3 16.0 29.8 d 0.3 d 0.705
0.005**
Brazil 1.7 e 0.8 e 5.1 e 6.0 8.1 -8.0 -0.089
0.763
Chile 7.6 8.1 0.9 9.3 12.7 -2.3 0.382
0.107
Mexico 3.0 3.5 1.7 3.6 5.7 1.4 0.774
0.000*
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the LA-KLEMS project [online] www.worldklems.net.
Note: * = significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 10%.
a Gross capital formation (GCF) is calculated as the ratio of investment in the tradable sector to investment in the non-tradable sector.
b REER = real effective exchange rate.
c The correlation is calculated on the basis of the series for the whole period 1990-2010.
d Up to 2007.
e Since 1995.
Two conclusions can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the sectoral distribution of investment in 
1993-2002 and 2003-2009 for the same four countries (see figure III.8). First, the increase in investment in the 
industrial sector, especially in Argentina and Brazil, in the second period helped to boost overall productivity as a 
result of the comparatively higher productivity of the industrial sector.
Second, most of the increase in investment was in the non-tradable sectors, as well as in the sectors producing tradable 
commodities (mining and agriculture). On the one hand, investment grew more in non-tradable sectors, particularly 
public administration (excluding construction) and transport, there being no evidence it particularly targeted areas, such 
as infrastructure (included in the construction sector in this case), that might have contributed to boosting productivity 
in the economy as a whole. On the other hand, although between 2003 and 2009 investment in the tradable sectors 
primarily targeted the industrial sector in Brazil (where exchange-rate appreciation seems to have had less of an impact 
during the subject period), Argentina and Mexico, mining also saw substantial investment: in Chile it was the primary 
focus of investment during this period, and in Mexico and Brazil it ranked second. In Argentina agriculture ranked 
second among the tradable sectors as an investment destination. This highlights the importance of commodity exports 
(copper in Chile, iron ore in Brazil, gold and silver in Mexico and soybeans in Argentina), driven by booming prices.
Most investment is, therefore, biased towards sectors (non-tradable ones) that are more labour-intensive 
 —albeit partly because of a pattern of employment that is governed more by labour supply than by demand— and 
have lower productivity levels, as well as tradable primary sectors (mining and agriculture) that have variable 
productivity levels. The region’s countries would therefore seem to be experiencing, to varying degrees, symptoms 
of Dutch disease, with not enough investment aimed at diversifying tradable production. Thus, although investment 
has increased, its contribution to structural change, defined as the reallocation of resources from low-productivity 
sectors (mostly non-tradable) to high-productivity sectors (tradable) has been positive but relatively limited in these 
countries. This confirms that not only the amount, but also the mix and destination of investment, have influenced 
productivity in the region.
9 The tradable sectors were defined as mining, agriculture and industry; all others were considered non-tradable. This breakdown between 
the two sectors does not reflect the fact that some services have become tradable, although non-tradable components still make up 
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Figure III.8  
Latin America (selected countries): destination of investment in tradable and non-tradable sectors 
and decomposition of the growth rate, 1993-2002 and 2003-2009
(Percentages)
 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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the LA-KLEMS project [online] http://www.worldklems.net/.
a Private services include financial intermediation, real estate and business services.
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E. Structural change as a weak source of labour productivity10
Steadily rising labour productivity is key to economic and social development. Achieving such an increase, which 
can also be measured in terms of growth in per capita GDP, requires constant transformation of the production 
structure by means of two simultaneous processes.
First, it calls for structural change, understood as the reallocation of resources from low-productivity sectors 
—which typically generate low-quality jobs— to intermediate- and high-productivity sectors. Structural change 
increases aggregate productivity and reduces productivity gaps between sectors. Second, the productivity of 
individual branches of activity can receive a boost from increased physical or human capital, technological 
change, more efficient use of the resources allocated to the sector, the closure of unproductive businesses 
and the creation of new, more productive ones. Investment plays a fundamental role in both processes, as do 
workforce skill levels. 
Labour productivity levels and trends must be interpreted against the backdrop of the region’s structural 
heterogeneity, which is reflected in the differing productivity levels seen within each sector. Changes in productivity 
associated with the reallocation of resources within each sector may be impeded by this structural heterogeneity. 
They may be the result of a decrease in allocated resources or reflect improvements in a single group of companies 
in the sector. This heterogeneity stems from the production structure and is manifested in the labour market, where, 
put simply, there are segments in which job creation is due to demand for labour by businesses, the public sector 
or —to a lesser extent— households in their role as employers, and there are segments in which job creation is the 
result of what can be viewed as labour oversupply (owing to limited demand) driven by household reproduction 
and income needs. 
The rise of the Asian economies in recent decades has been characterized by the simultaneous reallocation 
of resources between sectors (structural change) and within each sector (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). In 
contrast, recent studies in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Africa, have found poor reallocation of 
SFTPVSDFTBTTPDJBUFEXJUITUSVDUVSBMDIBOHF"DDPSEJOHUP.D.JMMBOBOE3PESJL	
CFUXFFOBOE
the contribution of structural change to changes in aggregate labour productivity in the region was very low or 
OFHBUJWF5IFTFBVUIPSTGPVOEUIBUJOUIFTJNQMFBWFSBHFGPSOJOFDPVOUSJFTGPSUIFQFSJPEUIFJOUFSOBM
SFBMMPDBUJPOPGSFTPVSDFTXJUIJOFBDITFDUPSNBEFBQPTJUJWFDPOUSJCVUJPOPGQFSDFOUBHFQPJOUTXIJMFTUSVDUVSBM
change made a negative contribution of 0.88 percentage points to annual growth in labour productivity, which 
JOOFUUFSNTSPTFCZ11 
Below are the results of a decomposition of changes in labour productivity for 1990-2010/2011, using the 
same methodology as McMillan and Rodrik (2011): 
where <W and \LWSFQSFTFOUUIFMFWFMPGQSPEVDUJWJUZ	NFBTVSFEJOEPMMBSTBUDPOTUBOUQSJDFTQFSXPSLFS
GPS
the economy as a whole and for sector i, respectively; while  i,t is the share of sector i in employment. Δ denotes the 
change in productivity or in the employment share, accordingly. The first term on the right is the sum of changes in 
productivity in individual sectors, weighted for their employment share at the beginning of the subject period. This 
term represents productivity changes within the sectors. The second term represents the contribution of structural 
change to the overall variation in productivity, calculated as the sum of the changes in the different sectors’ shares 
in overall employment, weighted by the corresponding productivity.12
10 This section is based largely on Weller and Kaldewei (2013).
11 6TJOHBOPUIFSNFUIPEPMPHZ0DBNQP3BEBBOE5BZMPS	
GPVOEUIBUEVSJOHTUSVDUVSBMDIBOHFIBEBOFHBUJWFJNQBDU
in the Andean countries and a positive one in Central America and the Caribbean. In the semi-industrialized countries (particularly 





12 If a sector loses part of its share in the employment structure to a sector with higher average productivity, aggregate productivity 
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This exercise was conducted for two subperiods (between the early 1990s and 2002, and between 2002 and 
2010/2011). The aim was to differentiate between one subperiod with generally modest and highly volatile economic 
growth and another with stronger and —with the exception of 2009— relatively stable growth rates.13 Despite using 
the same methodology as McMillan and Rodrik (2011), the results differ somewhat owing to the differences in the 
periods covered and the larger number of countries included. 
Figure III.9 shows how intra- and intersectoral changes influenced average annual growth in labour productivity 
in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries in the two periods.
Figure III.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean (23 countries): impact of intra- and intersectoral changes 

































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Weller and C. Kaldewei, “Empleo, crecimiento sostenible e igualdad”, 
Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished.
13 Dividing the study period into two subperiods makes it possible to weight each one more accurately, using the production structure 
BUDPOTUBOUBOEQSJDFTSFTQFDUJWFMZ
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Figure III.9 confirms previous observations for the region as a whole: labour productivity (simple average of 
the countries) increased by very little (0.2% per year) between the early 1990s and 2002. On average for these 
countries, the contribution to labour productivity during this period (as shown by the shaded rectangle) from 
both the reallocation of resources between sectors (structural change) and the reallocation of resources within 
each sector, was minimal (0.1 of a percentage point per year). Furthermore, no directly or inversely proportional 
relationship was found between each contribution.
In the subsequent period (2002-2011), both contributions, while still highly dispersed, were larger than in the 
prior period. However, the contribution of resource reallocation among sectors (structural change) continued to 
be significantly weaker, as shown by the red part of the bar for each country. These bars, except for the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Mexico and Peru, are substantially smaller for all of the countries. In the simple average of 
UIFDPVOUSJFT	TIBEFESFDUBOHMF
UIFBOOVBMHSPXUIPGMBCPVSQSPEVDUJWJUZCSFBLTEPXOJOUPBQFSDFOUBHF
point contribution from structural change and a 1.2-percentage-point contribution from reallocation of resources 
within individual sectors.16
The assessment of changes in sectoral productivity and the impact of structural change and resource reallocation 
within each sector shows that, between 1990 and 2002, employment grew significantly only in the tertiary sector 
and construction, but, with the exception of basic services, all of these branches of activity saw a fall in average 
productivity (see figure III.10). The slow growth in productivity during this period was attributable largely to 
agriculture and mining, which saw significant productivity gains but no job creation.
Figure III.10 
Latin America and the Caribbean: contribution of the variation in employment and labour productivity 















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Weller and C. Kaldewei, “Empleo, crecimiento sostenible e igualdad”, 
Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished.
During this stage, labour supply pressures increased employment levels in low-productivity activities with few 
barriers to entry, particularly in the tertiary sector, which weakened the productivity gains arising from structural 
change (reallocation of resources to higher-productivity sectors), with the exception of basic services (electricity, gas 
and water, and transport, storage, and communications), which were privatized and modernized in many countries 
during this period.
In the second period (2003-2010), a number of branches of activity (including some in the tertiary sector) grew 
thanks to a combination of increased employment and labour productivity, and the productivity of each branch of 
 The median rate for the countries is also 0.2%; the weighted average shows no growth. 
16 In this period more countries (Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina (urban areas), Ecuador, Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras 
and Chile) posted significant increases in the contributions of both processes, as shown by the overall annual growth rate of labour 
productivity. At the other extreme, only in Nicaragua did both processes have a negative impact. In contrast with the previous period, 
only four countries experienced negative structural change and in only six countries (three of which were Caribbean) did the changes 
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activity rose across the board for the region as a whole, with the exception of mining. In several mining or hydrocarbon-
producing countries (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Mexico and Peru), this sector’s contribution to overall 
productivity was negative, possibly because less-productive fields were brought on line as international prices soared.
Most job creation continued to take place in the sectors producing mostly non-tradable goods and services, and 
there was a reversal of the commerce sector productivity downtrend seen in the previous period. The relatively high 
contribution of this sector to productivity gains suggests that this improvement does not stem exclusively from a drop 
in the number of jobs created owing to labour supply pressures in a context of high demand, but rather that changes 
within the sector played an important role in this respect, such as the expansion of supermarkets and shopping malls in 
many countries in the region during this period. Commerce and basic services, by combining productivity gains with 
a significant increase in employment, were among the main sources of productivity growth resulting from structural 
change, which serves as further evidence that this process took place predominantly in non-tradable sectors.
F. The economic cycle and the negative impact of structural 
 heterogeneity on productivity
The high levels of structural heterogeneity in Latin America and the Caribbean are reflected in gaps within individual 
sectors owing to the co-existence of very low-productivity enterprises alongside intermediate and high-productivity 
enterprises (ECLAC, 2012).17 The relative share of each sector according to its productivity level depends on how 
developed the economy is: economies with a higher per capita GDP generally have narrower productivity gaps (Infante, 
2011). In these economies, the medium- and high-productivity sectors tend to account for a larger share of employment, 
reflecting the greater dynamism and weight of labour demand in the labour market as a whole. This reduces the pressure 
exerted on low-productivity sectors by excess labour supply and thus leads to narrower income gaps (see figure III.11).
Figure III.11 
Latin America (16 countries): relative income of own-account workers (not including professionals 
or technical workers) as a proportion of the income of private-sector employees in companies 
with five or more workers, by per capita GDP, around 2005-around 2010
































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Weller and C. Kaldewei, “Empleo, crecimiento sostenible e igualdad”, 
Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2013, unpublished. 
Note:  The values for the Dominican Republic and Guatemala were clear outliers and were therefore not included. 
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the existence of two distinct labour segments —one dependent 
on the demand of large and medium-sized enterprises, the public sector and formal employment by households, 
and the other consisting of a surplus labour supply seeking employment in low-productivity sectors with lower entry 
barriers— influences the way in which the region’s labour markets adjust to the different phases of the economic 
17 The level of heterogeneity within each sector varies considerably. For example, the electricity, gas and water sector is very homogeneous 
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cycle (Ocampo, Rada and Taylor, 2009). In marked contrast with developed economies and owing particularly to 
the labour supply situation, in periods of sluggish economic growth and low labour demand those markets have 
tended to adjust by reducing labour productivity rather than lowering employment (ECLAC/ILO, 2012). This structural 
heterogeneity has had an adverse effect both on structural change, since the employment driven by supply-side 
pressures tends to be concentrated in low-productivity sectors, and on productivity gains within individual sectors, 
since the higher employment in each branch of activity reduces its marginal productivity, which in turn is detrimental 
to its average productivity. 
Specifically, under conditions of sluggish economic growth and low labour demand, income gaps between these 
two segments tend to widen, while the opposite takes place during periods of increased demand for labour. Thus, for 
the region as a whole, it is estimated that between 1980 and 1989 real average earnings fell by 7% in medium and large 
companies, by 30% in small companies and in the public sector, and by 42% in the informal sector (PREALC, 1990). 
Between the early 1990s and around 2002, the countries in the region saw average wages in microenterprises fall from 
73% to 63% with respect to average salaries in small, medium-sized and large enterprises; an even greater decline was 
recorded in the wages of own-account workers (not including professionals or technical workers), which dropped from 
113% to 86% relative to average wages in small, medium-sized and large enterprises. By contrast, in subsequent years 
(late 2000s), when there was an uptick in wage employment in formal enterprises, these gaps stopped widening and held 
steady at 64% in the case of microenterprises and at 90% in the case of own-account workers.18
The expansion of medium- and high-productivity sectors, as a result of economic growth and productive development 
policies, tends to have a twofold positive distributive impact. First, the emergence of new, more productive posts gives 
access to better jobs to workers who were previously employed in low-productivity sectors and, second, it reduces 
income gaps between the two segments.19
G. The limited impact of international trade on productivity 
 in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. The effect of intra-industry specialization on productivity remains small
Intra-industry specialization implies greater production efficiency, particularly as a result of economies of scale and 
learning, and should lead to greater productivity and growth.20 In the case of the Latin American subregions and 
countries, intra-industry trade relations exist mainly within subregional integration schemes (Caribbean Community, 
Andean Community, Central American Common Market and MERCOSUR), while trade between the members of 
these different schemes is predominantly inter-industry. As to partners from outside the region, the highest proportion 
of intra-industry trade is with the United States, followed by the European Union (see table III.2).21 The region’s 
trade with developing Asia is essentially inter-industrial. Given that this was precisely the area of trade that saw the 
most growth in the last decade, the level of intra-industry trade in the region declined overall, suggesting that the 
contribution of trade to productivity, from a business perspective, was not significant. 
18 Calculations on the basis of ECLAC (2010), table A-21.1.
19 The positive distributive impact is more pronounced if, as occurred during much of the 2000s, demand covers all skill levels. Calculated 
on the basis of a legal definition, the income gap between workers with the same personal characteristics in formal and informal jobs is 
between 20% and 40%, which means that informal workers who move into formal higher-productivity sectors experience a significant 
improvement in income (Keifman and Maurizio, 2012).
20 Intra-industry trade is measured using the Grubel-Lloyd index, which shows the extent to which trade between two countries takes 
place between similar sectors. In contrast to inter-industry trade, growth in intra-industry trade is based on economies of scale and 
product differentiation. Both of these elements help to explain trade patterns within the framework of the new theory of international 
trade that emerged in the 1980s, another factor of which is the recognition of the existence of markets characterized by imperfect 
competition (Durán Lima and Álvarez, 2011). A weakness of the index is its sensitivity to the level of aggregation of trade flows: the 
likelihood of identifying intra-industry trade flows increases in line with the level of aggregation of the trade classification used and 
the number of countries.
21 The higher degree of intra-industry trade with the United States is mainly attributable to the extension of its value chains into Mexico 
and Central America. However, the benefits of this trade are limited because they are based primarily on the maquila sector, where 
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Table III.2 




























Mexico 0.14 0.12 0.35 0.05 0.15 0.34 0.44 0.27 0.10
Central America 
(including Panama) 0.18 0.82 0.12 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.63 0.23 0.10 0.04





0.33 0.07 0.02 0.93 0.05 0.17 0.69 0.30 0.27 0.09
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.00
Andean Community 0.12 0.33 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.87 0.53 0.15 0.06 0.03
Latin America and  
the Caribbean 0.32 0.58 0.04 0.60 0.13 0.57 0.89 0.47 0.29 0.09
United States 0.48 0.16 0.32 0.26 0.03 0.14 0.47 0.64 0.39
European Union 0.31 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.23 0.28 0.62 0.41
Developing Asia 0.36 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.36 0.40 0.58
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
Note:  According to the Grubel-Lloyd index, a value above 0.33 indicates a high incidence of intra-industry trade; a value between 0.10 and 0.33 indicates potential 
intra-industry trade; and a value lower than 0.10 indicates inter-industry trade.
2. The incipient participation of Latin America and the Caribbean in international 
value chains 
Another determinant of the impact of trade on growth is the degree to which it is part of a regional or international 
value chain. The involvement of a company, sector or country in a chain can benefit productivity, for example, by 
establishing more stable demand or access to new technologies, business practices or financing. 
Latin America and the Caribbean has had little involvement in international production chains, as shown 
by an indicator used to measure the fragmentation of production processes. This indicator measures the share of 
intermediate products (including accessories, components, parts and pieces) in trade, which account for more 
than half of world trade (excluding fuel) (WTO/IDE-JETRO, 2011). In the region, intermediate goods accounted for 
only 10% of exports to destinations both within and outside the region in 2011. This figure is surprising, given that 
the share of manufacturing is much higher for intraregional exports than for extraregional exports. However, the 
large share of trade in manufactures within the region does not translate into a higher share of intermediate goods 
in intraregional trade. This suggests that the manufactured goods traded between the countries of the region are 
made almost entirely in the exporting country. In other regions, intermediate goods accounted for a substantially 
higher proportion of intraregional exports in 2011: 30% in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN +3), 19% in the countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and 17% in the European Union (ECLAC, 2012).
Notwithstanding the above, there are marked differences between the countries in the region with respect to 
their production chains with other countries. These differences can be shown using the vertical integration indicator, 
which measures the proportion of exports composed of imported intermediate inputs (see figure III.12). In 2007 the 
most integrated countries were Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and the least integrated were the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Peru. The vertical integration of Latin America as a region declined between 2004 and 2007.
The impact of participation in value chains on inclusive growth depends crucially on the value-added generated 
in the link in which the company, sector or country is operating and the potential for upgrading to links with higher 
productivity and skill levels. There are significant differences between the sectors, for example, in the development 
of links, opportunities for acquiring technological knowledge (especially regarding cutting-edge technologies), 
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Figure III.12 
Latin America (selected countries): vertical integration index, 2001, 2004 and 2007












































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Comercio internacional: ¿Qué aporta al crecimiento inclusivo?”, paper presented at 
the Seminar Macroeconomics for Growth and Equality, Santiago, 7-8 May 2013 
3. Productivity as a driver, not a consequence, of exports
On the basis of the finding that the productivity of exporting firms is higher than that of other companies, further 
research has been conducted to ascertain the direction of causality between productivity and exports (Melitz, 2003). 
In general, most studies mention at least one of the following two hypotheses to explain this finding: (i) self-selection 
and (ii) “learning by doing”. The first refers to the observation that only the most productive firms engage in export 
processes, while “learning by doing” emphasizes that previous experience of exporting is a fundamental factor in 
future decisions to export.
8BHOFS	
CBTFEPOBSFWJFXPGTUVEJFTXJUIEBUBGSPNDPVOUSJFTQVCMJTIFECFUXFFOBOE
indicates that, after 10 years of research into the relationship between exports and productivity, the following broad 
conclusions can be drawn: (i) exporters have higher productivity levels than non-exporters; (ii) higher-productivity 
firms are self-selecting exporters; and (iii) exporting does not necessarily increase the productivity of firms. However, 
these general observations hide considerable heterogeneity since drawing comparisons between countries and even 
between studies on the same country is difficult, since the methodologies of the studies vary widely. 
The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity (ISGEP, 2007) applied a single methodology to study the 
SFMBUJPOTIJQCFUXFFOFYQPSUTBOEQSPEVDUJWJUZJODPVOUSJFTXPSMEXJEF	JODMVEJOH$IJMFBOE$PMPNCJB
BOEBSSJWFE
at the following complementary conclusions: (i) exporters are more productive than non-exporters; (ii) productivity 
gains tend to increase in line with the share of exports in a company’s sales; (iii) there is strong evidence in favour 
of self-selection; and (iv) there is virtually no evidence supporting the “learning by doing” hypothesis. It was also 
found that, even when measuring using the same model, the productivity gains made by exporters vary considerably 
between countries. In addition, more open countries with more effective governments report higher productivity 
levels. Countries’ level of development does not appear to have an impact on the relationship between exports and 
firms’ productivity levels. 
Another line of research has analysed the entry and exit of firms, which has shown systematic differences in the 
productivity, size and other economic characteristics of firms that are entering and those that are exiting the market 
(Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989). Wagner (2011) reviewed the literature available between 2006 and 2011 
and concluded that the probability of survival is higher for exporters, even controlling for the company’s size, age 
and productivity. In the same connection, a variety of studies have shown that the size of firms is inherently linked to 
survival in foreign markets (Arauzo-Carod and Manjón-Antolín, 2008) and that smaller firms are more likely to exit 
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Conclusions
The most important determinant of labour productivity in the region has been investment, which, along with the 
increasingly skilled labour force and the demographic dividend, has helped to boost productivity in most countries 
since 2003. This contrasts with the fall in labour productivity during the 1980s, when investment slumped, and the 
lacklustre performance of the 1990s, when investment saw only limited growth. 
Although the favourable external environment since 2003 has fostered savings and investment (see chapter II), 
thus contributing to increased productivity, exchange-rate appreciation, among other variables, has promoted higher 
growth of investment in non-tradable sectors (as well as in commodity-exporting sectors), which generally register 
lower levels of labour productivity than tradable sectors. As a result, despite the contribution of investment to labour 
productivity, productivity increases were lower than they would have been if there had been greater diversification 
in tradable production. Since investment was targeting these areas, the labour productivity growth that took place 
during the last decade resulted primarily from greater reallocation of resources within individual branches of activity, 
rather than productivity gains associated with structural change brought about by the reallocation of resources from 
low-productivity to high-productivity industries, although the latter was more prevalent in the 2000s than during the 
previous decade.
In turn, the predominantly inter-industry nature of the specialization pattern between Latin America and China, 
which has been reinforced by the increased trade flows between them, has been less favourable towards the processes 
of intra-industry specialization that have characterized other trade flows, thus making less of a contribution to 
learning and technological development. Furthermore, the participation of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
in international value chains, especially in the most intensive stages in terms of productivity and learning, has been 
limited and, in general, exports reflect the region’s performance in terms of productivity instead of contributing to it. 
This highlights the central role of investment and skilled labour, as well as the need for explicit and ambitious 
policies in these areas as a means of boosting productivity and promoting the diversification of investment and 
production, especially in tradable sectors. Ensuring the sectoral focus of investment is key, grounded in consultation 
processes that involve the public and private sectors in each country with a view to building a shared vision and 
making long-term institutional arrangements to reduce the degree of uncertainty facing decision-making in the field 
of investment. Another essential factor is introducing macroeconomic policies that ensure appropriate relative prices, 
financing, complementary public investment and demand management, as well as social, microeconomic and sectoral 
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Chapter IV
Macroeconomic policy 
enhancement and challenges 
for promoting growth 
with equality
Introduction
A. The contribution of fiscal policy to growth and equality has gradually strengthened
B. Monetary and exchange-rate policy have gradually come to play a greater role in reducing 
  nominal and real volatility




The main macroeconomic policies implemented over the past three decades are outlined below, highlighting how 
they have been enhanced over time. In the case of fiscal policy, the discussion centres on how this enhancement 
contributed to growth in relation to public debt, countercyclical action, social spending and public investment. 
For monetary and exchange-rate policy, the focus is on the policy contribution to nominal stability (inflation and 
interest rate reduction) and the enhancement that comes with institutional changes and flexible exchange-rate 
management; these changes helped to broaden the scope for monetary policy to play a countercyclical role 
during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. This chapter also looks at the build-up of international reserves 
as the monetary authorities responded to growing international financial volatility. The closing section proposes 
orienting macroeconomic policy so that (while leveraging and maintaining its strengths in an institutional 
framework that ensures public policy coordination and cooperation with social actors) it encourages investment, 
especially in the tradable sectors (the ones that produce goods and services that are exported or compete with 
imports) that generate linkages, thus fostering structural change to further sustainable growth with equality.1
A. The contribution of fiscal policy to growth and equality 
 has gradually strengthened 
One of the critical aspects of the relationship between fiscal policy and growth lies in how it impacts the level and 
composition of public expenditure and income in the macroeconomic cycle as well as the medium-term GDP trend. 
This relationship is explored below, taking account of how debt, countercyclical fiscal policy, social spending and 
public investment affect growth.
1. Debt reduction has helped stabilize economic agents’ expectations
In past decades, the public-debt-to-GDP ratio has been a recurring financial constraint on economic growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean as well as in other regions. It was also a drag on growth expectations and added to the 
cost of financing public and private investment projects. 
External public debt as a percentage of GDP was already growing in the 1970s (see figure IV.1), but in the 1980s 
weak economic growth, capital flight and the resulting sharp depreciation of national currencies in a framework of 
dollarized liabilities swelled fiscal deficits and increased the public debt burden. Between 1980 and 1989 external 
public debt rose from less than 35% of GDP to a high of 75% of GDP on average and surpassed 100% of GDP in 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
1 Favouring the tradable sectors would mean prioritizing exportable and importable sectors over non-tradable ones. But the former include 
producers of natural resources that, because they have absolute advantages and generate rents, would not need policy instruments to 
encourage investment in them in comparison with investment in other sectors. That is why this proposal is for fostering investment in 
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Figure IV.1 


























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
In several countries, ballooning debt meant that debt service absorbed an increasing share of tax revenue. 
In the 1990s, the external public debt burden eased substantially as economic growth returned, albeit unevenly, 
and debt was renegotiated or restructured. In other cases, exchange rates that held steady or appreciated in real 
terms were also a factor, temporarily reducing external liabilities in national currency. But these scenarios were 
unsustainable, and, as explained in chapter I, new crises were set off. 
The fiscal situation began to improve significantly in the region starting in 2003, as reflected in systematic 
primary surpluses (owing to stronger tax regimes and extraordinary revenue from export commodities as their prices 
rose), the launch of self-insurance mechanisms (such as stabilization funds and debt prepayment programmes during 
booms or in times of falling interest rates) and improved management of public assets and liabilities. Not only did 
the level of public debt come down in the span of a few years (between 2003 and 2007). Its make-up changed 
significantly, too, shifting to longer terms, a higher percentage of fixed-rate debt, a greater share held by residents 
and a larger portion denominated in local currency (since 2010, domestic debt has accounted for a larger share 
of total public debt than external debt has). Several countries issued external debt denominated in local currency, 
thus overcoming the so-called “original sin” that worked against this option.
Public debt went from averages of nearly 60% of GDP in 2003 to just 32% of GDP in 2008. The external 
component shrank to values in the area of 16% of GDP. As noted above, much of this decline took place in 2003-
2007; despite the deteriorating primary balance after 2008, the debt ratio has held fairly steady since then (32% of 
GDP in 2012) because the difference between interest rates and the rate of economic growth (the snowball effect) 
has been insignificant, except in some countries of Central America and the Caribbean. 
A breakdown of the factors behind public debt trends shows high exposure to the risk of rising exchange 
rates until 2002. The drop in debt as a percentage of GDP starting in 2003 was due to the reversal of that trend, 
but also to positive primary balances, economic growth and lower external and domestic interest rates (see 
figure IV.2). Figure  IV.2 also illustrates the importance of discretionary and composition factors (stock-flow 
adjustment) associated, among other things, with decisions taken by several countries to prepay external debt 
during that period.2 
Unlike in other parts of the world, and unlike what happened in the past in the region, public finance 
management is now a significant asset for Latin America. This can be seen in the widespread upgrade of sovereign 
risk ratings, showing that public debt reduction has been a factor in stabilizing economic actors’ expectations.
2 In such exercises, it is common to find a high residual (the so-called stock-flow adjustment) indicating discrepancies between fiscal 
balances and changes in public debt. Among the potential reasons are coverage, accounting methods, the impact of asset and liability 
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Figure IV.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean: drivers of changes in central government debt, 1999-2012














































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
But the picture is still uneven. Some Central American countries are still relatively highly indebted. In the 
Caribbean, many countries have very high debt-to-GDP ratios. And some countries of South America need to further 
reduce debt levels in the medium term because public debt interest rates remain high. 
Thanks to this set of factors, the region still has room (albeit constrained in a few cases) for facing adverse 
scenarios, mainly because public debt is below pre-crisis levels.
2. Progress has been made in implementing countercyclical policies during 
contractions of the economic cycle 
Ideally, fiscal policies should promote the generation of surpluses during booms and allow deficits during recessions, 
with a fixed average balance throughout the economic cycle, so as to reduce the negative impact of public-spending 
procyclicality on economic growth. 
Fiscal accounts in the region have tended to fluctuate widely due to their sensitivity to swings in GDP and 
commodity prices (Martner, González and Podestá, 2013). The primary cyclical factors have been gaps between 
effective growth and the trend growth rate, as well as raw materials prices. As table IV.1 shows, cyclical factors play a 
major role. Wide (recessionary) gaps between effective growth and the growth trend rate like the ones that opened in 
the early 2000s in a number of countries (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay) increased the cyclical component of the fiscal balance and added 
three or more percentage points to the cyclical deficit.
If the effective fiscal balance is corrected for these two factors, it will reflect decisions made by the authority more 
than cycle impacts. It will therefore be possible to identify the fiscal policy stance in certain periods by comparing 
variations in the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance with the GDP gap. When the GDP gap is positive, a procyclical 
policy is characterized by a decrease in the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance, which indicates an expansionary 
discretionary measure. By the same token, if the gap is negative (that is, GDP is in a recessionary phase that is below 
trend), a procyclical policy is characterized by a rising cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance, indicating a contractionary 
discretionary policy. In Martner (2007), an examination of 267 episodes in 18 countries in Latin America during 
 GJOET UIBU XFSF QSPDZDMJDBM BOE XFSF DPVOUFSDZDMJDBM PS OFVUSBM8IJMF DPOGJSNJOH UIF
prevalence of procyclical policies, it also shows that this is not always the case: a number of countries of the region 
implemented restrictive measures during booms, in the 1990s, and after 2003. Furthermore, there has been some 
degree of asymmetry, since with positive GDP gaps there has been a trend towards procyclicality. This would indicate 
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Table IV.1 
Latin America: maximum and minimum GDP gaps and cyclical balance, 1990-2012
  GDP gap(percentages of GDP)
Cyclical balance
(percentages of potential GDP)
  Minimum  Maximum  Minimum    Maximum
Argentina -27.9 (2001) 21.6 (1994) -3.3   2.1  
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) -11.0 (2003) 9.2 (1998) -9.8 (1999) 7.7 (2008)
Brazil -3.7 (2003) 3.1 (1997) -0.8   0.6 (2011)
Chile -10.3 (2002) 9.8 (1995) -2.0 (2002)ª 7.3 (2007)ª
Colombia -6.2 (2003) 15.1 (1991) -1.0   1.3  
Costa Rica -18.7 (2002) 18.2 (1997) -3.3   2.9 (1998)
Dominican Republic -35.8 (2002) 11.4 (1995) -5.3   1.3  
Ecuador -44.3 (2000) 22.0 (1994) -7.2   2.5  
El Salvador -7.1 (1992) 6.2 (2008) -1.0   1.2  
Guatemala -5.3 (2005) 12.2 (1991) -0.5   0.9  
Mexico -29.6 (1994) 11.4 (1992) -3.2   2.6 (2008)
Nicaragua -11.0 (2003) 21.9 (1992) -2.1   3.1  
Panama -15.5 (2003) 9.5 (1998) -4.9   2.4  
Peru -23.2 (1991) 12.5 (1997) -3.2   2.1  
Uruguay -18.7 (2002) 18.2 (1997) -3.4   3.0 (1998)
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -58.7 (2003 84.9 1995) -10.6   7.2 (1995)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a  Official projections.
Another way of examining fiscal policy stance is to compare growth in public spending and in GDP. Table IV.2 shows 
that, on average, in the 1980s the spread between primary public spending and GDP growth rates was only 0.3 percentage 
points. In subsequent upswings the spread was positive, which is evidence of the propensity to spend more during booms.3 
Table IV.2 
Latin America (20 countries): gap between real growth rates of primary spending and GDP, 1980-2012 
  1980-1989 1990-1996 1997-2002 2003-2008 2009 2010-2012
Argentina -0.6 4.0 -1.8 5.2 18.0 6.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 3.4 4.8 5.1 1.0 4.2 0.4
Brazil 2.3 -0.1 3.8 1.6 1.5 1.7
Chile 0.2 2.6 2.3 0.0 15.8 -3.2
Colombia 1.2 5.9 9.9 1.1 9.9 -1.0
Costa Rica 1.0 1.1 1.6 0.4 13.1 3.6
Cuba … … -0.9 7.7 -3.3 -8.4
Dominican Republic -1.2 3.1 4.4 3.3 -17.1 4.5
Ecuador -0.1 1.4 4.0 10.2 0.9 10.5
El Salvador -1.5 0.1 1.2 -0.7 12.2 1.1
Guatemala -1.7 -3.5 4.6 0.1 4.0 -0.3
Haiti … … 5.1 2.3 8.5 3.5
Honduras -1.5 -2.7 5.8 2.5 5.7 -6.6
Mexico 2.5 0.6 1.1 2.6 1.5 -0.8
Nicaragua 2.2 0.5 -0.6 3.8 0.9 -0.4
Panama -0.1 1.1 1.9 2.3 3.8 -0.9
Paraguay -1.1 7.8 1.0 -2.8 33.7 6.5
Peru -0.8 5.3 -0.6 0.1 8.0 -0.5
Uruguay 1.7 5.1 3.4 -1.9 5.2 0.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -0.7 -3.5 3.6 2.6 2.9 -6.3
Latin America 0.3 1.9 2.7 2.1 6.5 0.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
3 The fact that public spending growth outpaces GDP in upswings is not always sufficient grounds for labelling fiscal policy as procyclical, 
because it must be established what happened with revenues, debt and the deficit. In the 2000s, income in Latin America (including 
tax receipts, see ECLAC, 2013) grew faster than GDP and expenditure. This improved the debt position and boosted expectations (see 
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The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 shrank the fiscal space in a number of countries, forcing them to slow 
the pace of expansion of public expenditure despite the recession. But spending rose sharply in other countries, 
such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Paraguay and Peru, showing their ability to respond 
to a recessionary environment. Between 2010 and 2012 the average gap was much smaller because some of these 
countries withdrew some fiscal stimuli. While there were wide swings in the rate of growth of public expenditure 
when compared with the GDP growth rate, the speed-up in 2012 is likely associated with a countercyclical response 
to the adverse impacts of the global economic crisis. 
In five countries of the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint 
Lucia) (see table IV.3) primary public expenditure rose by more or less the same pace as GDP during 2003-
2008; six (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) 
saw a surge in 2009. Spending fell off in Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica, where fiscal space was constrained 
by the substantial public debt burden on their economies. The overall pattern between 2010 and 2012 seems 
to have little correlation with where any given economy is in the cycle; public expenditure growth rates are 
highly volatile, although, on average, they increased more in the 13 countries of the Caribbean than in the 20 
countries of Latin America. 
Table IV.3 
The Caribbean (13 countries): gap between real growth rates of primary expenditure and GDP, 1990-2012
(Percentage points)
  1990-1996 1997-2002 2003-2008 2009 2010-2012
Antigua and Barbuda … 7.2 0.2 7.1 -4.8
Bahamas … -1.8 4.0 4.1 7.1
Barbados … 3.4 0.7 6.4 -3.5
Belize … 4.0 -2.6 4.8 -0.1
Dominica … -20.2 7.1 -4.0 6.6
Grenada … 17.0 -2.5 -10.8 -3.6
Guyana … -1.2 2.6 6.4 3.6
Jamaica 3.4 0.6 4.1 -3.8 4.3
Saint Lucia … 1.4 -1.5 6.0 6.2
Saint Kitts and Nevis … 15.8 -3.8 7.4 4.4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … -0.9 2.2 4.5 -2.1
Suriname … -14.5 1.4 30.2 0.3
Trinidad and Tobago … 1.3 2.7 40.6 -1.0
The Caribbean … 0.9 1.1 7.6 1.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
3. Public investment has partially recovered
During the 1980s and 1990s, fiscal consolidation in the region translated into a sharp decline in public investment, 
with its negative impact on medium-term economic growth. This has been the most procyclical component of spending, 
as has been documented in many studies (see, for example, Akitoby and others, 2006). 
In practice it has been easier to cut back on investment during downswings. Compared with 1980-1981, public 
investment in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay fell by the equivalent of 1% of GDP or more in the two decades that followed (see Jiménez 
and Manuelito, 2013). Public investment in infrastructure fell from 3.1% of GDP to close to 1.0% of GDP in the 
1980s (see Perroti and Sánchez, 2011) and remained at those levels until 2008. The stock of capital in infrastructure 
posted a sharp three-decade decline.
In recent years, however, there has been a recovery. In terms of composition, capital expenditure has gained 
considerable space and risen at the same pace that public debt interest payments have fallen (see figure IV.3). In 
Latin America, the simple average of public capital expenditure for 20 countries increased from 2% of GDP to 4.6% 
of GDP between 1990 and 2012. In the Caribbean, the average for 13 countries went from 6.0% of GDP to 5.1% 










Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Figure IV.3 
Latin America (20 countries) and the Caribbean (13 countries): composition of public expenditure
































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Since the 2008-2009 crisis, public investment has become a more significant factor in economies. 
Comparing 1990-1996 with 2010-2012 shows a strong recovery in countries such as Argentina, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Uruguay and Trinidad and Tobago. But capital expenditure has fallen 
—sharply in some cases— in a number of Caribbean countries that had a high public investment ratio in early 
2000. Among them are Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
In some Latin American countries public-private partnership initiatives have taken hold. While these practices 
represent a real and potentially very attractive alternative for reducing the bias against public investment, they 
entail future fiscal obligations that must be part of a careful assessment of the costs, benefits and risks of each 
initiative in this area. 
4. Social spending and fiscal policy support for growth with equality has strengthened 
Fiscal policy has substantial potential for making a significant contribution to the growth and improved distribution of 
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have made social spending a macroeconomic priority. As a result, they were more agile in their countercyclical 
response to the 2009 crisis, showing that such spending is a cornerstone of policies aimed at macroeconomic 
stabilization and poverty reduction.
5IFSFXFSFTIBSQJODSFBTFTJODPVOUSJFTUIBUBMSFBEZIBEBIJHIMFWFMPGTPDJBMTQFOEJOHJO	TFFGJHVSF*7

including Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba and Uruguay. On the other hand, public social spending still makes 
up less than 12% of GDP in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay and Peru.
Figure IV.4 







































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The composition of this social spending is highly dispersed, reflecting the wide range of modalities for providing 
public goods and services (especially education, health and pensions) and illustrating the low level of social protection 
coverage in some countries.
There is striking heterogeneity in spending on education, which can be explained in part by the varying public/
private split in delivering education services at different levels. In certain cases, however, it is also due to insufficient 
capacity on the part of the State to generate the necessary resources. The impact of direct public sector spending on 
education, with changes in preschool and primary and secondary school coverage, has been substantial in the countries 
of the region (see OECD, 2012). Empirical evidence (González and Martner, 2012) shows that, in addition to the 
direct impact of fiscal measures and the macroeconomic cycle, the quality of education and an array of institutional 
variables have played a significant role in the recent improvements in income distribution in Latin America. Particular 
attention should be paid to human capital indicators: by any measure, they are key in determining the distribution 
of disposable income.
From the point of view of the tax system, the redistributive effect of fiscal action depends directly on the level, 
composition and degree of progressivity of each component of taxes and transfers. These three dimensions shape 
the picture in each country (Joumard, Pisu and Bloch, 2012). Thus, in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries, disposable-income inequality after taxes and transfers is 30% lower than market-
JODPNFJOFRVBMJUZ	CFGPSFUBYFTBOEUSBOTGFST
"TNFBTVSFECZUIF(JOJJOEFYUIFEFDSFBTFJTQFSDFOUBHFQPJOUT
on average. OECD countries with more unequal primary distribution tend to redistribute more through fiscal action. 
Direct transfers reduce income dispersion more than taxes do: three quarters of the decrease in inequality between 
market income and disposable income can be attributed to transfers, and the rest to taxes. 
In the countries of Latin America, direct fiscal action only slightly improves the markedly unequal distribution of 
personal income. Lustig, Pessino and Scott (2012) found that in six countries the decrease in inequality attributable 










Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)




that income per adult appears to be the main driver of improving distribution between 2002 and 2011 in 10 countries 
of the region. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, changes 
in labour income were behind 90% or more of the rise in total income per adult. In five other countries changes in 
OPOMBCPVSJODPNF	FTTFOUJBMMZQVCMJDUSBOTGFST
XFSFBDDPVOUBCMFGPSPSNPSFPGUIFEFDSFBTFJOJOFRVBMJUZ
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay). 
The limited impact of fiscal action on income distribution is related, on the one hand, to a lower comparative 
level of cash transfers, and, on the other hand, to limited direct tax receipts. The latter represent approximately half of 
indirect taxes, which have a regressive impact on income distribution. Accordingly, the still inadequate contribution 
of personal income tax despite recent progress, coupled with the small property and wealth tax take, leads to tax 
systems that do very little to help bring Gini coefficients down. In short, the redistribution of disposable income via 
taxes has been practically non-existent in the region. 
Most of the countries of the region saw a marked increase in the tax burden in relation to GDP (especially 
from 2002 on) together with major structural changes such as the consolidation of the value added tax, a significant 
improvement in the share of direct taxes and the roll-back of taxes on international trade. Contributing to this increase 
in the tax burden, albeit with variations from country to country, were a favourable macroeconomic context, steadily 
rising commodity prices, new taxes such as financial transaction taxes and minimum taxes, cuts in exemptions and 
deductions, improved tax administration and rising consumption. 
A recent change has been the increase in the portion of receipts coming from income taxes, consolidating 
UIFNBTUIFTFDPOEQJMMBSPGUIFSFHJPOTUBYTZTUFN	TFFGJHVSF*7BOE&$-"$
BOESFWFBMJOHBDFSUBJOUSFOE
towards greater tax system progressivity in the region over the past decade. As a percentage of GDP, income tax 
JO-BUJO"NFSJDB	TJNQMFBWFSBHF
DMJNCFEGSPNUIFFRVJWBMFOUPGPG(%1JOUPJOXIJMFJO
the Caribbean it went from 6.3% of GDP to 7.7% of GDP. Among the reasons were partial expansion of the base 
for some taxes on services, implementation of minimum taxes and contributions, improvements in tracking the 
universe of taxpayers, and, in some countries, the appropriation of additional resources from the production and 
export of commodities. There were more personal income tax reform measures in Latin America and the Caribbean 
in recent years; the tax base was expanded, and taxation was extended to all labour income and capital yields as 
well as dividends.
Figure IV.5 












































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
B. Monetary and exchange-rate policy have gradually come to play 
 a greater role in reducing nominal and real volatility
The evolution of monetary policy during the past three decades is outlined below, highlighting how it has helped 
reduce nominal volatility (inflation). The focus is on how monetary policy has been enhanced, both institutionally 
and, in many countries, by means of more flexible exchange rate regimes. This enabled most of the countries of the 
region to address the impacts of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis using countercyclical monetary policies that 
complemented the fiscal policies put in place at that time, in order to dampen real economic volatility and thereby 
promote growth. Finally, management of international reserves is examined as an increasingly important component 
of monetary and exchange-rate policy over the past decade and a half, spotlighting the build-up of international 
reserves in the region in response to international financial volatility.
1. Monetary policy promoted nominal stability: a low-inflation path was reached in 
most of the countries and made it possible to bring down interest rates as well
During the 1980s, monetary policy in a framework of high foreign currency-denominated external debt, stagnant 
economic activity, a low terms of trade ratio, external financing constraints and fiscal problems at the consolidated 
public sector level (which includes quasi-fiscal deficits) led to high rates of inflation and even hyperinflation in some 
cases (such as Argentina, Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of Bolivia). During the 1980s and part of the 1990s, 
the region tended to have fixed exchange-rate regimes that were often used as an exchange-rate anchor as part of a 
macroeconomic stabilization plan. Accordingly, monetary policy during the 1980s acted countercyclically and did 
not help to reduce nominal inflation volatility, nominal exchange-rate volatility or real GDP volatility. Figure I.13 
(see chapter I) shows the high average rates of inflation recorded in Latin America during the 1980s, while inflation 
remained low in the Caribbean.
Inflation declined throughout the region during the second half of the 1990s, not only on average but also in 
UFSNTPGUIFOVNCFSPGDPVOUSJFTXJUIIJHIJOGMBUJPOEVSJOHUIFQFSJPE5BCMF*7TIPXTUIBUDPVOUSJFTJOUIFSFHJPO
recorded inflation rates in excess of 20% during the first half of the 1990s; during the second half of the decade just 
EJETPBOEOPDPVOUSZQPTUFEUISFFEJHJUSBUFT*OGMBUJPOJTTUJMMUSFOEJOHEPXOBOEJTJOUIFTJOHMFEJHJUTJOOFBSMZ
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Table IV.4  
Latin America and the Caribbean: average rate of inflation, 1990-2012
Number of countries
  More than 100 99 - 50 49 - 20 19 - 10 9 - 5 5 - 1 Total sample
1990-1994 4 2 4 8 1 8 27
1995-1999 0 2 3 6 8 10 29
2000-2004 0 0 4 3 9 13 29
2005-2012 0 0 1 2 14 13 30
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The reasons for the decline in inflation in the region are varied and differ from country to country. Among them 
are falling external public debt (including restructurings under the Brady Plan), improving fiscal accounts, exchange 
rates that were initially used as an inflation anchor and made imports less expensive, trade opening that helped align 
tradable goods and services with external prices, a return to growth and the gradual strengthening of central banks 
as the institutions charged with the conduct of monetary policy. The latter was reflected in the gradual adoption by 
most of the region’s central banks of low and stable inflation as a priority goal (or even, in some cases, the only goal), 
either implicitly or explicitly, to the point of setting official inflation rate targets in the 1990s and early 2000s. Such a 
change of focus towards achieving low and stable inflation crystallized in central bank charter reforms in the region, 
BTOPUFECZ+ÈDPNF	
UIBUJOBEEJUJPOUPUIFBOUJJOGMBUJPONBOEBUFHBWFUIFTFJOTUJUVUJPOTHSFBUFSPQFSBUJPOBM
independence from political pressure and, among other reforms, imposed restrictions on the central banks’ ability 
to fund public deficits. 
In addition to this shift in monetary policy orientation, external factors such as the emergence of China and 
India in global markets helped bring down prices for manufactures and thus mitigated external inflationary pressures. 
 As inflation rates in the region fell, so did bank lending rates, as shown in figure IV.6. Lending rates in the region 
HSBEVBMMZEFDMJOFEGSPNBOBWFSBHFPGJO"QSJMUPJO%FDFNCFS5IJTTUFBEZESPQJOSBUFT
in most of the countries of the region encouraged the growth of domestic consumption and investment demand, 
particularly from 2003 on (see chapter II). 
Figure IV.6 















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
 According to the author, the following countries reformed their central banks in the 1990s and early 2000s: Chile (1989), El Salvador 
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2. The establishment of flexible exchange-rate regimes with varying degrees of 
regulation provided more room for monetary policy action 
The gradual spread of more flexible exchange-rate regimes in the region (in particular in South America and Mexico 
GSPNUIFTBOEFBSMZTBTTIPXOJOUBCMF*7
QSPWJEFEBHSFBUFSEFHSFFPGNPOFUBSZQPMJDZGSFFEPN6 
However, despite the adoption of de jure flexible regimes, most of the countries (except for Chile and Mexico) tended 
towards active intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Table IV.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean: exchange-rate regimes, 1990-2010
Exchange-rate regime 1990 1996 2003 2010
Fixed rate of exchange Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Panama, Dominican Republic, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, 
Suriname, Trinidad  and Tobago
Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Vincent y las Grenadines,  
Saint Lucia
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Grenada, Panama, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Saint Lucia, Suriname, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of)
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of), Dominica, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, 
Honduras, Panama, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of)
Intermediate regimes Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Uruguay, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of)
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua
Costa Rica, Nicaragua
Flexible rate  
of exchange
Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of)
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Dominican Republic, Suriname, 
Trinidad  
and Tobago
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Dominican Republic, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Dominican Republic, Uruguay
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
This meant that several countries of the region recovered monetary policy as a countercyclical tool for addressing 
exogenous shocks, thereby reducing real volatility and spurring growth while mitigating the negative impacts of real 
volatility on the well-being of the population and on equality. 
The 1980s and part of the 1990s were also marked by high volatility of real exchange rates against the United 
States dollar, as shown in figure IV.7, in particular in South America and Mexico. This volatility was largely a reflection 
of regular devaluations in countries with fixed exchange rates. As inflation was gradually controlled and exchange-rate 
regimes became more flexible, average volatility declined over time. 
Figure IV.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean: real exchange rate against the 
United States dollar, by subregion, 1980-2012
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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3. Monetary policy helped to reduce real economic growth volatility in the face of 
the international financial crisis 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which is regarded as the most severe since the Great Depression, sent 
economic activity, world trade and international financial flows into a tailspin. The expected impact on Latin America 
and the Caribbean was a reversal of the growth trend that had begun in 2003. Many countries of the region did 
indeed see a contraction of economic activity as a result of the crisis. For that reason, the authorities of Latin America 
and the Caribbean started to aim their actions at keeping the decline in external aggregate demand and the drop in 
international financial flows from triggering a contraction of economic activity that would, as in the past, be prolonged 
and cause a sharp increase in marginalization and poverty. 
Monetary authorities began by reversing the monetary policy rate increases made since mid-20087 and encouraging 
the expansion of credit so that shrinking financial flows and negative expectations would not collapse payment and 
credit systems and thus the aggregate domestic demand that would be crucial for a recovery. During this period, 
policy rates were lowered quickly, especially in those economies that were more integrated into international financial 
markets. Between July 2008 and December 2009, monetary policy rates were revised downwards in 16 of the region’s 
economies, were held unchanged in 11 economies and were increased in only 3. The most significant contractions were 
in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile and Colombia where the changes were of more than 600 basis points. 
The intention behind these changes in monetary-policy reference rates was not reflected, in the short run, in 
monetary aggregate growth because negative expectations as to aggregate demand translated into slower growth 
in monetary aggregates, such as credit.. However, in the course of 2010 efforts to advance expansionary monetary 
policy finally managed to reverse the trend; aggregates began to grow in some cases and to grow faster in others.8 
Similarly, lending (especially by private institutions) slowed considerably and in some cases even contracted. 
In response to the private credit crunch, channeling resources through the public banking system was often used 
by the governments of the region as a tool for mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis. In Brazil, the cutback in 
private bank lending was offset by injecting funds into public banks (so that they could increase the supply of credit 
to the public) and, in some cases, into other financial institutions that might be facing temporary liquidity constraints. 
Growing concerns about the international liquidity squeeze and its impact on the stability of the region’s financial 
systems gave rise to a number of measures to provide funds to national financial institutions in order to keep the lack 
of liquidity from creating solvency problems. 
4. Financial instability fed the build-up of international reserves
After the sudden stops associated with the crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s9 and as developing countries became 
more integrated into international capital markets, it became clear that the emerging economies were highly exposed to 
sudden reversals of capital flows. The lack of liquidity during these episodes, and the lack of appropriate mechanisms for 
providing it, brought to light one of the major weaknesses of the international financial system (ECLAC, 2012b). 
The response was a build-up of international reserves in Latin America and the Caribbean. This self-insurance 
mechanism makes it less necessary for countries to turn to private financial markets in times of high costs10 that 
come with international financial market illiquidity or heightened perceived risk of certain categories of assets. The 
conditionality imposed by the international financial institutions that provide assistance, along with delays in the 
disbursement of funds, also spurred the countries into pursuing a policy of build-up of reserves (ECLAC, 2012b).
Figure IV.8 shows the growth of reserves starting in the 1990s and gathering momentum from 2005 on. However, 
the pattern in Central America differs from the one seen in South America because the terms of trade improved 
significantly in the latter. 
7 Monetary policy rate increases were in response to heightening inflationary pressures that by the third quarter of 2008 had driven food 
and energy prices up.
8 The drop in external aggregate demand in the region and the decline in financial flows, including remittances from workers abroad, sparked 
greater currency volatility in the region, especially in those economies that were more integrated into international financial markets. In 
some cases this led to central bank intervention in currency markets and therefore led to a temporary decrease in international reserves. 
9 The Mexican crisis (1994), the Asian crisis (1997-1998), and the Argentine and Russian crises (early 2000s).
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Figure IV.8 












       
/DWLQ$PHULFDDQGWKH&DULEEHDQ 6RXWK$PHULFD 0H[LFR
&HQWUDO$PHULFD 7KH&DULEEHDQZLWKRXW7ULQLGDGDQG7REDJR
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
But as figure IV.9 shows, the increase in international reserves in the region has been very uneven among 
countries, not just between subregions. 
Figure IV.9 


































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The build-up of reserves has had another objective: to reduce exchange-rate volatility.11 The use of exchange-rate 
policy to reduce volatility in Latin America has gained prominence in recent years —even more so after the developed 
countries rolled out very expansionary monetary policies as a cornerstone of their strategy for weathering the financial 
crisis and the economic slowdown that came with it. 
Figure IV.10 shows the relationship, during 2001-2012, between exchange-rate volatility and the build-up of 
reserves in those countries of Latin America and the Caribbean with relatively more flexible exchange rate-regimes. 
The solid line tracks exchange-rate volatility measured by the exchange-rate coefficient of variation; the bars 
show the annual accumulation of reserves in response to central bank intervention. As can be seen in the figure, 
exchange-rate volatility in economies with flexible exchange rates increased significantly following the financial 
11 While there are many empirical studies that have tested for a relationship between exchange-rate volatility and investment and growth, 
there are no conclusive findings (Eichengreen, 2007). However, others such as Aghion and others (2009) have found that in countries 
with underdeveloped financial systems, excessive exchange-rate volatility may negatively impact growth, particularly if the shocks 










Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
crisis. The coefficient of variation of the nominal exchange rate in these economies rose significantly between 
July 2008 and October 2009. After that, this indicator declined but remained above the pre-crisis level, showing 
that exchange-rate volatility persisted.
Figure IV.10 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): exchange-rate volatility and annual build-up of  
international reserves, January 2001 to September 2012





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Note: Exchange-rate volatility was determined using the natural logarithm of the average nominal monthly exchange rate, calculating the moving average standard 
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The region had been building up reserves long before the crisis, but the pace accelerated markedly in its wake. 
In most of the countries of the region, improving terms of trade, larger inflows of short-term capital and soaring 
remittances and foreign direct investment boosted international reserves (ECLAC, 2011). However, after the crisis 
and in response to greater international financial market volatility, many central banks in the region opted for a more 
aggressive international reserve build-up policy in order to reduce the volatility of their currencies and prevent these 
fluctuations from having a long-term impact on the production capacity of the economy, especially in the tradable 
goods-producing sectors. 
A third argument, which is currently the subject of considerable debate, refers to the build-up of reserves to 
influence the real exchange rate level. Changes in the average real effective exchange rate in 21 countries of the region 
before and after the international financial crisis can be seen in figure IV.11 and show that exchange-rate appreciation 
has on average been more marked in the countries of South America than in Mexico and Central America.
Figure IV.11 






































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
There is a broad recognition of the problems created by marked and sustained currency overvaluation (especially, 
resource allocation bias in favour of the non-tradable sector of the economy, as highlighted in chapter III),12 but there 
is no consensus as to the practical feasibility or cost-benefit ratio of monetary, exchange-rate or macroprudential 
policies aimed at keeping a currency undervalued for a prolonged period when there is access to voluntary external 
financing. Despite growing recognition that short-term capital can be managed and disincentivized by means of 
limits, taxes or macroprudential policies, the malleability of financial flows and their ability to escape regulations 
after the latter have been in effect for a certain period of time work against the effectiveness of these regulations in 
the long term. And exchange-rate undervaluation has its costs, mainly quasi-fiscal ones. So, the costs of building 
up reserves include the risk that the value of central-bank assets measured in domestic currency will change over 
time along with the exchange rate. Another factor to take into account is the cost arising from the spread between 
low rates of return on external assets and the typically higher interest rates paid on debt issued by the central 
bank to sterilize the monetary effect of the purchase of foreign currency,13 as well as the additional cost of any 
remunerated reserve requirements.







13 For a review of how sterilization works and the channels through which it can impact exchange rates, see Taylor and Sarno (2001).
 For central banks, monetary expansion owing to payouts on sterilization instruments is an additional monetary policy constraint when 
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C. Strategic aspects of macroeconomic policy for boosting growth 
The gradual strengthening of fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies in recent decades suggests that their 
contribution to greater growth with equality will be decisive in the future. There are four reasons why macroeconomic 
policy should give priority attention to encouraging investment in Latin America and the Caribbean and thereby help 
to create the conditions for diversifying the production structure. First is a likely future scenario in which high prices 
for the region’s export commodities contribute significantly less to disposable income. In many countries, especially 
in South America, improving terms of trade accounted for one third or more of the rise in national disposable income 
during the past decade, as documented in chapter II. However, this could be coming to an end as the commodity price 
super-cycle winds down. It is therefore necessary to diversify the production structure with a focus on environmental 
sustainability and less dependence on the exploitation of natural resources and, especially, on identifying and 
promoting new axes of growth in an uncertain environment where coordinating public and private investment can 
lead to significant externalities.
Second, slowing GDP growth in the region in recent years, and the increasing dependence of growth on 
expanding consumption in the face of a weakening investment contribution and the negative contribution of 
net exports (exports minus imports) does not help reduce external vulnerability, and this casts doubts on the 
sustainability of GDP growth over the long term. It is therefore necessary to give priority to increasing investment, 
especially in the tradable sectors that produce goods and services and in infrastructure sectors that contribute 
to systemic competitiveness. Thirdly, investment is one of the key channels for the technological progress and 
increased productivity needed for growth and competitiveness in the long term. Lastly, as noted in chapter III, over 
the past few years investment in non-tradable (lower-productivity) sectors has increased more than in tradable 
(higher-productivity) sectors in a number of countries. This trend needs to be reversed in order to promote a more 
balanced and productive process in the future.
Set out below are macroeconomic strategy guidelines for promoting investment, especially in tradable sectors 
with greater linkages, as part of socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable economic growth.
1. Sound institutions are a must for boosting investment
This strategy proposal depends on an institutional setting that fosters synergies between macroeconomic, 
industrial, environmental and labour policies for the sake of targeted, consistent public-sector action (ECLAC 
2012a, chapter VII) and includes tacit or explicit agreements or compacts between the State and social actors 
to move in the same direction (Devlin and Moguillansky, 2010). Boosting private investment generally requires 
a set of economic, institutional and social conditions that make for an attractive outlook for long-term returns; 
this could be provided by social compacts for investment. In addition to complementary investments in 
infrastructure (energy, transport and telecommunications) and other public policies, inclusive growth makes 
socially sustainable investment possible. In general, this is helped by a political and institutional framework 
that enjoys broad legitimacy and provides space for expressing views and interests and for channeling social, 
environmental or other conflicts towards a solution. 
On the labour front, this approach involves building labour relations at different levels (ranging from individual 
businesses to the national level) that recognize the legitimate divergence of opinions and interests and provide forums for 
dialogue and negotiation, respecting the rights of internationally recognized trade unions. The institutional environment 
must also include rules and procedures to facilitate the management and resolution of social, environmental and 
other conflicts that, if not resolved, could delay or prevent the execution of private investment projects. 
2. Promoting investment in the short term calls for stabilizing, countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies 
The institutional setting for monetary and fiscal policies geared towards the steady growth of aggregate demand is 
crucial because it has been shown to be a determining factor in investment and growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the positive correlation between investment and installed capacity 
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path (see chapter II), justify the implementation of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies, recognizing the 
greater impact potential of the former and the greater operational flexibility of the latter. Such policies should help 
reduce idle capacity and economic growth volatility (booms and busts)15 that, by leading to sudden downturns in 
GDP growth, discourage investment.
These considerations give rise to three macroeconomic policy orientations in regard to the correlation between 
investment and growth. While these are discussed here separately, in practice they are very much interlinked and 
are part of the main goal: higher rates of growth. 
First, since idle capacity disincentivizes investment, it is necessary to achieve and maintain levels of activity that 
are consistent with high, sustainable use of production capacities. Macroeconomic policy aimed at a high degree 
of use of such capacities (the idea of real stability stressed by ECLAC) results in a real interest rate that does not 
discourage real investment, inflation that is within a socially tolerable range, a real exchange rate without sustained 
deviations from its long-term trend, sustainable public and external finances and low unemployment, according 
to the characteristics of each country’s production structure and labour markets. In these conditions, aggregate 
demand can expand and remain high without compromising internal and external balances. However, this involves 
so many targets that meeting them requires, more than a single type of instrument, adopting a set of fiscal, monetary, 
exchange-rate, financial (domestic and external) and labour-market policies aimed in that direction in a manner that 
is consistent and sustained over time. Depending on the situation in each country, there is more than one way to 
shape a macroeconomic policy framework that is conducive to these results. 
Secondly, the negative impacts that economic downturns have on investment call for developing countercyclical 
capacities in order to counteract or mitigate downswings triggered by external and internal shocks. The economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean have a long history of domestic and external turmoil set off by economic, social 
or political factors, extreme events or natural disasters, causing wide fluctuations and declines in activity that have 
negatively impacted investment and, therefore, growth. Thus, not only is it important to achieve a high degree of use 
of production capacity —it needs to be maintained by implementing temporary countercyclical policies to smooth 
the fluctuations resulting from such shocks.
Doing so calls for creating space or scope for action on the fiscal, monetary, exchange-rate and financial (both 
internal and external) fronts that allows for countercyclical measures without disrupting the trends of the key variables 
that determine long-term growth or working against short- and medium-term policy consistency or credibility. As 
in the previous case, this space can be created through a range of instruments, such as the build-up of savings, 
international reserves and mechanisms for accessing liquidity or emergency funding. In any case, the main input for 
their effectiveness over time will be the reputation of the authorities in charge of macroeconomic policy because if 
domestic space is exhausted it will be easier to access the financial resources (whether public, private or multilateral) 
needed to take countercyclical action while anchoring expectations as to the future policy path even if addressing 
the immediate situation involves temporary extraordinary measures.
Thirdly, beyond the fluctuations caused by temporary shocks, macroeconomic policy should, by promoting 
internal and external balances that are sustainable over time, help to prevent crises that lead to recessions, slow 
growth and idle production capacity. Over the past few decades, Latin America and the Caribbean has gone through 
crises sparked by the long-term unsustainability of finances (public and private, domestic and external) together 
with a serious loss of competitiveness by the export goods- and services-producing and import-substitution sectors 
(tradable goods and services). 
While not all of the crisis episodes were the same, they all involved a substantial expansion of spending and 
credit underpinned by short-term capital inflows and real exchange-rate appreciation rooted in anti-inflationary 
policies that used the exchange rate as a nominal anchor.16 In other cases, the authority did not react in time or 
in a coordinated manner to the significantly deteriorating external environment that made the pattern of domestic 
expenditure unsustainable. In both cases, a low domestic savings rate (both public and private) made it necessary 
to turn to external savings for funding investment, with vulnerabilities accumulating owing to constant and growing 
15 This does not just mean ensuring nominal stability in order to control inflation, but ensuring real stability as well, so as to contribute 
to stable growth of demand and output.
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external imbalances.17 In this context, it took just a small external shock (like rising external interest rates, a debt 
moratorium on the part of a faraway country or falling export prices) for those vulnerabilities to surface in the 
form of external payment difficulties in the face of sudden capital outflows. The resulting crises sent growth and 
investment plummeting. 
Preventing crises and avoiding the accumulation of imbalances that increase vulnerabilities is, then, a third key 
aspect for sustaining growth over the long term. In the current context of financial globalization, this goal is facing 
new challenges. In addition to fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies seeking public finance solvency and price 
and external-balance stability, macroprudential policy and financial regulation have gained greater importance, 
especially in the wake of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. As that and other crises have shown, private actors 
(particularly the financial markets) are prone to herd behaviour, with episodes of euphoria followed by panics, 
perceived procyclicality of individual risks and underestimation, if not complete ignorance, of systemic risks. This 
therefore calls for a broader view of financial regulation and macroprudential policy to curb excessive private sector 
risk-taking by establishing permanent rules (such as regulations covering bank liquidity, bank leverage ratios and risk 
provisioning) and adopting special temporary measures in the form of direct controls to limit private behaviour that 
would exacerbate systemic risks (such as capital flow controls and credit limits).
Several policy issues run through the three aspects discussed above, but it is useful to highlight the role that 
avoiding excessive deviation of the real exchange rate from its long-term trend plays in all of them. This is key for 
investment, not only in terms of avoiding imbalances that give rise to crises, but also because the scale of domestic 
markets (population size and per capita income) in certain cases is still too low to serve as an incentive for private 
investment. This underlines the importance of export or tradable-sector development (which includes exportable and 
importable goods and services) as a source of growth —a factor in which the real exchange rate is a key variable, as 
highlighted in the next section.
Preventing crises also involves limiting the use of external savings. As noted, the region has tapped domestic 
savings for financing investment to a lesser extent than other countries, and this was a source of vulnerability for 
quite some time. Experience after 2003 shows that a higher domestic savings rate was among the sources of the 
region’s resilience in the face of the financial crisis. For these savings to materialize there must be fiscal and financial 
development policies pointing in that direction. 
Implementing countercyclical and crisis-prevention policies is not without its challenges and has substantial 
institutional requirements. By the early 2000s legal initiatives aimed at strengthening accountability and transparency 
in public finances (generically labeled as fiscal rules) were already gaining momentum. But these first-generation 
rules had a procyclical bias: targets that are based on a balanced budget (zero deficit) or on a reduction of public 
debt regardless of macroeconomic conditions exacerbate boom-and-bust cycles and thus hamper relatively stable 
and sustainable growth. Just setting annual deficit or public-debt ceilings is not enough to achieve stabilization. 
To ensure consistency over the long run by seeking debt reduction during upswings and accepting larger deficits 
during periods of slower growth so as to help stabilize GDP and investment growth, second-generation macro-fiscal 
rules should have a medium-term structural balance target, exception and transitory clauses and some room for 
manoeuvre to deal with catastrophic events or persistent recessionary conditions. 
Second-generation macro-fiscal rules also require substantial institutional development, especially the ability 
to transform sensitivity analyses and prospective scenarios into budgeting procedures so as to ensure appropriate 
multi-year budget programming, clauses of exception and explicit treatment of transitory income. Institutions and 
their capacities, reflected in monetary and fiscal authority credibility, should help ease the pressure for procyclical 
policies during cycle upswings and make it easier to withdraw stimulus policies when they are no longer justified. 
Such weaknesses have surfaced in a number of countries in recent years. 
The cyclical component of public finances has been substantial in many countries of the region, so conducting 
fiscal policy on the basis of a medium-term objective is very much linked to institutional capacity for saving during 
upswings. In turn, the free operation of automatic stabilizers during downturns can lead to significant temporary 
deficits that will need to be addressed. 
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The corollary of the structural rules is, then, the need for a comprehensive funding strategy that will mitigate any 
spending restrictions stemming from cyclical deficits and avoid the unsustainable expansion of expenditure in the face 
of temporary surpluses. The countries of the region have taken three approaches in this regard. First, several countries 
have developed strategies for integration into international financial markets that go beyond temporary deficit funding 
to seek a stable presence in those markets so it will be easier to tap them. Secondly, developing domestic financial 
markets as a source of funding for both the private and the public sector has become very important for the region. 
Thirdly, several countries have turned to stabilization funds. While consolidating explicit savings mechanisms during 
booms has proven to be complex, some stabilization funds linked to fiscal responsibility legislation (as in Chile and 
Peru) have become the tools of choice for public-sector funding strategies. 
While the greater prudence and response capacity seen in recent years have been based on a certain consensus, in 
most countries of the region there is still no robust institutional framework for fiscal and monetary policy coordination. 
The challenge, then, is to design strategies to internalize cycle impacts on public finances and to ensure effective 
coordination of the set of countercyclical policies. In order to be effective, countercyclical policies must encompass 
actions in multiple areas, such as monetary, macroprudential, labour (including wage policies) and production policies. 
There are at least two perverse dynamics that can considerably amplify macroeconomic fluctuations and act as 
a drag on investment. At the low point of the cycle, lack of coordination can lead to higher-than-necessary interest 
rates, which in turn amplifies fiscal imbalances both on the primary balance side and on the interest payment side 
and jeopardizes public-sector solvency by feeding expectations of higher interest rates and disincentivizing private 
investment. Subsequent correction of the public accounts imbalance can turn a recession into a depression, with 
very negative consequences for unemployment. The institutional framework has yet to be reformed in a way that 
encourages monetary and fiscal policy coordination. This issue is under discussion in a number of countries and 
should not only be part of the investment promotion agenda but also be linked to the challenge of ensuring stable, 
sustained growth in general.
3. Stimulating investment in the medium and long term requires eliminating the 
bias in favour of investment in non-tradable sectors and promoting fiscal, financial 
and employment policies that support structural change 
On the production front, productivity varies depending on the sector where investment has taken place and this 
(coupled with the evidence provided in chapter III that in several countries of the region there has been a bias in 
favour of investment in non-tradable sectors during the past decade) highlights the need for macroeconomic policies 
to promote investment in the tradable sectors, especially with a view to fostering diversification, complemented by 
industrial policies and other microeconomic and sectoral policies (ECLAC 2012a). Any relative price bias against 
investment in tradable sectors resulting from overvalued exchange rates that are difficult to adjust provides justification 
for correcting this problem with other policy instruments, without contractionary impacts.18 
 The contribution of exchange-rate policy to promoting investment in the tradable sectors has both potential 
and limits. On the one hand, over the past few years exchange-rate volatility has increased in many countries and 
likely heightened uncertainty for investments that could have taken place in the tradable sectors. Setting up financial 
mechanisms that allow exchange-rate hedges and intervening in the market to reduce exchange-rate volatility without 
necessarily changing its trend are practices that several countries have already implemented and could be strengthened. 
Most countries have adopted flexible exchange-rate regimes that, while subject to a certain degree of managed 
flexibility or dirty floats, have made it possible to relatively successfully weather external shocks. Facilitating the 
investment of pension fund or of sovereign wealth funds abroad can help ease appreciation pressure. So can 
macroprudential and short-term capital management measures. But the quasi-fiscal costs (especially, the opportunity 
cost of reserve build-up and sterilization costs) of warding off currency appreciation in high international financial 
liquidity scenarios can be high, and the malleability of financial flows makes it difficult to achieve full and lasting 
control over them in a globalized economy. This context warrants other policy actions that, through a variety of 
incentives, can encourage investment in the tradable sectors in particular.
18 In the eurozone, what is called “internal devaluation” has been used for this purpose, but by turning to contractionary fiscal policies 
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High international liquidity and liquidity constraints alike call for a new pro-investment fiscal policy agenda 
(Fanelli, 2013) geared above all towards promoting investment in the higher-productivity sectors (goods and services), 
especially the tradable sectors, and fostering diversification. Three fiscal and financial policy targets could further 
this objective. First, public or public-private investment should focus on infrastructure (complementary non-tradable 
sector) with the aim of reducing the logistical and transport costs associated with the delivery of tradable goods and 
services, thereby seeking to counteract what could be an unfavourable relative price ratio stemming from significant 
exchange-rate misalignments (especially, real appreciation). This could be enhanced by a region-wide financial policy 
orientation, so that national, regional and international public banks focus their resources on addressing this need, 
based on the general recognition that there are marked gaps and lags in this area (Estevadeordal and others, 2010).
Having a more adequate infrastructure and, in general, sound institutional arrangements conducive to resolving 
conflicts and setting rules that reduce investment risk while ensuring stability and social inclusion would be part 
of a suitable business climate for sustained investing. An unfavourable business climate drives up the cost of other 
investment attraction mechanisms (such as exemptions and subsidies) needed to offset it. 
In a broader sense, moreover, the business climate hinges on perceptions of future demand and democratic and 
institutional stability, which can be achieved only by means of inclusive, socially sustainable growth providing quality 
public goods, an appropriate distribution of disposable income and environmental sustainability. This means that 
a high rate of long-term economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean requires a diversified, efficient and 
cost-competitive energy matrix in which renewable energy plays a relevant role (see box IV.1). As noted in chapter 
II, improvements in education, government collection of rents generated by the exploitation of natural resources, as 
well as the reallocation of public expenditure, have helped decrease final income concentration despite a higher 
operating surplus and so are seen as public policy musts for growth to be inclusive and socially sustainable.
Box IV.1 
Economic growth and energy consumption in Latin America  
and the Caribbean: a long-term challenge
GDP and per capita GDP in Latin America have followed an 
upward path over the past three decades, at a long-term pace 
with cyclical swings in keeping with these trends and significant 
differences among countries (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989; Hodrick 
and Prescott, 1997; Mills, 2003). The region’s GDP grew at an 
average annual rate of 2.6% between 1980 and 2010 that breaks 
down into a growth rate of 1.4% in the 1980s, 3.1% in the 1990s 
and 3.2% in the 2000s (see figure 1). Energy consumption in 
Latin America and the Caribbean grew at a similar but slower 
pace: 2.2% between 1980 and 2010 and 1.7%, 2.7% and 2.2%, 
respectively, in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (see figure 2). So, 
GDP and energy consumptiona in Latin America and the Caribbean 
have followed similar paths, although energy consumption has 
posted a slower pace that is reflected in a gradual 0.4%-per-year 
decline in the energy intensity of GDP: after rising 0.3% per 
year in 1980-1990 there was a slight and steady decline during 
1990-2000 and 2000-2010, at 0.4% and 1.0% respectively. The 
data show that, like modern economies overall, the economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean are very dependent on energy 
consumption and that energy decoupling tends to be a slow 
process (Ozturk, 2010; Chen, Chen and Chen, 2012; Stern, 2011). 
The marked correspondence between GDP and energy 
consumption paths in Latin America and the Caribbean is, 
moreover, consistent with energy demand response sensitivities 
to the income and relative price path, which can be synthesized 
by means of meta-analysis.b The global weighted average of 
income elasticities of energy demand is 0.68; the estimated 
average including only studies for Latin America is even higher, 
at 0.92 (see figure 3).c This indicates that a high economic growth 
rate in the region means a similar albeit slightly smaller increase 
in energy consumption there. The global weighted average of 
price elasticities of energy demand is negative and statistically 
significant but relatively low (-0.206). This price elasticity is 
even lower in studies available for Latin America (even with a 
particularly small value for the entire region, at -0.014).d This low 
price elasticity of demand reflects low substitutibility and the lack 
of technology innovation and diffusion in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Accordingly, the ability to influence the consumption 
path with the price mechanism alone is still limited in the region 
and should therefore be complemented by regulations and other 
kinds of public policies. 
So, in order to maintain a high pace of growth, Latin America 
and the Caribbean needs to build, soon, an adequate and flexible 
energy supply at reasonable prices that, however, reflects all of 
its negative externalities. In this context, the major challenges 
lie in building an adequate energy supply in specific regions or 
sectors such as mining, air pollution in urban areas and CO2 
emissions and their impacts on climate change. These challenges 
are substantial and should be addressed very soon in view of 
the high correlation between per capita income, per capita 
energy consumption and per capita emissions and the fact that 
infrastructure built today will most likely be in use for the next 
40 years (ECLAC, 2010; Hepburn and Stern, 2008). Building this 
clean and efficient energy matrix therefore entails an international 
strategic competitive advantage and a need for economic growth, 
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Box IV.1 (continued)
Figure 1 
























































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ECLAC, “América Latina y el Caribe: series históricas de estadísticas 
económicas 1950-2008”, Cuadernos Estadísticos, No. 37 (LC/G.2415-P), Santiago, Chile, 2009; and CEPALSTAT database.
a  Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay.
Figure 2 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countriesa): GDP and energy consumption  


































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of CEPALSTAT database and International Energy Agency 
(IEA), World Energy Statistics, World Energy Statistics and Balances (database) doi: 10.1787/data-00510-en [date of reference: 7 June 2012].
a Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay.
Figure 3 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a Energy consumption refers to the sum of energy consumption by end-use sectors. It includes the demand for energy by the industrial, transport, agriculture, 
housing, commerce and public services sectors as well as non-energy use. Another widely used indicator of energy demand is total primary energy supply, 
although this indicator does not substantially change the findings of the study. 
b Meta-analysis is a statistical method that combines results from different independent studies to obtain more accurate inferences than individual studies and, 
in some cases, to pinpoint the sources of heterogeneity of results among those studies (Borenstein and others, 2009). The estimator of the combined effect 
obtained via meta-analysis is the weighted average of the effect size or values found in each study, where weighting is based on the precision (variance or 
standard error) of the findings of each study (Sterne, 2009).
c This evidence is based on a review of articles from a wide range of journals, reports and books published between 1981 and 2012 spanning the subject period 
(1948 to 2008) and compiling 63 studies, including a total of 831 elasticities. The review of the international literature on long-term income elasticity yielded 
414 estimations (ranging from -6.48 to 8.01; simple average = 0.81). 
d The meta-analysis for price elasticity includes a total of 417 long-term estimations (ranging from -4.2 to 4.16; simple average = -0.398). A meta-analysis dividing 
OECD member countries (excluding Chile and Mexico) and non-OECD countries showed that income elasticity for OECD countries is 0.63 and for non-OECD 










Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2013
Second, subsidies could be channelled to promote complementarities (externalities) between private investment 
projects as well as structural change associated with diversified investments in the tradable sectors with greater 
linkages, taking account of their environmental sustainability. Given the risk of introducing incentives by means of tax 
exemptions —a scenario of extreme fiscal opacity with no clear outcomes that already exists in several countries of the 
region (Jiménez and Podestá, 2009)— a good alternative would be selective, fixed-term subsidies targeting investments 
with greater externalities and ensuring regular assessments of the impact of such measures. This transition to a new 
generation of subsidy-dependent incentives and loans will ensure greater transparency because the expenditures 
involved will have to be included in each annual government budget and will be easier to evaluate, as is the case 
in most OECD countries. 
Third, improving public capacities to implement these measures and coordinate public and private investment is 
as important as designing appropriate incentives. In addition to the risk of not ensuring proper coordination among 
the public institutions charged with promoting structural change, there are other hazards: establishing incentives that 
can be diverted and manipulate eligibility rules; attracting overly risky projects; and using subsidies to encourage 
investments that would have been carried out without government support. Addressing these risks and ensuring 
compliance with criteria (such as environmental standards) that are not always consistent with private returns in the 
short term require robust institutional coordination, monitoring and evaluation. 
Fiscal transparency, which should be extended with particular attention to all subsidies, must play a key role as a 
deterrent to even the most extreme abuse. In addition to budget and expenditure oversight by the legislative branch, 
courts of auditors and comptrollers, social oversight has to be extended as an instrument for citizen participation 
in the design, monitoring and follow-up of government action, including the use of subsidies and transfers. Social 
oversight is a useful tool for preventing corruption and enhancing citizen participation in fiscal matters. Initiatives in 
the area of transparency, especially social oversight, in Latin America and the Caribbean have differed in pace and 
scope and are still very incipient.
Long-term employment policies should include encouraging investment in higher value-added tradable sectors, 
that is, they should facilitate structural change. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the lack of skilled workers is 
often cited as a hindrance to better business performance (Weller, 2011). Investment projects are profitable only to 
the extent that there is an appropriately qualified labour force. This is especially crucial in the case of investments 
involving new technologies; fully leveraging them requires new skills and know-how that would be particularly 
important for structural change involving the reallocation of investment and labour to sectors with greater productivity 
requirements. This poses a major challenge for university education as well as for technical education and calls for 
the development of national systems of vocational education and training that should focus on three points:
• Initial technical training for young people in line with production-system demand, with content updated 
frequently as a result of a joint effort by labour and social actors.
• Continuing training that enables workers to upgrade their knowledge and skills throughout their working lives.
• Support for structural change through training of workers in low-productivity sectors in order to facilitate their 
mobility towards higher-productivity sectors. To this end, many of them need to acquire additional skills.
Training poses challenges that are often related to information and communication technologies (ICT), which 
make up a growing share of many investments. National systems of vocational education and training must also take 
account of the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, which often run into difficulties in finding skilled labour 
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Table A-1 
Latin America and the Caribbean: main economic indicators 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product b 5.8 4.5 5.5 5.5 3.8 -1.9 5.6 4.3 3.0
Latin America b 4.4 3.2 4.2 4.3 2.7 -3.0 4.5 3.2 1.9
Consumer prices c 7.3 6.1 5.1 6.5 8.1 4.6 6.5 6.8 5.9
Percentages
Urban open unemployment 10.3 9.0 8.6 7.9 7.3 8.1 7.3 6.7 6.4
Total gross external debt / GDP d e 34.8 25.4 21.3 20.0 17.7 20.4 20.2 19.4 21.2
Total gross external debt / exports
  of goods and services 139.6 102.5 85.4 83.8 74.7 102.0 97.3 88.0 94.5
Millions of dollars
Balance of payments e
Current account balance 22 780 36 691 50 319 12 667 -32 877 -22 737 -57 943 -75 221 -101 841
   Exports of goods f.o.b. 482 246 582 036 695 283 781 648 906 181 704 326 892 768 1 108 966 1 124 646
   Imports of goods  f.o.b. 424 926 502 566 598 544 713 680 868 002 653 331 846 356 1 035 703 1 076 906
   Services trade balance -11 802 -14 876 -16 243 -23 954 -30 996 -31 152 -48 253 -66 474 -74 039
   Income balance -68 097 -81 238 -94 279 -98 451 -107 843 -100 546 -117 752 -145 124 -138 197
   Net current transfers  45 360 53 335 64 103 67 104 67 783 57 967 61 651 63 116 61 941
Capital and financial balance f -8 059 24 349 13 589 112 512 71 372 69 022 144 067 181 163 159 144
   Net foreign direct investment 50 192 57 358 32 512 92 793 99 148 70 324 76 003 125 784 125 662
   Other capital movements -58 251 -33 009 -18 924 19 720 -27 776 -1 302 68 064 55 379 33 482
Overall balance 14 721 61 040 63 908 125 180 38 495 46 285 86 124 105 943 57 182
   Variation in reserve assets g -23 504 -39 643 -51 162 -127 113 -42 123 -50 585 -87 573 -106 287 -57 841
   Other financing 8 783 -21 397 -12 747 1 945 3 628 4 301 1 450 344 659
Net transfer of resources -67 224 -78 919 -94 054 15 046 -32 842 -27 223 27 764 36 383 21 935
International reserves 225 943 262 402 319 242 459 464 512 611 567 421 655 993 774 230 836 041
Percentages of GDP
Fiscal sector h
Overall balance -1.9 -1.1 -0.0 0.2 -0.5 -2.8 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9
Primary balance 0.5 1.3 2.2 2.1 1.1 -1.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
Total revenue 16.4 17.4 18.4 18.9 18.9 17.8 18.3 18.7 19.0
Tax revenue 13.1 13.7 14.2 14.7 14.6 14.1 14.4 14.9 15.3
Total expenditure 18.2 18.5 18.4 18.7 19.4 20.6 20.1 20.4 20.9
Capital expenditure 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5
Central-government public debt 51.2 43.2 36.1 30.6 29.7 30.7 29.7 29.5 30.3
Public debt of the non-financial public-sector 54.9 47.6 38.9 33.4 32.3 33.3 31.7 31.5 32.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
b Based on official figures expressed in 2005 dollars.  
c December - December variation.    
d Estimates based on figures denominated in dollars at current prices.  
e Does not include Cuba. 
f Includes errors and omissions.    
g A minus sign (-) indicates an increase in reserve assets.  
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Table A-2 
Latin America and the Caribbean: gross domestic product
(Millions of dollars)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 2 235 067 2 708 071 3 185 532 3 765 878 4 384 109 4 105 071 4 924 425 5 704 717 5 702 925
Latin America 2 193 162 2 660 514 3 133 297 3 707 716 4 317 889 4 049 279 4 865 468 5 641 207 5 636 925
Argentina 153 129 183 196 214 267 262 451 328 469 308 740 370 263 448 165 477 028
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 8 773 9 549 11 452 13 120 16 674 17 340 19 650 23 949 27 035
Brazil 663 733 882 044 1 089 253 1 366 853 1 653 535 1 620 164 2 143 034 2 476 651 2 252 926
Chile 100 631 124 404 154 412 172 869 179 627 171 957 217 556 251 191 268 310
Colombia 117 082 146 567 162 590 207 417 243 983 232 901 287 018 336 346 369 790
Costa Rica 18 595 19 965 22 526 26 322 29 838 29 383 36 298 41 031 45 107
Cuba 38 203 42 644 52 743 58 604 60 806 62 079 64 328 68 990 71 017
Dominican Republic 21 582 33 542 35 660 41 013 45 523 46 598 51 576 55 433 58 898
Ecuador 36 592 41 507 46 802 51 008 61 763 62 520 67 812 77 832 84 682
El Salvador 15 798 17 094 18 551 20 105 21 431 20 661 21 418 23 095 23 787
Guatemala 23 965 27 211 30 231 34 113 39 136 37 734 41 338 47 689 50 377
Haiti 3 660 4 154 4 880 5 971 6 408 6 470 6 635 7 346 7 865
Honduras 8 871 9 757 10 917 12 361 13 882 14 587 15 839 17 697 18 985
Mexico 758 577 846 094 949 066 1 033 176 1 091 982 880 101 1 031 109 1 155 206 1 173 600
Nicaragua 5 793 6 321 6 786 7 447 8 254 8 156 8 587 9 636 10 529
Panama 14 179 15 465 17 137 19 794 23 002 24 163 27 053 31 316 36 654
Paraguay 8 034 8 735 10 646 13 795 18 503 15 934 20 048 25 957 25 297
Peru 69 701 79 389 92 319 107 524 129 107 130 144 157 438 180 760 203 833
Uruguay 13 811 17 363 19 579 23 411 30 366 30 229 38 846 46 435 49 919
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 112 452 145 513 183 478 230 364 315 600 329 419 239 620 316 482 381 286
The Caribbean 41 905 47 557 52 235 58 163 66 220 55 793 58 957 63 511 66 000
Antigua and Barbuda 898 997 1 135 1 289 1 347 1 206 1 136 1 125 1 176
Bahamas 7 094 7 706 7 966 8 319 8 247 7 820 7 888 7 873 8 149
Barbados 3 495 3 908 4 197 4 483 4 344 4 397 4 245 4 313 4 589
Belize 1 058 1 114 1 217 1 291 1 370 1 339 1 398 1 493 1 591
Dominica 361 356 382 413 452 482 475 476 480
Grenada 599 695 699 759 826 771 770 780 790
Guyana 1 256 1 315 1 458 1 740 1 923 2 026 2 259 2 577 2 851
Jamaica 10 173 11 239 11 928 12 796 13 712 12 150 13 231 14 457 14 880
Saint Kitts and Nevis 502 543 636 686 736 710 715 748 748
Saint Lucia 849 905 1 010 1 125 1 165 1 167 1 200 1 211 1 186
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 522 551 611 684 695 674 681 691 713
Suriname 1 816 2 244 2 626 2 936 3 533 3 876 4 367 4 305 4 908
Trinidad and Tobago 13 280 15 982 18 369 21 642 27 870 19 175 20 593 23 462 23 939
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Table A-3 
Latin America and the Caribbean: gross domestic product
(Annual growth rates) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
Latin America and the Caribbeanb 5.8 4.5 5.5 5.5 3.8 -1.9 5.6 4.3 3.0
Latin America 5.8 4.4 5.3 5.5 3.9 -1.9 5.8 4.4 3.0
Argentina 9.0 9.2 8.5 8.7 6.8 0.9 9.2 8.9 1.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 4.2 4.4 4.8 4.6 6.1 3.4 4.1 5.2 5.2
Brazil 5.6 3.0 3.7 5.8 4.8 -0.3 6.9 2.7 0.9
Chile 6.0 5.6 4.6 4.6 3.7 -1.0 5.8 5.9 5.6
Colombia 5.3 4.7 6.7 6.9 3.5 1.7 4.0 6.6 4.0
Cuba 5.8 11.2 12.1 7.3 4.1 1.5 2.4 2.8 3.0
Costa Rica 4.3 5.9 8.8 7.9 2.7 -1.0 5.0 4.4 5.1
Dominican Republic 1.3 9.3 10.7 8.5 5.3 3.5 7.8 4.5 3.9
Ecuador 8.2 5.3 4.4 2.2 6.4 0.6 2.8 7.4 5.0
El Salvador 1.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 1.3 -3.1 1.4 2.2 1.9
Guatemala 3.2 3.3 5.4 6.3 3.3 0.5 2.9 4.2 3.0
Haiti -3.5 1.8 2.3 3.3 0.8 2.9 -5.4 5.6 2.8
Honduras 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.2 4.2 -2.4 3.7 3.7 3.3
Mexico 4.1 3.3 5.1 3.4 1.2 -6.0 5.3 3.9 3.9
Nicaragua 5.3 4.3 4.2 5.0 4.0 -2.2 3.6 5.4 5.2
Panama 7.5 7.2 8.5 12.1 10.1 3.9 7.5 10.8 10.7
Paraguay 4.1 2.1 4.8 5.4 6.4 -4.0 13.1 4.3 -1.2
Peru 5.0 6.8 7.7 8.9 9.8 0.9 8.8 6.9 6.3
Uruguay 11.8 6.6 4.1 6.5 7.2 2.2 8.9 6.5 3.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 18.3 10.3 9.9 8.8 5.3 -3.2 -1.5 4.2 5.6
The Caribbean 4.6 7.1 9.8 5.1 2.7 -1.0 1.3 1.5 2.1
Antigua and Barbuda 5.3 6.1 13.4 9.5 0.1 -12.0 -7.1 -2.8 2.3
Bahamas 0.9 3.4 2.5 1.4 -2.3 -4.2 1.0 1.7 1.8
Barbados 1.4 4.0 5.7 1.7 0.3 -4.1 0.2 0.6 0.2
Belize 4.7 3.0 4.7 1.2 3.9 0.3 3.9 2.3 5.3
Dominica 2.6 -0.3 4.6 6.0 7.8 -1.1 1.2 1.0 -1.5
Grenada -0.6 13.3 -4.0 6.1 0.9 -6.7 -0.4 1.0 -0.8
Guyana 1.6 -2.0 5.1 7.0 2.0 3.3 4.4 5.4 4.8
Jamaica 1.3 0.9 2.9 1.4 -0.8 -3.5 -1.5 1.3 -0.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4.2 8.9 6.0 2.8 4.6 -6.0 0.2 1.7 -1.1
Saint Lucia 7.5 -1.2 8.9 1.6 5.1 0.4 0.2 1.4 -3.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 4.2 2.5 7.7 3.3 1.6 -2.3 -3.4 -0.7 1.5
Suriname 0.5 7.2 11.4 5.1 4.1 3.0 4.1 4.7 4.4
Trinidad and Tobago 8.0 5.4 14.4 4.5 3.4 -4.4 0.2 -2.6 1.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
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Table A-4 
Latin America and the Caribbean: per capita gross domestic product
(Annual growth rates)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
Latin America and the Caribbeanb 4.4 3.2 4.2 4.3 2.7 -3.0 4.5 3.2 1.9
Latin America 4.5 3.2 4.2 4.3 2.7 -3.0 4.5 3.2 1.9
Argentina 8.1 8.2 7.5 7.7 5.8 -0.0 8.2 7.9 1.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.2 2.5 3.0 2.8 4.4 1.7 2.5 3.6 3.6
Brazil 4.3 1.8 2.6 4.8 3.8 -1.2 5.9 1.9 0.1
Chile 4.9 4.5 3.5 3.6 2.7 -2.0 4.8 4.9 4.6
Colombia 3.7 3.1 5.1 5.3 2.0 0.2 2.5 5.2 2.6
Costa Rica 2.4 4.1 7.0 6.2 1.2 -2.5 3.5 3.0 3.7
Cuba 5.5 11.0 12.0 7.2 4.1 1.5 2.4 2.8 3.0
Dominican Republic -0.2 7.7 9.1 7.0 3.8 2.1 6.3 3.1 2.6
Ecuador 6.2 3.4 2.6 0.5 4.6 -1.1 1.2 5.7 3.3
El Salvador 1.5 3.2 3.5 3.4 0.8 -3.6 0.8 1.4 1.1
Guatemala 0.6 0.7 2.8 3.7 0.8 -1.9 0.4 1.7 0.5
Haiti -4.9 0.4 0.9 2.0 -0.4 1.6 -6.6 4.3 1.5
Honduras 4.1 4.0 4.5 4.1 2.2 -4.3 1.7 1.7 1.3
Mexico 2.8 2.0 3.7 2.1 -0.0 -7.1 4.1 2.7 2.7
Nicaragua 4.0 3.0 2.8 3.7 2.7 -3.4 2.3 4.0 3.7
Panama 5.5 5.2 6.6 10.1 8.2 2.1 5.6 9.0 8.8
Paraguay 2.1 0.2 2.9 3.5 4.5 -5.6 11.2 2.6 -2.8
Peru 3.7 5.6 6.5 7.7 8.6 -0.2 7.6 5.7 5.1
Uruguay 11.9 6.6 3.9 6.3 6.8 1.9 8.6 6.2 3.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 16.2 8.4 8.0 6.9 3.5 -4.8 -3.0 2.6 4.0
The Caribbean 2.9 2.9 7.1 2.6 0.7 -4.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.7
Antigua and Barbuda 3.9 4.7 12.0 8.2 -1.0 -13.0 -8.1 -3.8 1.3
Bahamas -0.6 1.9 1.0 -0.0 -3.7 -5.5 -0.3 0.4 0.6
Barbados 1.2 3.8 5.5 1.5 0.1 -4.3 0.0 0.4 0.0
Belize 2.3 0.7 2.5 -0.9 1.7 -1.7 1.8 0.3 3.2
Dominica 2.8 -0.1 4.9 6.4 8.3 -0.8 1.4 1.1 -1.4
Grenada -0.9 13.0 -4.3 5.8 0.6 -7.0 -0.7 0.6 -1.2
Guyana 1.2 -2.3 4.8 6.8 1.8 3.1 4.2 5.2 4.6
Jamaica 0.6 0.3 2.3 1.0 -1.2 -3.8 -1.9 0.9 -0.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis 2.8 7.5 4.6 1.5 3.3 -7.2 -1.0 0.4 -2.3
Saint Lucia 6.5 -2.2 7.8 0.5 4.0 -0.7 -0.8 0.4 -4.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 4.0 2.3 7.5 3.2 1.5 -2.4 -3.4 -0.7 1.5
Suriname -0.8 5.9 10.1 4.0 3.1 2.1 3.2 3.7 3.5
Trinidad and Tobago 7.6 5.0 14.0 4.1 3.0 -4.8 -0.2 -2.9 0.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
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Table A-5 
Latin America and the Caribbean: gross domestic product a
(Variation from same quarter of preceding year)  
2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Argentina 9.9 9.1 9.3 7.3 5.2 0.0 0.7 2.1 3.0
Belize 7.8 0.4 2.4 -1.1 6.1 6.7 4.4 3.7 -0.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 5.6 4.2 5.4 5.5 5.1 4.5 4.6 6.5 6.0
Brazil 4.2 3.3 2.1 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.9
Chile 9.8 5.8 3.2 5.0 5.1 5.7 5.8 5.7 4.1
Colombia 5.6 6.5 7.7 6.7 5.5 4.7 2.7 3.1 2.8
Costa Rica 2.9 4.3 5.0 5.6 7.7 5.7 3.8 3.4 1.2
Dominican Republic 4.3 3.6 4.7 5.2 3.8 3.8 4.1 3.9 0.3
Ecuador 6.8 7.8 8.4 6.8 6.8 5.0 4.1 4.2 …
El Salvador 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.8 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.4
Guatemala 4.3 4.5 4.7 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.4 3.1 2.4
Jamaica 1.5 1.9 0.3 1.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.9 -1.3
Mexico 4.3 2.9 4.4 3.9 4.9 4.5 3.2 3.2 0.8
Nicaragua 5.3 6.5 4.7 5.3 5.8 2.2 5.6 7.0 3.6
Panama 9.9 12.2 11.4 10.0 11.4 10.8 10.5 10.0 7.0
Paraguay 6.9 4.9 3.3 2.6 -3.0 -2.3 1.4 -0.9 14.8
Peru 8.7 6.6 6.5 5.5 6.0 6.1 6.5 5.9 4.8
Trinidad and Tobago -2.4 1.7 -2.3 -2.1 0.6 -2.8 1.8 1.0 …
Uruguay 7.5 6.3 8.8 3.8 4.4 3.7 2.9 4.8 3.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 4.8 2.6 4.4 4.9 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.5 0.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Based on figures in local currency at constant prices.
Table A-6 
Latin America and the Caribbean: gross fixed capital formation
(Percentages of GDP) a
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 b
Latin America and the Caribbean 17.6 18.6 19.8 21.0 22.2 20.6 21.6 22.5 22.8
Argentina 19.1 21.5 23.4 24.4 25.0 22.2 24.7 26.4 24.7
Bahamas 19.9 24.2 29.0 27.8 25.8 24.2 24.3 25.7 31.1
Belize 17.6 18.5 18.0 18.4 22.7 18.3 13.9 13.5 …
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 12.7 13.0 13.5 14.6 16.3 16.2 16.8 19.7 19.0
Brazil 15.8 15.9 16.9 18.2 19.7 18.4 20.9 21.3 20.3
Chile 18.1 21.2 20.8 22.1 25.5 22.6 24.0 26.0 27.7
Colombia 18.2 19.7 21.8 23.3 24.7 24.0 24.2 26.9 27.5
Costa Rica 19.0 18.7 19.1 20.9 22.6 20.3 20.4 21.2 21.8
Cuba 8.3 9.0 11.5 11.0 11.4 10.5 9.9 10.2 …
Dominican Republic 15.8 16.4 17.9 18.6 19.3 15.9 17.3 16.2 16.2
Ecuador 19.4 20.4 20.5 20.8 22.7 21.8 22.3 24.0 25.5
El Salvador 15.5 15.3 16.5 17.1 16.0 13.3 13.5 15.0 14.6
Guatemala 18.1 18.3 20.1 19.8 18.1 15.6 14.9 15.2 15.5
Haiti 27.5 27.4 27.4 27.3 27.9 28.0 27.7 28.6 29.4
Honduras 26.8 24.9 26.5 31.0 31.6 21.0 20.5 24.1 24.0
Mexico 19.5 20.3 21.2 21.9 22.8 21.4 20.4 21.2 21.6
Nicaragua 21.8 23.0 22.5 23.7 23.0 20.4 20.0 23.2 28.7
Panama 16.9 16.8 18.1 22.7 25.9 23.4 24.3 25.4 26.3
Paraguay 16.5 16.6 16.5 17.6 19.5 18.9 20.3 21.6 20.2
Peru 17.5 18.3 20.2 22.9 27.5 25.0 29.0 29.6 32.0
Trinidad and Tobago 20.7 30.2 15.8 14.7 15.6 … … … …
Uruguay 15.0 16.5 18.1 18.6 20.7 19.1 19.8 19.6 22.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 16.2 20.3 23.9 27.6 26.9 25.4 24.2 24.2 28.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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Table A-8 
Latin America and the Caribbean: international trade of goods
(Indices 2005=100) 
                                                                                   Exports of goods, f.o.b.
Value Volume Unit value
2010 2011 2012 a 2010 2011 2012 a 2010 2011 2012 a
Latin America 154.3 191.5 194.5 112.8 118.1 123.2 136.8 162.2 157.9
Argentina 168.7 207.9 201.1 127.2 132.8 126.6 132.6 156.5 158.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 226.5 295.3 392.9 124.4 134.1 172.4 182.0 220.3 228.0
Brazil 170.7 216.4 205.0 104.1 107.3 107.0 164.0 201.7 191.7
Chile 169.4 194.1 186.5 104.0 108.0 110.1 162.9 179.7 169.5
Colombia 187.9 267.7 283.7 128.0 148.2 157.1 146.8 180.6 180.6
Costa Rica 134.0 146.3 161.2 141.2 149.6 165.7 94.9 97.7 97.3
Dominican Republic 109.9 140.2 147.8 94.1 111.1 118.3 116.8 126.1 124.9
Ecuador 173.3 220.5 235.5 117.5 123.6 130.0 147.5 178.4 181.1
El Salvador 132.1 155.9 157.2 118.8 128.6 133.0 111.2 121.2 118.2
Guatemala 156.3 192.7 185.1 121.8 134.1 136.3 128.3 143.7 135.8
Haiti 122.6 167.1 170.8 103.2 137.8 127.7 118.8 121.3 133.8
Honduras 121.1 154.5 148.1 97.7 100.5 110.4 123.9 153.7 134.2
Mexico 139.2 163.0 173.0 121.0 123.2 133.4 115.1 132.3 129.7
Nicaragua 190.9 245.3 279.8 154.8 176.0 200.7 123.3 139.4 139.4
Panama 171.9 229.5 255.9 152.9 190.8 209.8 112.4 120.3 122.0
Paraguay 254.2 376.9 356.9 207.8 275.1 255.4 122.3 137.0 139.8
Peru 204.8 266.4 262.8 109.4 114.7 117.0 187.2 232.2 224.5
Uruguay 212.8 245.7 262.5 148.1 148.7 153.8 143.7 165.2 170.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 118.0 166.6 174.7 73.1 78.8 81.0 161.4 211.5 215.7
                                                                       Imports of goods, f.o.b.
Value Volume Unit value
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 a
Latin America 170.3 208.2 217.0 141.1 156.9 163.0 120.6 132.7 133.1
Argentina 197.3 259.1 240.2 176.2 209.2 190.3 112.0 123.9 126.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 230.0 315.3 340.2 178.0 223.9 241.4 129.2 140.8 140.9
Brazil 246.9 307.4 303.2 189.9 207.4 202.7 130.0 148.2 149.6
Chile 180.9 231.2 244.1 162.1 189.1 199.6 111.6 122.3 122.3
Colombia 191.0 258.2 276.3 157.5 193.5 207.3 121.3 133.4 133.3
Costa Rica 139.9 167.8 180.9 135.4 151.7 163.6 103.4 110.6 110.6
Dominican Republic 156.9 176.7 179.9 136.8 135.1 137.6 114.7 130.8 130.8
Ecuador 202.3 239.4 253.2 161.9 174.1 184.2 125.0 137.5 137.5
El Salvador 124.7 148.4 152.4 105.8 115.5 117.6 117.8 128.4 129.6
Guatemala 132.7 160.4 164.1 104.8 112.1 114.7 126.7 143.1 143.1
Haiti 214.8 230.3 204.8 152.0 132.6 110.7 141.2 173.7 185.0
Honduras 136.1 168.0 166.3 106.0 114.4 113.2 128.4 146.8 146.8
Mexico 135.7 157.9 166.9 115.2 124.9 132.0 117.8 126.4 126.4
Nicaragua 162.1 207.2 229.7 134.4 151.3 167.7 120.7 136.9 136.9
Panama 192.7 256.9 275.6 161.9 197.2 209.5 119.1 130.3 131.6
Paraguay 260.0 307.7 291.5 229.0 247.8 232.4 113.5 124.2 125.4
Peru 238.5 306.0 340.3 162.6 189.7 207.4 146.6 161.3 164.0
Uruguay 228.0 285.2 325.5 174.9 193.6 222.1 130.4 147.3 146.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 160.8 195.0 247.2 139.3 154.9 194.5 115.5 125.8 127.1
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Table A-9 
Latin America and the Caribbean: exports of goods, f.o.b.
(Millions of dollars)
2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 243 003 285 428 288 149 277 565 267 506 280 681 278 584 282 609 247 038 156 077
Latin America 238 166 279 644 281 221 272 740 263 056 275 259 272 197 277 765 246 054 156 032
Argentina 16 902 23 173 23 522 20 454 17 826 21 142 22 139 19 820 17 376 15 994
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1 870 2 233 2 713 2 361 2 270 2 957 3 271 3 449 2 982 913 b
Brazil 51 233 67 071 71 695 66 041 55 080 62 134 63 383 61 984 50 837 42 453
Chile 20 214 21 368 19 288 20 585 19 874 19 767 17 336 21 300 19 060 14 142
Colombia 12 612 14 686 14 390 15 227 15 497 15 124 14 458 15 195 14 070 4 949 b
Costa Rica 2 508 2 728 2 565 2 608 2 944 2 992 2 731 2 791 2 875 1 996
Dominican Republic 1 947 2 355 2 204 2 106 2 110 2 308 2 320 2 342 … …
Ecuador 5 344 5 704 5 602 5 672 6 205 6 051 5 907 5 684 6 187 1 969 b
El Salvador 1 395 1 379 1 332 1 203 1 403 1 269 1 388 1 280 1 362 1 009
Guatemala 2 718 2 702 2 494 2 487 2 638 2 577 2 399 2 364 2 605 934 b
Haiti 171 211 224 181 158 221 225 211 … …
Honduras 1 159 1 205 782 856 1 279 1 194 1 099 848 1 117 …
Mexico 81 801 89 283 88 088 90 204 89 609 94 309 91 235 95 552 88 325 65 696
Nicaragua 637 611 488 527 695 699 644 639 632 231 b
Panama 3 315 3 796 4 573 4 211 4 244 3 999 4 294 4 427 2 333 c …
Paraguay 1 709 2 129 2 244 1 684 1 633 1 974 1 923 1 754 2 233 918 b
Peru 10 106 11 752 12 900 11 511 11 974 10 586 11 611 11 468 10 183 3 060 b
Uruguay 1 656 2 140 2 178 1 938 1 881 2 290 2 523 2 031 1 678 1 767
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 20 869 25 119 23 939 22 884 25 736 23 668 23 310 24 626 22 200 …
The Caribbean 4 837 5 784 6 928 4 826 4 449 5 423 6 388 4 845 984 …
Antigua and Barbuda 10 14 3 2 8 12 5 5 8 …
Bahamas 166 204 178 181 203 190 214 220 … …
Barbados 123 129 108 116 156 190 101 119 120 …
Belize 154 164 142 155 179 164 162 147 161 …
Dominica 6 7 7 10 8 9 8 11 8 …
Grenada 6 10 7 6 8 11 8 7 8 …
Guyana 219 363 235 313 306 276 375 438 … …
Jamaica 418 462 407 378 444 427 417 460 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis 15 17 14 15 16 14 16 16 13 …
Saint Lucia 31 41 43 46 39 43 40 45 40 …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 8 9 11 11 11 11 10 12 11 …
Suriname 566 619 591 692 619 614 616 715 616 …
Trinidad and Tobago 3 115 3 746 5 182 2 901 2 452 3 461 4 416 2 652 … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Figures as of May.
b Figures as of April.
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Table A-10 
Latin America and the Caribbean: imports of goods, c.i.f.
(Millions of dollars)
2011 2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 228 617 262 382 275 622 270 996 255 517 269 465 272 282 284 885 253 055 160 092
Latin America 222 861 255 376 268 603 263 579 248 448 262 571 265 933 277 883 251 447 159 934
Argentina CIF 15 330 19 051 21 418 18 520 15 314 17 002 18 585 17 607 16 066 13 505
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) CIF 1 545 1 767 2 146 2 215 1 896 1 941 2 038 2 396 2 101 724 b
Brazil FOB 48 091 57 260 61 587 59 309 52 659 57 491 54 742 58 272 55 992 42 690
Chile CIF 17 127 18 494 20 143 19 466 18 282 19 233 20 392 21 560 19 400 13 859
Colombia CIF 12 098 13 519 14 275 14 340 14 044 15 082 15 112 14 874 14 187 5 167 b
Costa Rica CIF 3 859 3 883 4 230 4 248 4 380 4 244 4 324 4 630 4 375 3 040
Dominican Republic FOB 3 230 3 788 3 680 3 838 3 515 3 760 3 894 3 796 … …
Ecuador CIF 5 333 6 104 6 220 6 629 6 032 6 380 6 612 6 173 6 407 1 907 b
El Salvador CIF 2 395 2 588 2 605 2 376 2 537 2 504 2 668 2 560 2 542 1 904
Guatemala CIF 3 855 4 394 4 250 4 114 4 127 4 347 4 147 4 373 4 148 1 609 b
Haiti CIF 822 809 840 756 743 648 734 769 … …
Honduras CIF 2 041 2 385 2 276 2 314 2 376 2 288 2 359 2 481 2 216 …
Mexico FOB 79 893 88 044 91 968 90 939 87 906 92 941 92 416 97 489 89 347 67 393
Nicaragua CIF 1 225 1 274 1 320 1 385 1 395 1 497 1 414 1 545 1 288 492 b
Panama CIF 2 485 2 898 2 909 3 047 2 877 3 042 3 472 3 242 2 028 c …
Paraguay CIF 2 698 3 103 3 344 3 223 2 630 2 770 3 024 3 131 2 943 2 134
Peru FOB 8 200 9 570 9 690 9 507 9 573 10 001 11 017 10 522 10 202 3 513 b
Uruguay CIF 2 600 2 750 2 652 2 724 2 889 2 968 2 859 2 930 2 649 1 996
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) CIF 10 037 13 692 13 048 14 631 15 273 14 430 16 123 19 534 15 556 …
The Caribbean 5 757 7 007 7 020 7 418 7 070 6 894 6 349 7 002 1 608 …
Antigua and Barbuda CIF 118 128 113 111 131 132 118 152 132 ...
Bahamas CIF 727 862 897 924 1 022 868 864 893 ... ...
Barbados CIF 420 458 451 497 433 428 426 493 425 ... 
Belize FOB 176 204 199 196 183 227 207 220 ... ...
Dominica CIF 54 58 57 57 46 49 52 48 45 ...
Grenada CIF 82 81 82 85 82 82 85 87 83 ...
Guyana CIF 374 487 452 457 475 473 447 583 ... ...
Jamaica FOB 1 390 1 442 1 523 1 568 1 469 1 443 1 538 1 454 ... ...
Saint Kitts and Nevis CIF 66 58 56 68 55 51 58 62 62 ...
Saint Lucia CIF 171 166 180 183 166 156 174 180 159 ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines CIF 82 79 83 87 83 91 89 94 84 ...
Suriname CIF 349 471 396 464 429 424 438 491 618 ...
Trinidad and Tobago CIF 1 748 2 511 2 532 2 721 2 497 2 470 1 854 2 244 ... ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Figures as of May.
b Figures as of April.
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Table A-11 
Latin America: terms of trade for goods f.o.b./f.o.b. 
(Indices 2005=100) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
Latin America 95.3 100.0 106.8 109.6 113.0 103.3 113.4 122.2 118.6
Argentina 102.2 100.0 106.0 110.0 124.6 118.9 118.4 126.3 125.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 93.0 100.0 125.0 127.0 128.7 124.6 140.9 156.4 161.8
Brazil 98.7 100.0 105.3 107.5 111.3 108.7 126.1 136.1 128.1
Chile 89.3 100.0 131.1 135.6 117.9 119.3 146.0 146.9 138.5
Colombia 92.2 100.0 103.8 112.1 124.4 107.0 121.0 135.4 135.5
Costa Rica 104.0 100.0 97.1 96.1 92.5 95.6 91.8 88.4 87.9
Cuba 102.7 100.0 126.3 132.9 … … … … …
Dominican Republic 101.0 100.0 99.0 102.3 97.7 105.7 101.8 96.5 95.5
Ecuador 89.3 100.0 107.3 110.3 121.1 107.2 118.0 129.8 131.7
El Salvador 100.0 100.0 98.7 97.7 95.0 98.1 94.4 94.4 91.2
Guatemala 100.9 100.0 98.1 96.3 93.8 101.8 101.3 100.4 94.9
Haiti 103.8 100.0 96.2 93.5 67.2 87.0 84.1 69.8 72.3
Honduras 100.0 100.0 95.4 93.6 87.9 94.0 96.6 104.7 91.4
Mexico 98.1 100.0 100.5 101.4 102.2 90.8 97.7 104.7 102.6
Nicaragua 101.4 100.0 97.6 96.6 92.4 101.3 102.2 101.8 101.8
Panama 101.9 100.0 97.1 96.2 91.8 96.3 94.4 92.4 92.7
Paraguay 107.1 100.0 98.1 102.7 110.2 107.8 107.8 110.3 111.4
Peru 93.2 100.0 127.3 132.0 114.4 108.1 127.7 143.9 136.9
Uruguay 110.1 100.0 97.6 97.8 103.7 106.8 110.2 112.2 116.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 76.5 100.0 119.4 130.9 161.6 117.6 139.8 168.1 169.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
Table A-12 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): remittances from emigrant workers
 (Millions of dollars)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Brazil 2 913 2 224 2 189 2 134 481 538 478 493 457 329
Colombia 4 842 4 145 4 023 4 168 961 1 033 1 006 1 074 952 382 b
Costa Rica 563 489 505 487 122 124 141 140 … …
Dominican Republic 3 222 3 042 2 998 3 200 791 738 718 911 … …
Ecuador 3 083 2 736 2 591 2 672 596 625 606 619 … …
El Salvador 3 742 3 387 3 431 3 649 946 999 949 1 018 921 715
Guatemala 4 315 3 912 4 127 4 378 1 058 1 303 1 229 1 193 1 133 928
Honduras 2 714 2 403 2 526 2 750 673 729 718 723 685 288 b
Jamaica 2 021 1 792 1 906 2 025 505 522 493 517 493 …
Mexico 25 144 21 306 21 304 22 803 5 386 6 470 5 414 5 168 4 822 1 902 b
Nicaragua 818 768 823 912 250 244 246 254 265 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Figures as of May.
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Table A-13 
Latin America and the Caribbean: net resource transfer a
(Millions of dollars)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 b
Latin America and the Caribbean -67 224 -78 919 -94 054 15 046 -32 842 -27 223 27 764 36 383 21 935
Latin America -66 998 -77 382 -89 735 16 547 -30 400 -26 657 30 294 38 237 23 883
Argentina -7 175 -3 722 -10 388 -198 -14 317 -16 154 -8 544 -16 539 -15 090
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) -571 -434 -175 -43 -154 -1 094 -707 670 -1 919
Brazil -29 955 -35 633 -10 553 56 642 -9 401 37 269 56 887 63 792 37 683
Chile -10 615 -10 541 -23 481 -29 153 -1 352 -13 265 -14 886 3 332 -3 546
Colombia -849 -1 846 -2 925 2 713 -788 -2 990 -79 -2 734 158
Costa Rica 432 1 166 2 058 1 929 2 022 -247 1 097 1 768 3 565
Cuba 150 -633 -618 -960 … … … … …
Dominican Republic -2 324 -321 -221 666 2 462 1 248 3 096 2 651 1 506
Ecuador -1 084 -1 580 -3 691 -2 138 -2 236 -2 258 -586 -646 -1 587
El Salvador 132 -59 375 1 039 1 477 179 -270 24 975
Guatemala 1 359 995 1 096 1 159 809 -902 29 154 574
Haiti 94 -20 201 286 465 479 1 033 589 636
Honduras 743 177 149 612 1 530 -428 700 605 94
Mexico 1 089 727 -10 998 1 098 7 372 -3 498 12 683 21 285 8 979
Nicaragua 616 590 804 1 178 1 315 780 838 1 087 1 056
Panama -414 418 -1 198 925 1 562 -664 1 223 1 744 593
Paraguay -98 72 168 400 486 546 439 -676 -1 445
Peru -1 354 -4 596 -7 681 -165 -288 -6 619 3 762 -5 645 9 262
Uruguay -137 84 -52 710 3 045 929 -1 109 2 319 4 447
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -17 037 -22 225 -22 603 -20 155 -24 408 -19 968 -25 312 -35 543 -22 060
The Caribbean -225 -1 538 -4 320 -1 500 -2 442 -566 -2 530 -1 854 -1 948
Antigua and Barbuda 56 137 260 333 282 108 148 89 45
Bahamas 349 57 787 723 903 909 623 864 1 077
Barbados 58 263 89 293 204 102 278 372 ...
Belize 7 25 -51 -84 38 22 -94 -64 -39
Dominica 20 62 48 66 108 116 73 67 44
Grenada 47 138 203 211 201 160 153 175 174
Guyana -10 143 242 215 350 474 414 348 449
Jamaica 605 623 798 937 2 120 430 871 1 386 662
Saint Kitts and Nevis 43 23 70 89 184 172 142 121 58
Saint Lucia 47 40 268 295 257 125 195 235 187
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 99 70 106 168 204 189 221 163 225
Suriname 112 83 -179 -152 -271 -11 -721 -389 -255
Trinidad and Tobago -1 659 -3 200 -6 962 -4 594 -7 022 -3 362 -4 833 -5 220 -4 573
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a The net resource transfer is calculated as total net capital income minus the income balance (net payments of profits and interest). Total net capital income is the 
balance on the capital and financial accounts plus errors and omissions, plus loans and the use of IMF credit plus exceptional financing. Negative figures indicate 











Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Table A-14 
Latin America and the Caribbean: net foreign direct investment a
 (Millions of dollars)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 b
Latin America and the Caribbean 50 192 57 358 32 512 92 793 99 148 70 324 76 003 125 784 125 662
Latin America 47 946 54 744 29 321 89 145 93 644 67 628 73 778 121 194 122 862
Argentina 3 449 3 954 3 099 4 969 8 335 3 307 6 884 8 394 11 462
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 63 -242 278 363 509 420 651 859 1 060
Brazil 8 339 12 550 -9 380 27 518 24 601 36 033 36 917 67 690 68 095
Chile 5 096 4 962 5 214 7 720 6 367 5 654 5 912 2 557 9 233
Colombia 2 873 5 590 5 558 8 136 8 110 3 789 -84 5 158 16 071
Costa Rica 733 904 1 371 1 634 2 072 1 339 1 441 2 098 1 839
Dominican Republic 909 1 123 1 085 1 667 2 870 2 165 1 896 2 275 3 610
Ecuador 837 493 271 194 1 056 306 163 639 587
El Salvador 366 398 268 1 455 824 366 117 385 516
Guatemala 255 470 552 720 737 574 782 1 009 1 167
Haiti 6 26 161 75 30 38 150 181 179
Honduras 553 599 669 926 1 007 505 971 997 1 052
Mexico 20 389 17 899 14 248 23 057 25 731 8 940 6 819 9 465 -11 872
Nicaragua 250 241 287 382 626 434 508 968 810
Panama 1 019 918 2 547 1 899 2 147 1 259 2 363 2 755 3 020
Paraguay 32 47 167 178 272 194 340 215 273
Peru 1 599 2 579 3 467 5 425 6 188 5 165 7 062 8 119 12 297
Uruguay 315 811 1 495 1 240 2 117 1 512 2 349 2 512 2 708
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 864 1 422 -2 032 1 587 45 -4 374 -1 462 4 919 756
The Caribbean 2 246 2 614 3 191 3 647 5 504 2 696 2 225 4 590 2 801
Antigua and Barbuda 80 221 359 338 159 81 97 65 71
Bahamas 274 563 706 746 860 497 872 667 445
Barbados -16 119 200 256 223 218 … … …
Belize 111 126 108 139 167 108 96 93 72
Dominica 26 19 26 40 57 42 24 14 20
Grenada 65 70 90 157 135 103 60 43 30
Guyana 30 77 102 110 178 164 270 308 294
Jamaica 542 581 797 751 1 361 480 169 144 273
Saint Kitts and Nevis 56 93 110 134 178 131 116 110 100
Saint Lucia 77 78 234 272 161 146 121 97 107
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 66 40 109 119 159 110 97 86 125
Suriname -37 28 -163 -247 -234 -93 -248 73 69
Trinidad and Tobago 973 599 513 830 2 101 709 549 2 891 1 195
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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Table A-15 
Latin America and the Caribbean: total gross external debt a
(Millions of dollars, end-of-period stocks)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Latin America and the Caribbean 676 384 668 273 739 755 763 639 826 323 984 001 1 095 285 1 191 057
Latin America 662 303 653 596 724 726 747 790 809 286 964 290 1 079 325 1 177 011
Argentina Total 113 768 108 839 124 542 124 916 115 537 129 333 140 655 141 126
Public 65 374 61 086 70 796 64 446 61 803 69 489 73 208 71 334
Private 48 394 47 753 53 746 60 471 53 734 59 844 67 447 69 792
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Total 7 666 6 278 5 403 5 930 5 801 5 875 6 298 6 283
Public 4 947 3 275 2 269 2 506 2 710 3 059 3 582 3 575
Private 2 719 3 002 3 134 3 424 3 092 2 815 2 716 2 708
Brazil Total 169 451 172 589 193 219 198 340 198 192 256 804 298 204 312 898
Public 87 567 76 269 70 272 67 352 77 155 82 847 77 300 82 245
Private 81 884 96 320 122 947 130 988 121 037 173 957 220 904 230 653
Chile Total 46 211 49 497 55 733 64 318 74 041 86 738 98 895 117 776
Public 9 847 11 445 12 761 12 288 13 751 17 408 20 647 25 243
Private 36 364 38 052 42 972 52 030 60 290 69 330 78 248 92 533
Colombia Total 38 507 40 103 44 553 46 369 53 719 64 723 75 903 78 642
Public 24 189 26 299 28 819 29 447 37 129 39 546 42 769 46 400
Private 14 317 13 803 15 734 16 921 16 590 25 177 33 135 32 242
Costa Rica Total 6 763 7 191 8 444 9 105 8 238 9 189 10 714 14 473
Dominican Republic Public 5 847 6 295 6 556 7 219 8 215 9 947 11 625 12 872
Ecuador Total 17 237 17 099 17 445 16 900 13 514 13 914 15 210 15 903
Public 10 851 10 215 10 605 10 028 7 364 8 622 9 973 10 768
Private 6 387 6 884 6 839 6 871 6 149 5 292 5 237 5 135
El Salvador Total 8 877 9 692 9 349 9 994 9 882 9 698 10 670 12 121
Public 4 976 5 693 5 444 5 837 6 550 6 806 7 116 8 021
Private 3 901 4 000 3 905 4 157 3 332 2 893 3 554 4 100
Guatemala Total 8 832 9 844 10 909 11 163 11 248 12 026 14 021 15 758
Public 3 972 4 204 4 458 4 423 5 391 6 038 6 027 6 823
Private 4 860 5 640 6 451 6 741 5 857 5 988 7 993 8 935
Haiti Public 1 335 1 484 1 628 1 917 1 272 353 727 1 049
Honduras Total 5 135 3 935 3 190 3 464 3 345 3 773 4 188 4 842
Public 4 364 3 030 2 026 2 323 2 461 2 831 3 202 3 647
Private 771 905 1 164 1 141 884 942 986 1 196
Mexico Total 128 248 119 084 128 090 129 424 165 932 197 727 209 743 229 032
Public 71 675 54 766 55 355 56 939 96 354 110 428 116 420 125 726
Private 56 573 64 318 72 735 72 484 69 578 87 299 93 322 103 306
Nicaragua Public 5 348 4 527 3 385 3 512 3 661 3 876 4 073 4 289
Panama Public 7 580 7 788 8 276 8 477 10 150 10 439 10 800 10 782
Paraguay Total 2 700 2 739 2 868 3 256 3 167 3 719 3 823 3 770
Public 2 271 2 240 2 205 2 204 2 234 2 335 2 291 2 238
Private 429 499 663 1 052 933 1 384 1 532 1 532
Peru Total 28 657 28 897 32 894 34 838 35 157 43 674 47 544 58 830
Public 22 302 22 026 21 002 19 973 20 241 22 980 24 275 26 377
Private 6 355 6 871 11 892 14 865 14 916 20 694 23 269 32 452
Uruguay  Total 13 717 12 977 14 864 15 425 17 969 18 425 18 345 21 072
Public 10 499 9 637 11 383 11 064 13 117 13 182 14 436 16 607
Private 3 218 3 340 3 480 4 361 4 853 5 243 3 909 4 464
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Total 46 427 44 735 53 378 53 223 70 246 84 058 97 888 115 495
Public 32 106 29 476 35 774 37 774 55 749 72 270 85 154 102 325
Private 14 321 15 259 17 604 15 449 14 497 11 788 12 734 13 170
The Caribbean 14 081 14 677 15 028 15 849 17 037 19 711 15 960 14 046
Antigua and Barbuda Public 317 321 481 436 416 431 444 …
Bahamas b Public 287 289 273 384 703 711 799 1 037
Barbados c Total 2 695 2 991 3 130 3 487 4 009 4 485 … …
Public 1 783 1 851 1 994 2 239 2 513 2 989 … …
Private 912 1 140 1 136 1 248 1 496 1 496 … …
Belize c Public 970 985 973 958 1 016 1 009 1 398 1 457
Dominica Public 221 225 241 234 222 242 248 254
Grenada Public 401 481 469 481 512 538 514 …
Guyana Public 1 215 1 043 718 834 933 1 043 1 111 …
Jamaica c Public 5 376 5 796 6 123 6 344 6 594 8 390 8 390 8 875
Saint Kitts and Nevis Public 299 310 313 328 306 302 290 …
Saint Lucia Public 350 365 399 364 373 393 384 …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Total 231 220 219 235 261 273 283 …
Suriname Public 390 391 298 319 269 334 463 564
Trinidad and Tobago d Public 1 329 1 261 1 392 1 445 1 422 1 561 1 639 1 859
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund.
b Fiscal years, from 1 July to 30 June.
c Fiscal years, from 1 April to 31 March.










Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Table A-16 
Latin America and the Caribbean: sovereign spreads on EMBI+ and EMBI global
(Basis points to end of period)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
March June September December March June
Latin America EMBI + 722 328 305 410 355 418 352 317 361 426
Argentina EMBI + 1 704 660 496 925 880 1 088 897 991 1 307 1 199
Belize EMBI Global … … 617 1 391 1 665 1 691 2 399 2 245 789 872
Brazil EMBI + 428 192 189 223 177 208 166 142 189 237
Chile EMBI Global 343 95 115 172 148 167 143 116 153 180
Colombia EMBI + 498 196 172 195 141 158 132 112 148 195
Dominican Republic EMBI Global … … 322 597 506 488 418 343 385 401
Ecuador EMBI + 4 731 769 913 846 824 892 743 826 700 665
El Salvador EMBI Global … … 302 478 453 480 426 396 350 436
Jamaica EMBI Global … … 427 637 579 640 662 711 680 623
Mexico EMBI + 376 164 149 187 159 171 142 126 158 194
Panama EMBI + 540 171 162 201 153 187 148 129 169 218
Peru EMBI + 509 165 163 216 157 174 125 114 145 200
Uruguay EMBI Global 685 238 188 213 127 173 139 127 173 235
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) EMBI + 1 862 1 017 1 044 1 197 907 1 097 928 773 787 966
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from JPMorgan, Emerging Markets Bond Index Monitor. 
Table A-17 
Latin America and the Caribbean: risk premia on five-year credit default swaps
(Basis points to end of period)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
March June September December March June
Argentina 4 041 914 602 922 823 1 253 960 1 442 3 754 3 009
Brazil 301 123 111 162 122 157 112 108 137 185
Chile 203 68 84 132 92 116 83 72 66 98
Colombia 309 143 113 156 110 143 103 96 98 141
Mexico 293 134 114 154 118 140 101 98 97 131
Panama 302 134 99 150 112 144 102 98 96 143
Peru 304 124 113 172 122 162 106 97 98 145
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3 218 1 104 1 016 928 722 894 777 647 739 1 013
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Table A-18 
Latin America and the Caribbean: international bond issues a
 (Millions of dollars)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Total 18 913 64 750 83 533 96 385 42 808 13 148 30 957 27 328 27 600 32 064
Latin America and the Caribbean 18 466 61 950 82 007 93 720 41 971 12 317 30 237 27 232 27 083 31 957
Argentina 65 500 3 146 2 449 600 63 - - - - 
Bahamas 100 300  -  - - - - - - - 
Barbados - 450 390  - - - - - - - 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) - -  -  - - - - 500 - - 
Brazil 6 400 25 745 39 500 38 147 24 076 5 859 10 456 9 864 8 372 16 803
Chile - 2 773 6 750 6 049 1 350 500 3 350 4 243 3 109 2 822
Colombia 1 000 5 450 1 912 6 411 2 850 900 3 709 - 3 600 600
Costa Rica - -  - 250 - 250 - 1 000 - 1 500
Dominican Republic - - 1 034 750 - - - 750 300 1 000
El Salvador - 800 450 654 - - - 800 310 - 
Guatemala 30 -  - 150 200 700 - 500 700 100
Honduras - - 20  - - - - - 500 - 
Jamaica 350 750 1 075 694 250 - 1 500 - 1 300 - 
Mexico 5 835 15 359 19 957 25 846 9 520 3 055 9 147 6 425 5 547 5 852
Panama 686 1 323  - 897 300 - 800 - - 750
Paraguay - -  - 100 - - - 500 500 - 
Peru - 2 150 4 693 2 455 2 825 990 1 275 2 150 2 845 2 530
Trinidad and Tobago - 850  - 175 - - - - - - 
Uruguay - 500  - 1 493 - - - 500 - - 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 4 000 5 000 3 000 7 200 - - - - - - 
Supranational issues 447 2 800 1 526 2 665 837 831 720 96 517 107
Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration  - 500 151  - 250 - - - 245 - 
Caribbean Development Bank  -  -  - 175 - - - - - - 
Foreign Trade Bank of Latin America  -  -  -  - 400 - - - - - 
Andean Development Corporation 447 1 000 1 375 1 240 187 831 720 96 272 107
NII Holdings  - 1 300  - 1 250 - - - - - - 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from Merrill-Lynch, J.P. Morgan and Latin Finance.
a Includes sovereign, bank and corporate bonds.
Table A-19 
Latin America and the Caribbean: stock exchange indices
 (National indices to end of period, 31 december 2005=100)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
March June September December March June
Argentina 70 150 228 160 174 152 159 185 219 193
Brazil 112 205 207 170 193 162 177 182 168 142
Chile 121 182 251 213 238 224 215 219 226 205
Colombia 79 122 163 133 158 141 148 155 149 135
Costa Rica 207 142 118 121 123 123 127 129 154 172
Ecuador 128 107 126 128 130 135 136 135 138 140
Jamaica 77 80 82 91 87 84 83 88 78 83
Mexico 126 180 217 208 222 226 230 246 248 228
Peru 147 295 487 406 492 421 451 430 414 324
Trinidad and Tobago 79 72 78 95 95 96 8 168 8 629 7 681 8 137
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 172 270 320 574 979 1 235 1 511 2 312 3 039 5 639
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Table A-20 
Latin America and the Caribbean: gross international reserves
 (Millions of dollars, end-of-period stocks)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
March June September December March May
Latin America and the Caribbean 512 611 567 421 655 993 774 230 799 222 819 678 829 742 836 041 844 705 826 336
Latin America 498 617 553 242 639 889 757 067 782 185 803 012 813 847 820 140 830 220 826 336
Argentina 46 198 47 967 52 145 46 376 47 291 46 348 45 010 43 290 40 446 38 814
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 7 722 8 580 9 730 12 018 12 746 12 438 13 419 13 969 14 188 13 998
Brazil 193 783 238 520 288 575 352 012 365 216 373 910 378 726 373 147 376 934 374 417
Chile 23 162 25 371 27 864 41 979 39 551 40 344 40 107 41 640 39 832 40 148
Colombia 23 672 24 992 28 464 32 303 33 130 34 272 35 835 37 474 39 339 40 513
Costa Rica a 3 799 4 066 4 627 4 756 4 745 4 870 5 140 6 857 6 937 7 885
Dominican Republica 2 662 3 307 3 765 4 098 3 459 3 608 3 369 3 559 3 826 4 392
Ecuador b 4 473 3 792 2 622 2 958 3 368 3 931 4 883 2 483 4 373 4 191
El Salvador 2 545 2 987 2 883 2 504 2 652 2 604 2 455 3 143 2 996 3 027
Guatemala a 4 659 5 213 5 954 6 188 6 141 6 813 6 754 6 694 7 280 7 253
Haiti 587 733 1 283 1 343 1 345 1 333 1 471 1 337 1 332 1 298
Honduras a 2 690 2 174 2 775 2 880 3 128 2 842 2 524 2 629 3 108 2 895
Mexico 95 302 99 893 120 587 149 209 155 949 162 721 165 590 167 050 171 298 170 097
Nicaragua 1 141 1 573 1 799 1 892 1 932 1 862 1 815 1 887 1 859 1 886
Panama a 2 637 3 222 2 843 2 514 2 010 2 518 1 971 2 441 2 122 2 794
Paraguay 2 864 3 861 4 169 4 984 4 804 4 800 4 838 4 994 5 793 5 930
Peru 31 233 33 175 44 150 48 859 55 843 57 281 61 240 64 050 67 975 66 814
Uruguay 6 360 7 987 7 743 10 302 11 285 12 090 12 810 13 605 13 478 14 939
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 43 127 35 830 27 911 29 892 27 590 28 427 25 890 29 891 27 104 25 045
The Caribbean 13 994 14 178 16 104 17 162 17 037 16 666 15 895 15 901 14 485 ...
Antigua and Barbudac 138 108 136 147 178 191 170 158 ... …
Bahamas 563 816 861 897 890 928 757 816 793 811
Barbados 680 829 805 805 806 772 748 828 803 759
Belize 156 210 216 242 243 262 272 289 312 338
Dominica c 55 64 66 74 84 84 84 91 ... …
Grenada c 104 112 103 105 105 95 98 103 ... …
Guyana 356 628 780 798 811 762 872 862 812 764
Jamaica 1 795 1 752 2 979 2 820 2 639 2 385 2 116 1 981 1 718 1 864
Saint Kitts and Nevisc 110 123 156 232 259 259 247 250 ... …
Saint Lucia c 140 151 182 190 192 182 168 206 ... …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines c 83 75 111 88 91 106 97 109 ... …
Suriname 433 659 639 941 855 905 930 1 008 861 842
Trinidad and Tobago 9 380 8 652 9 070 9 823 9 885 9 735 9 336 9 201 9 186 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Series corresponding to the harmonized monetary and financial statistics.
b Freely available international reserves.
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Table A-21 
Latin America and the Caribbean: real effective exchange rates a 
(Indices: 2005=100, average values for the period)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 b 2013 b
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 c
Latin America and the Caribbean d 88.6 88.0 85.2 82.9 80.9 80.9 80.6 80.2 79.4 79.4
Argentina 97.2 99.3 98.6 99.1 95.9 93.4 93.9 96.7 100.1 101.7
Barbados 97.8 93.1 89.4 91.5 89.9 90.5 90.6 90.4 90.7 90.1
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 92.5 84.3 88.0 86.7 84.6 82.0 80.9 80.5 79.3 78.3
Brazil 79.9 81.5 70.6 67.5 69.2 76.0 77.6 78.6 74.6 74.3
Chile 96.9 100.9 95.4 94.3 93.5 94.0 91.0 90.6 89.3 89.2
Colombia 87.9 91.9 79.1 79.1 75.7 74.5 74.9 76.1 75.4 76.9
Costa Rica 93.9 92.8 82.4 79.4 78.7 76.5 75.6 75.3 74.1 73.2
Dominica 105.5 108.1 106.8 110.1 111.2 112.5 112.5 112.9 112.5 112.3
Dominican Republic 106.3 110.4 108.9 110.4 112.0 112.4 112.3 113.7 114.0 114.4
Ecuador 109.0 101.9 100.1 102.2 100.4 99.7 99.3 99.6 98.7 97.8
El Salvador 103.0 100.4 101.9 103.2 103.1 103.0 103.8 104.4 104.3 105.2
Guatemala 91.7 94.6 94.2 90.1 88.6 88.1 88.7 88.8 87.7 86.8
Honduras 93.8 87.0 86.1 84.9 83.9 82.5 83.4 84.8 84.7 82.3
Jamaica 99.2 111.1 98.5 96.2 95.3 95.6 96.7 97.1 97.5 99.2
Mexico 103.3 117.9 108.9 108.9 110.9 116.5 112.1 109.4 105.6 101.9
Nicaragua 97.6 103.7 101.2 106.1 106.5 106.9 108.6 109.3 106.2 104.8
Panama 101.5 97.0 98.1 98.2 95.4 93.8 93.4 93.7 92.9 92.0
Paraguay 72.9 80.4 77.9 69.8 72.6 69.8 69.8 70.2 64.9 65.7
Peru 99.3 97.7 94.1 95.9 91.6 89.5 87.3 87.2 86.5 86.9
Trinidad and Tobago 90.7 82.6 78.7 79.2 75.1 73.1 73.1 72.6 71.3 71.0
Uruguay 92.1 90.7 78.7 76.6 74.6 74.7 77.0 70.2 66.9 65.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 68.5 52.4 79.6 69.8 61.5 59.4 57.2 54.6 64.4 68.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a A country’s overall real effective exchange rate index is calculated by weighting its real bilateral exchange rate indices with each of its trading partners by each 
partner’s share in the country’s total trade flows in terms of exports and imports. The extraregional real effective exchange rate index excludes trade with other 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. A currency depreciates in real effective terms when this index rises and appreciates when it falls.
b Preliminary figures, weighted by trade in 2011.
c Figures as of May.
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Table A-22 
Latin America and the Caribbean: participation rate
 (Average annual rates) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a 2012 2013 a
First quarter
Latin America and 
the Caribbean b Total 61.4 61.5 61.8 61.9 61.6 61.8 61.9 … …
Female 48.6 48.7 49.3 49.6 49.5 49.7 50.0 … …
Male 74.1 74.3 74.4 74.3 73.9 74.1 73.9 … …
Argentina Urban areas  Total 60.3 59.5 58.8 59.3 58.9 59.5 59.3 58.4 58.5
Female 49.0 47.7 47.2 48.0 47.0 47.4 47.6 46.8 46.5
Male 73.3 73.0 72.0 72.1 72.3 72.9 72.2 71.3 72.1
Barbados Nationwide total Total 67.9 67.8 67.6 67.0 66.6 67.6 66.2 … …
Female 62.8 61.9 62.5 62.2 62.0 63.0 61.1 … …
Male 73.6 74.3 73.3 72.3 71.7 72.7 72.0 … …
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Departamental capitals c Total 66.3 64.8 | … 56.9 57.3 … … … …
Female 58.7 56.2 | … … … … … … …
Male 74.2 74.2 | … … … … … … …
Brazil Six metropoplitan areas Total 56.9 56.9 57.0 56.7 57.1 57.1 57.3 56.9 57.2
Female 48.1 48.5 48.7 48.6 49.0 48.9 49.3 48.8 49.5
Male 66.8 66.5 66.5 66.0 66.5 66.5 66.6 66.3 66.3
Chile d Nationwide total Total 54.8 54.9 56.0 55.9 | 58.5 59.8 59.5 59.9 59.6
Female 38.5 39.1 40.9 41.3 | 45.3 47.3 47.6 47.7 47.6
Male 71.7 71.4 71.8 71.0 | 72.1 72.7 71.9 72.5 72.1
Colombia Nationwide total Total 59.1 58.3 58.5 61.3 62.7 63.7 64.5 64.2 63.5
Female 46.9 46.1 46.5 49.8 51.8 52.8 54.1 53.7 52.6
Male 72.0 71.1 71.1 73.3 74.2 75.1 75.4 75.1 74.9
Costa Rica e Nationwide total Total 56.6 57.0 56.7 | 60.4 59.1 60.7 60.1 … …
Female 40.7 41.6 41.7 | 44.5 43.5 45.7 45.2 … …
Male 73.5 73.2 72.5 | 77.2 75.9 76.8 76.0 … …
Cuba f Nationwide total Total 72.1 73.7 74.7 75.4 74.9 76.1 … … …
Female 56.7 59.3 60.2 61.0 60.5 60.5 … … …
Male 86.0 86.7 87.8 88.4 87.7 90.0 … … …
Dominican Republic Nationwide total Total 56.0 56.1 55.6 53.8 55.0 56.2 56.5 … …
Female 43.6 43.2 43.5 40.3 42.4 44.0 45.0 … …
Male 68.6 69.3 67.9 67.4 67.8 68.5 68.1 … …
Ecuador Urban total Total 59.1 61.3 60.1 58.9 56.9 55.2 55.9 57.2 54.9
Female 47.7 50.9 49.6 48.4 46.6 44.5 45.0 45.5 43.0
Male 71.2 72.5 71.3 70.0 68.0 67.0 67.8 69.7 68.0
El Salvador g Nationwide total Total 52.6 | 62.1 62.7 62.8 62.5 62.7 63.2 … …
Female 40.4 | 46.7 47.3 47.6 47.3 47.0 47.9 … …
Male 67.0 | 81.0 81.4 81.0 80.9 81.2 81.4 … …
Honduras  Nationwide total Total 50.7 50.7 51.0 53.1 53.6 51.9 50.8 … …
Female 33.5 33.3 34.4 35.9 37.4 34.9 33.8 … …
Male 69.7 70.1 69.3 72.3 71.0 70.4 69.2 … …
Jamaica  Nationwide total Total 64.7 64.9 65.4 63.5 62.4 62.3 62.7 62.7 63.4
Female 56.4 56.5 57.3 55.7 54.8 54.9 55.6 55.6 56.6
Male 73.5 73.6 73.9 71.8 70.4 70.2 70.2 70.3 70.5
Mexico Nationwide total Total 58.8 58.8 58.7 58.6 58.4 58.6 59.2 58.4 58.2
Female 41.2 41.7 41.5 42.0 41.6 42.0 43.0 41.9 41.9
Male 78.7 78.4 78.0 77.1 77.0 76.9 77.1 76.6 76.0
Nicaragua e Nationwide total Total 51.4 53.4 53.3 | 66.9 72.1 … … … …
Panama Nationwide total Total 62.6 62.7 63.9 64.1 63.5 61.9 63.5 … …
Female 45.8 46.8 47.2 48.3 47.5 45.6 48.2 … …
Male 79.9 79.3 81.5 80.9 80.4 79.2 80.1 … …
Paraguay Nationwide total Total 59.4 60.8 61.7 62.9 60.5 60.7 … … …
Female 45.3 48.0 47.9 49.7 47.3 48.9 … … …
Male 73.7 73.9 75.8 75.9 73.5 72.8 … … …
Peru Metropolitan Lima Total 67.4 68.9 68.1 68.4 70.0 70.0 69.1 69.9 69.0
Female 58.7 59.6 58.9 60.1 61.7 61.5 60.7 61.9 60.4
Male 76.9 78.7 77.9 77.2 79.0 79.0 78.2 78.4 78.3
Trinidad and Tobago Nationwide total Total 63.9 63.5 63.5 62.7 62.1 61.3 61.8 h … …
Uruguay Nationwide total Total 60.8 62.7 62.5 63.2 62.9 63.9 63.9 63.3 63.2
Female 50.9 52.9 53.4 54.1 53.9 55.1 55.5 54.7 54.6
Male 72.3 74.1 73.2 73.7 73.3 73.7 73.2 72.7 73.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian   
  Republic of) 
Nationwide total Total 65.4 64.9 64.9 65.1 64.6 64.4 63.9 63.6 63.7
Female 50.6 50.0 50.1 51.0 50.5 50.3 50.1 49.8 49.9
Male 80.4 79.9 79.9 79.7 79.2 78.6 77.8 77.5 77.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b The data relating to the different countries are not comparable owing to differences in coverage and in the definition of the working age population. The regional 
series are simple averages of national data (excluding Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) and include adjustments for lack of information and changes 
in methodology.
c Up to 2007, urban areas.
d New measurements have been used since 2010; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
e New measurements have been used since 2009; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
f The working-age population is measured as follows: for males, 17 to 59 years and for females, 15 to 54 years. 
g New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
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Table A-23 
Latin America and the Caribbean: open urban unemployment a
(Average annual rates) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 b
2012 2013 b
First quarter
Latin America and the Caribbean c 9.0 8.6 7.9 7.3 8.1 7.3 6.7 6.4 … …
Argentina  Urban areas   11.6 10.2 8.5 7.9 8.7 7.7 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.9 d
Bahamas e Nationwide total 10.2 7.6 7.9 8.7 14.2 … 15.9 14.0 … …
Barbados e Nationwide total 9.1 8.7 7.4 8.1 10.0 10.8 11.2 11.7 … …
Belize e Nationwide total 11.0 9.4 8.5 8.2 13.1 12.5 … 15.3 … …
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Departamental capitals f 8.1 8.0 7.7 6.7 | 7.9 6.1 5.8 … … …
Brazil  Six metropolitan areas  9.8 10.0 9.3 7.9 8.1 6.7 6.0 5.5 5.9 5.7 g
Chile h Nationwide total 9.2 7.7 7.1 7.8 9.7 | 8.2 7.1 6.4 6.6 6.2 d
Colombia e 13 metropolitan areas 14.3 13.1 11.4 11.5 13.0 12.4 11.5 11.2 12.0 11.6 g
Colombia i 13 metropolitan areas 13.1 12.2 10.7 11.0 12.4 11.8 10.9 10.6 11.4 11.1 g
Costa Rica j Urban total  6.9 6.0 4.8 4.8 | 8.5 7.1 7.7 7.8 … …
Cuba  Nationwide total 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.5 3.2 3.8 … …
Dominican Republic Nationwide total 6.4 5.5 5.1 4.7 5.3 5.0 5.8 6.5 … …
Ecuador e Urban total  8.5 8.1 7.4 6.9 8.5 7.6 6.0 4.9 4.9 4.6 d
Ecuador i Urban total  6.5 5.7 5.5 5.3 6.8 6.1 4.9 4.2 4.3 4.2 d
El Salvador  Urban total  7.3 5.7 5.8 5.5 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.2 … …
Guatemala k Urban total  … … … … … 4.8 | 3.1 4.0 … …
Honduras  Urban total  6.5 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.9 6.4 6.8 5.6 … …
Jamaica e Nationwide total 11.3 10.3 9.8 10.6 11.4 | 12.4 12.6 13.7 14.1 14.2 l
Jamaica i Nationwide total 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.9 7.5 | 8.0 8.4 9.2 9.4 9.9 l
Mexico  Urban areas   4.7 4.6 4.8 4.9 6.7 6.4 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 g
Nicaragua  Urban total  7.0 7.0 6.9 8.0 10.5 9.7 … … … …
Panama e Urban total  12.1 10.4 7.8 6.5 7.9 7.7 5.4 4.8 … …
Panama i Urban total  9.8 8.4 5.8 5.0 6.3 5.8 3.6 3.6 … …
Paraguay Asunción and urban areas of the Central Department m 7.6 8.9 7.2 7.4 8.2 7.0 6.5 | 8.1 … …
Peru  Urban total  9.6 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.4 7.9 7.7 6.8 8.7 6.4 d
Trinidad and Tobago  Nationwide total 8.0 6.2 5.6 4.6 5.3 5.9 5.1 5.2 n … …
Uruguay  Urban total  12.2 11.4 9.6 7.9 7.6 7.1 6.3 6.4 6.0 6.7 o
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Nationwide total 12.4 9.9 8.4 7.3 7.9 8.7 8.3 8.1 8.8 8.1 g
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of household surveys.
a Unemployed population as a percentage of the economically active population.
b Preliminary figures.
c Weighted average adjusted for lack of information and differences and changes in methodology.The data relating to the different countries are not comparable 
owing to differences in coverage and in the definition of the working age population. 
d The figures in the last two columns refer to the first quarter.
e Includes hidden unemployment. 
f Up to 2008, urban areas.
g The figures in the last two columns refer to the period January-May.
h New measurements have been used since 2010; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
i Includes an adjustment to the figures for the economically active population for exclusion of hidden unemployment.
j New measurements have been used since 2009; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
k Owing to methodological changes, as of 2011 the data are not comparable with the previous series.
l The figures in the last two columns refer to the measurement of January.
m Up to 2011, urban total.
n March and June average.
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Table A-24 
Latin America and the Caribbean: employment rate a
 (Average annual rates) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 b
2012 2013 b
First semester
Latin America and the Caribbeanc 53.3 53.7 54.2 54.5 54.2 54.9 55.4 55.8 … …
Argentina Urban areas  52.9 54.1 54.5 54.2 54.2 54.4 55.2 55.0 54.2 53.9 d
Bahamas Nationwide total 68.5 69.4 70.2 69.7 63.0 … 60.6 64.1 … …
Barbados Nationwide total 63.2 61.9 62.7 62.1 60.3 59.4 60.0 58.6 … …
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Departamental capitals e 51.2 54.0 52.7 | ... 52.4 53.6 … … … …
Brazil Six metropolitan areas 51.0 51.2 51.6 52.5 52.1 53.2 53.7 54.2 53.7 53.9 f
Chile g Nationwide total 50.4 50.5 51.0 51.7 50.5 | 53.7 55.5 55.7 55.9 55.9 d
Colombia Nationwide total 53.4 52.0 51.8 51.9 53.9 55.4 56.8 57.9 57.3 56.9 f
Costa Rica h Nationwide total 53.0 53.3 54.4 53.9 | 55.4 54.8 56.0 55.4 … …
Cuba i Nationwide total 70.7 70.7 72.4 73.6 74.2 73.0 73.6 … … …
Dominican Republic Nationwide total 45.9 46.9 47.4 47.7 45.8 47.1 48.0 48.2 … …
Ecuador Urban total 54.4 54.3 56.8 56.0 53.9 52.6 51.9 53.2 54.4 52.3 d
El Salvador j Nationwide total 48.3 49.2 | 58.1 59.0 59.2 58.1 58.6 59.4 … …
Honduras Nationwide total 48.6 49.0 49.2 49.4 51.5 51.5 49.7 49.0 … …
Jamaica g Nationwide total 57.0 58.0 58.6 58.5 56.3 | 54.6 54.4 54.1 53.9 54.3 k
Mexico Nationwide total 55.8 56.7 56.7 56.3 55.4 55.3 55.6 56.3 55.9 55.7 f
Nicaragua h Nationwide total 50.8 48.8 48.6 50.1 | 61.8 66.8 … … … …
Panama Nationwide total 57.3 57.2 58.7 60.3 59.9 59.4 59.1 61.0 … …
Paraguay Nationwide total 58.2 55.4 57.4 57.0 57.1 57.1 57.3 … … …
Peru Urban total 60.7 61.8 63.0 62.4 62.7 64.5 64.5 64.4 63.8 64.6 d
Trinidad and Tobago Nationwide total 58.6 59.9 59.9 60.6 59.4 58.4 58.2 58.6 l … …
Uruguay Nationwide total m 51.4 | 54.2 56.8 57.7 58.6 59.1 60.1 59.9 59.7 59.3 n
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Nationwide total 58.1 58.9 59.4 60.2 60.0 59.0 59.0 58.7 58.1 58.6 f
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Employed population as a percentage of the working-age population.
b Preliminary figures.
c Weighted average adjusted for lack of information and differences and changes in methodology. The data relating to the different countries are not comparable 
owing to differences in coverage and in the definition of the working age population. 
d The figures in the last two columns refer to the first quarter.
e Up to 2007, urban areas.
f The figures in the last two columns refer to the period January-May.
g New measurements have been used since 2010; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
h New measurements have been used since 2009; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
i The working-age population is measured as follows: for males, 17 to 59 years and for females, 15 to 54 years. 
j New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
k The figures in the last two columns refer to the measurement of January.
l March and June average.
m The figure for 2005 refers to the urban total.
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Table A-25 
Latin America and the Caribbean: formal employment indicators  
(Indices 2005=100) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
2012 2013 a
First semester
Argentina b 90.2 100.0 108.6 117.6 125.4 125.0 128.7 135.2 137.7 … …
Brazil c 94.7 100.0 104.9 110.2 117.3 119.7 127.0 133.8 138.0 134.8 137.3 d
Chile b 92.7 100.0 106.3 114.9 123.2 124.7 132.4 140.0 148.4 147.5 153.6 e
Costa Rica f 95.5 100.0 106.7 115.7 124.3 123.5 127.3 131.3 135.9 135.9 138.7 e
El Salvador f 96.6 100.0 104.9 110.3 113.5 110.4 112.1 115.8 118.2 … …
Guatemala f 98.6 100.0 102.4 107.1 107.0 108.6 110.5 115.2 118.3 … …
Jamaica g 98.9 100.0 101.0 102.4 104.4 103.4 … … … … …
Mexico f 96.9 100.0 104.8 109.1 111.4 107.9 112.0 116.9 122.3 120.5 125.4 d
Nicaragua f 91.6 100.0 110.5 120.8 129.8 132.5 140.7 152.1 164.0 161.0 174.0 e
Panama f h 91.6 100.0 106.8 121.9 140.8 143.6 145.8 160.9 168.4 165.5 169.9 i
Peru j 95.7 100.0 107.4 116.1 125.8 127.4 132.6 139.8 145.3 138.9 144.2 i
Uruguay k 90.1 100.0 108.8 118.2 127.4 131.2 139.0 145.7 151.4 150.7 153.7 e
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b Dependent workers paying into pension schemes.
c Workers covered by social and labour legislation.    
d The figures in the last two columns refer to the period January-May.
e The figures in the last two columns refer to the period January-April.
f Workers with social security coverage. 
g Workers of medium-sized and large firms.    
h As of 2012, corresponds to workers in small, medium-sized and large businesses, in manufacturing, commerce and services.
i The figures in the last two columns refer to the first quarter.
j Workers at firms with 10 or more employees.
k Employement positions generating social security contributions.
Table A-26 
Latin America: visible underemployment by hours 
 (Percentages of employed workers) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
Argentina b Urban areas  17.5 14.2 12.5 10.4 9.5 11.1 9.8 9.1 9.3
Brazil c Six metropolitan areas 4.6 3.7 4.1 3.6 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.0
Chile d Nationwide total 8.4 8.5 | 8.5 8.0 9.0 10.8 | 11.5 11.6 11.2
Colombia e Thirteen metropolitan areas 15.2 13.8 11.9 10.0 9.1 9.5 12.0 11.1 11.7
Costa Rica f Nationwide total 14.4 14.6 13.5 11.5 10.5 | 13.5 11.2 13.4 13.8
Ecuador c Urban total g 8.1 7.3 6.3 | 11.3 10.6 11.8 11.5 9.4 7.9
El Salvador c h Urban total 4.5 6.2 4.9 | 5.3 6.3 7.7 7.0 3.4 …
Honduras i Urban total 6.5 6.9 5.4 4.3 3.5 4.4 6.7 10.6 10.1
Mexico j Nationwide total … 7.5 6.8 7.2 6.8 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.6
Panama c Urban total 4.4 4.6 3.4 2.7 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.3 2.0
Paraguay k Urban total 8.3 7.5 5.6 5.8 6.6 8.2 | 5.7 6.3 5.4
Peru b Metropolitan Lima 18.1 17.8 16.4 16.5 15.6 15.4 14.5 12.4 12.2
Uruguay c Urban total 15.8 17.1 13.6 12.9 10.8 9.1 8.6 7.2 7.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b Employed persons who work less than 35 hours per week and wish to work more hours; urban total. 
c Employed persons who work less than 40 hours per week and wish to work more hours. 
d Employed persons who work less than 30 hours per week and wish to work more hours. Up to 2009, employed persons who work less than 35 hours per week 
and wish to work more hours. The 2004-2005, 2006-2009 and 2010-2012 series are not comparable. In the first series a different sample was used and in the later 
series different measurements were used.
e Employed persons who work less than 48 hours per week and wish to work more hours. 
f Employed persons wishing to work more than their current job permits. Up to 2008, employed persons who work less than 47 hours per week and wish to work 
more hours. 
g Up to 2006, the figures relate to Cuenca, Guayaquil and Quito 
h New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
i Employed persons who work less than 36 hours per week and wish to work more hours. 
j Employed persons wishing to work more than their current job permits.










Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Table A-27 
Latin America: real average wages
(Indices 2005=100) a
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 b
2012 2013 b
First semester
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)c 100.0 92.0 86.8 80.1 81.9 84.5 83.4 … … …
Brazil d 100.0 103.5 105.0 107.2 108.6 110.9 113.6 117.8 111.6 114.2 e
Chile f 100.0 101.9 104.8 104.6 109.6 112.0 114.8 118.5 117.0 122.3 e
Colombia g 100.0 104.0 103.8 102.2 103.5 106.4 106.7 107.8 104.7 107.3 h
Costa Rica i 100.0 101.6 102.9 100.9 108.6 110.9 117.2 118.8 124.3 125.0 e
Cuba  100.0 111.6 109.9 110.0 115.1 118.5 118.8 119.2 … …
El Salvador j 100.0 100.4 98.0 94.9 98.2 99.3 96.4 93.7 … …
Guatemala i 100.0 98.9 97.3 94.8 94.9 97.6 98.0 101.9 … …
Mexicoi 100.0 101.6 103.1 103.3 102.3 101.4 102.2 102.4 103.1 103.2 k
Nicaragua i 100.0 101.4 99.6 95.9 101.5 102.8 103.0 103.3 101.9 102.3 e
Panama  100.0 102.0 103.4 99.1 101.7 109.0 109.2 112.0 l … …
Paraguay  100.0 100.6 103.0 102.2 106.9 107.5 110.5 111.3 … …
Peru m 100.0 101.2 99.4 101.6 104.8 107.5 … … … …
Uruguay  100.0 104.3 109.3 113.2 121.4 125.5 130.5 136.0 136.3 140.5 k
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  100.0 105.1 106.4 101.6 95.7 90.6 93.3 98.8 94.4 93.6 h
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Figures deflated by the official consumer price index of each country.
b Preliminary figures.
c Private-sector average wage index.
d Private-sector workers covered by social and labour legislation. 
e The figures in the last two columns refer to the period January-April.
f General index of hourly remuneration.
g Manufacturing.
h The figures in the last two columns refer to the first quarter.
i Average wage declared by workers covered by social security. 
j Gross salary.
k The figures in the last two columns refer to the period January-May.
l The figure for 2012 corresponds to workers in small, medium-sized and large businesses, in manufacturing, commerce and services.
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Table A-28 
Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary indicators
(Percentage variation with respect to the year-earlier period) 
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina Monetary base 19.1 5.4 25.1 37.1 31.7 32.0 36.4 38.7 37.7 34.6
Money (M1) 16.7 13.0 24.1 32.4 28.4 30.2 35.5 37.8 34.3 33.2 b
M2 18.1 5.9 27.6 36.9 30.1 29.6 32.6 36.5 35.4 33.9 b
Foreign-currency deposits 36.4 61.6 35.9 8.7 -8.4 -20.4 -36.9 -23.9 -23.2 -25.2 b
Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de) Monetary base 53.8 19.6 32.4 11.6 19.6 23.7 16.6 14.0 13.3 …
 Money (M1) 50.2 9.4 24.1 27.2 18.6 20.7 16.9 17.2 17.1 …
M2 59.6 18.4 34.6 34.0 31.4 35.0 30.6 28.8 28.0 …
Foreign-currency deposits -9.2 20.4 4.7 -12.8 -3.6 -4.3 -6.8 -5.5 -4.1 …
Brazil Monetary base 12.5 8.0 17.5 11.0 8.3 7.8 10.8 10.6 3.9 6.7
Money (M1) 11.8 7.4 17.5 6.1 1.5 4.3 6.8 10.8 11.8 11.8
M2 30.3 22.1 11.1 21.0 17.2 14.7 12.2 10.0 8.2 8.6
Chile Monetary base 7.0 15.0 13.8 14.8 17.0 14.1 14.7 9.8 13.9 18.5
Money (M1) 11.1 14.1 27.7 10.9 10.5 10.6 8.0 7.5 8.2 8.3
M2 17.7 3.7 5.1 14.7 20.2 19.2 12.1 8.4 7.5 9.9
Foreign-currency deposits 40.7 2.6 8.5 11.8 7.3 13.1 4.8 10.6 6.2 0.5
Colombia Monetary base 14.3 10.3 12.4 15.1 10.0 11.2 7.3 9.6 7.5 13.8
Money (M1) 8.0 9.7 14.7 16.2 8.0 8.2 6.1 4.9 10.0 12.2 b
M2 14.6 13.2 6.9 14.8 18.8 17.2 15.6 16.1 16.0 17.0 b
Costa Rica Monetary base 25.7 6.3 10.0 11.7 10.0 10.0 12.2 15.9 13.3 …
Money (M1) 21.7 -3.4 9.5 19.2 12.0 8.7 6.6 10.4 11.1 …
M2 22.9 1.3 2.6 11.1 11.5 13.1 15.4 15.3 14.8 …
Foreign-currency deposits 10.7 36.8 -1.9 -5.5 -0.2 1.4 4.0 0.9 2.5 …
Dominican Republic Monetary base 12.3 3.4 6.4 5.8 9.7 8.6 9.7 7.9 6.8 9.9
Money (M1) 11.0 -1.1 17.7 4.9 4.2 4.5 9.6 10.2 13.3 8.8
M2 10.6 7.2 13.3 8.8 11.6 11.8 13.7 10.7 9.0 7.7
Foreign-currency deposits 14.9 4.6 18.7 17.8 20.8 18.0 18.6 16.8 13.7 18.5
Ecuador Monetary base 16.4 18.1 24.1 9.9 20.0 10.0 15.3 19.7 19.2 26.0 b
Money (M1) 44.5 38.0 16.1 15.5 13.8 13.8 10.7 17.8 16.1 14.4 b
M2 33.0 22.0 18.6 20.0 20.8 18.8 14.8 16.9 14.6 11.9 b
El Salvador Monetary base 8.1 10.8 0.4 -1.3 3.8 8.4 -3.9 -0.3 3.9 3.1
Money (M1) 8.5 7.6 19.8 10.4 9.3 10.2 -0.8 -0.3 1.0 1.5
M2 6.1 0.9 1.6 -2.1 -0.2 1.7 -0.3 0.9 1.7 1.1
Guatemala Monetary base 4.1 6.6 8.0 10.1 3.8 3.1 4.0 12.1 10.3 13.7
Money (M1) 3.4 7.6 7.2 9.1 7.6 4.3 4.7 6.5 6.3 8.4
M2 7.3 9.4 8.4 10.6 9.9 8.4 9.1 10.1 9.4 10.5
Foreign-currency deposits 9.9 18.1 11.6 4.9 0.8 0.9 5.2 6.1 7.7 13.3
Haiti Monetary base 16.1 14.2 34.1 18.1 4.1 8.5 10.2 13.7 9.2 7.4 b
Money (M1) 21.4 9.2 26.9 14.4 3.5 5.0 11.0 15.1 20.4 11.9
M2 13.7 6.9 17.4 11.5 2.3 3.4 7.0 10.0 13.8 8.9
Foreign-currency deposits 22.1 14.4 22.5 18.4 8.4 7.2 6.1 6.1 9.3 8.1
Honduras Monetary base 24.8 11.6 -13.8 10.7 12.3 14.4 11.5 7.1 3.9 5.8 b
Money (M1) 11.5 2.2 5.2 17.7 10.2 5.5 -1.9 -5.5 -11.7 -10.1 b
M2 9.2 0.8 4.7 17.1 10.1 8.9 8.6 6.3 1.5 1.3 b
Foreign-currency deposits 20.3 -1.0 5.4 7.8 14.8 10.6 17.8 17.9 14.2 21.0 b
Mexico Monetary base 12.6 15.9 9.7 9.5 12.4 15.9 15.1 12.2 9.7 4.2
Money (M1) 8.5 11.8 11.2 16.2 15.1 16.9 13.5 9.7 8.4 5.9
M2 13.9 11.5 5.8 12.4 11.5 12.7 9.8 8.8 6.9 5.7
Foreign-currency deposits 2.8 20.7 0.9 3.0 17.5 13.7 15.6 20.2 8.4 14.3
Nicaragua Monetary base 15.2 0.7 24.0 20.5 27.6 19.5 11.1 15.7 1.5 8.0 b
Money (M1) 32.9 4.4 21.4 24.8 27.3 20.9 15.9 7.8 2.9 6.2 b
M2 32.9 4.4 21.4 24.8 27.3 20.9 15.9 7.8 2.9 6.2 b
Foreign-currency deposits 10.2 5.3 25.8 7.8 19.8 21.4 23.3 20.1 14.7 14.4 b
Panama Monetary base 17.7 11.2 7.5 27.1 15.1 10.2 10.2 15.2 16.6 28.0 b
Money (M1) 26.5 17.4 19.2 21.5 17.7 19.1 15.9 15.8 10.6 12.2
M2 17.1 9.2 11.3 9.9 9.1 11.3 11.2 11.7 10.2 10.2
Paraguay Monetary base 27.6 30.7 5.2 5.0 12.9 13.0 9.2 12.2 8.8 4.1
Money (M1) 30.5 6.6 28.7 7.8 9.3 8.2 7.5 9.3 16.2 20.7
M2 38.4 13.3 26.4 14.0 16.2 13.9 12.1 13.1 17.0 21.4
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2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Peru Monetary base 38.2 2.1 24.2 31.3 28.6 28.6 29.9 36.8 37.3 31.4
Money (M1) 31.3 8.8 28.0 19.9 17.2 19.8 18.4 20.2 20.9 16.4
M2 48.5 -2.2 27.8 18.8 17.8 25.5 23.0 27.8 27.4 22.0
Foreign-currency deposits 11.2 23.1 -0.1 14.1 7.6 -3.3 0.3 -3.3 -3.3 6.9
Uruguay Monetary base 28.6 6.1 12.9 23.1 28.1 22.9 22.8 14.6 15.2 13.0
Money (M1) 22.4 13.1 24.6 19.6 20.8 23.8 18.6 11.2 12.7 8.3
M2 26.1 11.3 25.8 26.0 20.8 21.4 16.4 11.8 12.1 9.6
Foreign-currency deposits 4.5 25.7 0.2 7.1 6.5 18.4 19.9 9.4 9.1 7.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Monetary base 39.5 18.3 24.5 27.0 41.6 25.2 40.9 52.4 55.6 65.2 b
Money (M1) 24.3 28.8 27.5 44.8 59.1 62.5 62.8 63.1 63.6 63.1
M2 16.9 28.3 18.0 37.6 54.1 57.1 57.6 60.3 62.1 61.7
The Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda  Monetary base 2.0 -10.5 0.9 20.1 30.6 42.7 23.8 21.4 … …
Money (M1) 6.7 -14.2 -7.3 -6.6 -2.0 -0.2 -1.2 -5.2 -7.2 -0.2 b
M2 7.6 -2.9 -3.1 -1.1 1.3 2.2 2.8 0.7 1.7 2.6 b
Foreign-currency deposits -0.5 39.9 -45.2 5.8 4.7 -18.2 -22.5 -15.2 -22.9 -1.6 b
Bahamas Monetary base 6.4 2.0 2.5 26.8 -4.9 -5.4 -15.4 -5.0 -6.4 …
Money (M1) 0.3 -0.2 2.8 6.2 10.9 8.5 7.4 7.9 6.3 2.3
M2 6.5 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -2.2
Foreign-currency deposits 15.9 8.4 0.1 -2.7 17.1 14.2 14.7 0.6 -1.7 6.2
Barbados Monetary base 9.2 -13.9 3.4 7.7 -5.2 -4.2 -6.9 12.9 22.7 12.7
Money (M1) 7.7 -5.3 1.7 -0.5 -18.5 -25.3 -25.7 -10.3 -3.1 …
M2 8.8 -1.1 -1.5 -0.0 -8.8 -10.5 -7.5 0.6 2.0 …
Belize Monetary base 11.5 11.9 -1.2 8.2 19.0 18.3 16.3 16.7 19.9 18.5
Money (M1) 9.2 -1.9 -0.9 9.1 21.1 25.2 22.3 27.0 19.7 14.7
Dominica Monetary base -0.1 -4.6 9.7 8.5 14.9 20.7 19.5 16.3 … …
Money (M1) 4.4 -1.3 -1.5 -2.1 2.9 6.8 15.6 14.2 8.0 5.9 b
M2 8.2 7.5 3.8 3.2 3.6 6.9 8.9 8.7 7.4 4.2 b
Foreign-currency deposits 19.0 15.9 30.2 38.8 21.0 26.0 20.1 34.1 3.1 -9.5 b
Grenada Monetary base 3.5 -8.5 6.0 7.2 8.7 8.0 0.4 2.2 … …
Money (M1) 3.1 -12.9 3.8 -7.3 -0.1 3.9 4.6 3.1 5.9 -0.6 b
M2 8.1 1.0 3.4 0.4 1.2 2.1 1.9 2.2 3.6 1.6 b
Foreign-currency deposits 2.7 17.4 -3.9 -5.5 13.5 17.5 5.5 -12.5 -26.7 -27.3 b
Guyana Monetary base 16.5 10.6 17.7 17.4 10.2 11.9 20.2 18.3 15.7 12.4
Money (M1) 18.6 8.2 12.9 21.9 16.5 14.6 16.6 16.5 13.9 11.3
Jamaica Monetary base 9.5 22.8 5.5 5.3 7.2 4.9 5.9 7.2 6.4 6.8
Money (M1) 9.1 7.6 7.0 7.8 6.1 2.1 5.4 5.2 7.2 7.5
M2 7.9 4.4 6.1 5.6 4.0 1.4 4.0 3.9 6.7 6.3
Foreign-currency deposits 10.9 17.5 -0.9 -4.8 2.5 4.6 8.6 11.9 25.5 28.5
Saint Kitts and Nevis Monetary base 7.3 48.3 -3.2 36.1 31.8 24.9 6.2 -3.4 … …
Money (M1) 7.2 9.2 16.8 28.6 15.1 22.8 20.0 15.4 33.4 46.3 b
M2 10.3 10.2 9.4 10.7 10.1 9.4 8.5 7.3 7.9 10.8 b
Foreign-currency deposits -9.2 -7.0 -9.0 -1.0 1.1 -2.4 2.3 25.9 28.7 25.5 b
Saint Lucia Monetary base 10.2 8.5 3.6 16.3 7.2 -6.6 7.6 10.4 … …
Money (M1) 7.1 -2.4 -4.3 4.0 3.8 -0.2 5.2 4.3 6.5 14.7 b
M2 10.7 4.1 0.2 4.9 4.9 2.1 4.6 3.4 4.7 8.1 b
Foreign-currency deposits 8.9 9.3 -13.2 16.4 20.2 10.3 10.6 15.4 -17.4 -13.3 b
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Monetary base 2.0 -3.2 11.9 0.8 -4.6 20.4 17.1 16.8 … …
Money (M1) -1.4 -8.3 -0.5 -3.9 -4.0 -1.9 0.4 4.4 5.5 11.2 b
M2 1.9 0.8 2.2 1.9 -1.3 0.1 1.7 4.4 … …
Foreign-currency deposits 1.5 -6.5 -7.7 30.8 6.8 -9.0 -0.1 -25.6 3.8 28.1 b
Suriname Monetary base 30.2 22.1 13.0 3.2 14.3 30.3 32.2 31.1 36.8 17.9 b
Money (M1) 21.3 26.3 16.7 5.3 6.9 14.6 24.1 22.4 20.9 11.7
M2 21.0 25.1 18.2 7.0 10.4 18.2 25.2 25.8 26.0 18.7
Foreign-currency deposits 24.3 12.0 7.9 39.1 18.9 14.8 9.9 11.5 8.5 6.8
Trinidad and Tobago Monetary base 32.3 37.6 24.7 14.1 25.7 21.2 10.3 7.0 12.5 …
Money (M1) 17.6 24.0 25.5 17.2 18.5 15.1 14.3 14.1 14.4 …
M2 17.2 17.6 17.9 8.4 11.5 11.9 12.9 11.9 11.7 …
Foreign-currency deposits 21.1 32.2 7.9 -4.0 3.0 1.9 2.4 10.9 22.3 c …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Figures as of May.
b Figures as of April.
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Table A-29 
Latin America and the Caribbean: domestic credit
(Percentage variation with respect to the year-earlier period) 
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 a
Latin America 
Argentina 23.9 2.3 51.3 59.5 31.0 28.7 33.7 37.9 41.1 39.7 b
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 7.5 10.9 13.0 18.8 22.2 23.2 22.0 23.1 ... ...
Brazil 15.8 11.3 18.0 17.6 17.5 16.1 16.9 16.7 14.0 14.6
Chile 18.4 6.6 -0.1 12.1 19.4 19.1 12.4 10.4 10.2 ...
Colombia 15.7 14.3 20.9 15.0 16.0 16.7 11.8 14.1 ... ...
Costa Rica 21.1 19.1 4.6 12.4 13.4 13.4 12.7 7.6 8.4 ...
Dominican Republic 17.2 14.3 12.1 12.5 13.5 10.4 14.4 14.2 15.1 11.1 b
Ecuador 1.7 20.8 33.6 31.5 26.7 20.7 18.3 21.1 15.5 15.2 b
El Salvador 11.3 2.4 2.2 3.5 10.3 12.0 8.9 7.3 4.6 3.7
Guatemala 10.4 5.2 5.6 15.2 15.0 11.6 7.9 10.9 8.7 9.1
Haiti 7.8 9.7 -22.9 -17.0 -3.7 -0.5 15.0 35.4 76.9 71.4 b
Honduras 27.1 6.7 10.0 10.9 19.0 20.1 18.5 17.3 12.5 7.8 b
Mexico 8.7 16.7 10.6 11.3 11.1 11.1 10.3 10.6 10.4 11.0 b
Nicaragua 10.1 -2.1 -3.9 -7.3 11.4 23.9 30.6 25.9 27.1 30.4 b
Panama 15.9 1.2 9.5 18.8 19.8 21.0 15.7 16.4 20.5 17.0 b
Paraguay c 51.5 31.8 36.1 28.2 23.0 23.5 22.1 16.0 11.0 11.8
Peru 9.4 9.9 24.1 12.0 8.6 8.7 8.9 11.7 9.9 7.2
Uruguay 3.2 -2.6 13.9 39.9 27.5 13.3 18.1 -4.6 10.3 6.5 b
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) d 22.0 28.4 13.7 36.0 52.9 58.8 56.7 55.8 58.2 59.9 b
The Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda 12.5 19.9 0.6 -3.9 -3.9 -2.6 -2.1 -4.8 -6.2 -6.8 b
Bahamas 7.5 5.3 3.4 0.8 2.1 6.6 5.1 3.4 2.4 -0.1
Barbados 10.1 6.4 -0.5 -0.9 2.6 7.5 8.4 7.9 11.3 ...
Belize 9.3 5.6 -0.3 -1.6 -1.1 0.3 0.7 2.4 0.3 -1.0
Dominica 5.0 8.5 12.5 13.7 8.6 7.0 9.4 5.4 5.0 5.2 b
Grenada 13.1 8.9 3.9 2.6 4.0 4.7 6.5 4.7 4.2 1.4 b
Guyana 15.8 4.5 -0.8 34.5 45.9 66.4 38.7 18.1 22.1 21.1
Jamaica 16.3 15.0 -3.4 -4.1 10.4 10.2 13.8 12.5 15.8 17.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.0 6.2 6.3 0.2 -7.0 -9.0 -7.7 -12.4 -14.5 -19.9 b
Saint Lucia 21.1 4.6 -0.3 2.9 4.3 6.9 7.5 7.7 8.9 9.7 b
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 9.5 7.1 1.5 -7.2 -4.4 -6.6 0.9 6.5 7.7 14.6 b
Suriname 18.5 16.9 21.4 20.8 9.1 9.2 10.2 5.1 18.4 20.6 b
Trinidad and Tobago 6.5 35.5 36.6 9.3 -3.5 17.2 7.7 11.8 2.7 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Figures as of May.
b Figures as of April.
c Credit granted to the private sector by the banking sector.
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Table A-30 
Latin America and the Caribbean: monetary policy rates
 (Average rates)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Latin America 
Argentina 11.3 14.0 12.3 11.8 14.0 12.4 11.9 12.8 13.1 14.0 a
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 9.0 7.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Brazil 12.4 10.1 9.9 11.8 10.3 9.1 7.7 7.3 7.3 7.6
Chile 7.2 1.8 1.5 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Colombia 9.8 5.8 3.2 4.0 5.0 5.3 5.0 4.7 4.0 3.3
Costa Rica 8.0 9.6 8.1 5.6 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Dominican Republic 9.0 5.1 4.2 6.4 6.8 6.5 5.5 5.0 5.0 4.8
Guatemala 6.9 5.5 4.5 4.9 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.2
Haiti 6.9 6.2 5.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 a
Honduras 8.4 4.9 4.5 4.8 5.8 6.7 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Mexico 7.8 5.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.0
Paraguay 5.9 2.1 2.2 8.0 6.5 6.3 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.5
Peru 5.9 3.3 2.1 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Uruguay 7.4 8.5 6.3 7.5 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 12.3 8.1 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.2 a
The Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Bahamas 5.3 5.3 5.3 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 a
Barbados 11.8 7.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 ...
Belize 18.0 18.0 18.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 ...
Dominica 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Grenada 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Guyana 6.6 6.9 6.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.0 b
Jamaica 14.1 14.8 9.0 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 5.8 b
Saint Kitts and Nevis 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Saint Lucia 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Trinidad and Tobago 8.4 7.5 4.7 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Figures as of May.
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Table A-31 
Latin America and the Caribbean: representative lending rates
(Average rates) 
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Latin America 
Argentina a 19.8 21.3 15.2 17.7 21.4 18.8 18.1 18.8 19.6 20.1 b
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c 8.9 8.5 5.2 6.3 6.7 6.5 6.7 7.0 7.1 6.8 b
Brazil d 54.1 47.5 42.9 44.9 44.7 39.6 38.1 37.2 37.5 36.8 b
Chile e 15.2 12.9 11.8 12.4 12.4 14.0 14.1 13.6 13.7 13.4
Colombia f 17.2 13.0 9.4 11.2 12.9 12.8 12.6 12.1 11.7 10.7 b
Costa Rica g 16.7 21.6 19.8 18.1 18.4 19.4 20.1 20.8 19.6 17.7 b
Dominican Republic h 16.0 12.9 8.3 11.7 13.7 13.1 11.8 10.1 10.6 10.9
Ecuador i 9.8 9.2 9.0 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 b
El Salvador j 7.9 9.3 7.6 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.7 b
Guatemala k 13.4 13.8 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.6 b
Haiti l 21.3 21.6 20.7 19.8 19.9 19.8 19.1 18.8 18.5 19.7 m
Honduras n 17.9 19.4 18.9 18.6 18.2 18.1 18.5 19.0 19.7 20.2 m
Mexico o 8.7 7.1 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.4 b
Nicaragua p 13.2 14.0 13.3 10.8 10.4 13.0 13.1 11.5 15.7 14.4 b
Panama q 8.2 8.3 7.9 7.3 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.1 b
Paraguay r 13.5 14.6 12.5 15.3 14.6 14.4 14.7 15.4 15.4 15.5 b
Peru s 23.7 21.0 19.0 18.7 18.9 19.4 19.4 19.2 19.3 19.0 b
Uruguay t 13.1 16.6 12.0 11.0 11.9 12.1 11.9 11.9 12.2 12.1 b
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) u 22.8 20.6 18.0 17.4 16.0 16.4 16.5 16.0 15.5 15.7 b
The Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda v 10.1 9.5 10.2 10.1 10.0 9.1 9.0 9.5 9.4 ...
Bahamas w 11.0 10.6 11.0 11.0 10.3 11.0 11.2 11.1 10.9 10.8 b
Barbados v 10.4 9.8 9.5 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.4 8.3 x ...
Belizey 14.1 14.1 13.9 13.4 12.8 12.6 12.3 12.1 11.9 ...
Dominica v 9.4 10.0 9.4 8.7 8.7 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 ...
Grenadav 9.4 10.7 10.3 10.4 10.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 ...
Guyana h 13.9 14.0 15.2 14.7 14.6 14.2 14.1 13.0 12.5 12.5 m
Jamaica v 22.3 22.6 20.3 18.3 18.4 17.8 17.5 17.4 17.2 17.3 m
Saint Kitts and Nevisv 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.2 9.0 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.4 ...
Saint Lucia v 9.3 9.5 9.5 9.2 9.1 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.4 ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v 9.5 9.1 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 ...
Suriname z 12.0 11.7 11.7 11.8 11.6 11.8 11.7 11.8 12.0 12.0 m
Trinidad and Tobago h 12.3 11.9 9.2 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.5 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Local-currency loans to the non-financial private sector, at fixed or renegotiable rates, signature loans of up to 89 days.
b Figures as of May.
c Nominal local-currency rate for 60-91-day operations.   
d Interest rate on total consumer credit.
e Non-adjustable 90-360 day operations.
f Weighted average of consumer, prime, ordinary and treasury lending rates for the working days of the month. Owing to the high turnover of treasury credit, its 
weighting was set at one fifth of the amount disbursed daily.
g Average system lending rate in local currency.
h Prime lending rate. 
i Effective benchmark lending rate for the corporate commercial segment.
j Basic lending rate for up to one year.   
k Weighted average of the system lending rates in local currency.
l Average of minimum and maximum lending rates.  
m Figures as of April.
n Weighted average of lending rates.
o Weighted average rate of private debt issues of up to 1 year, expressed as a 28-day curve. Includes only stock certificates.
p Weighted average of short-term lending rates in local currency.
q Interest rate on one-year trade credit.   
r Commercial lending rate, local currency.
s Market lending rate, average for transactions conducted in the last 30 business days.
 t Business credit, 30-367 days.  
u Average rate for loan operations for the six major commercial banks.   
v Lending rate, weighted average.
w Weighted average of lending and overdraft rates.
x Figures as of February.
y Rate for personal and business loans, residential and other construction loans; weighted average.   
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Table A-32 
Latin America and the Caribbean: consumer prices 
(12-Month percentage variation)
2008 2009 2010 2011
2012 2013
March June September December March May
Latin America and the Caribbean a 8.1 4.6 6.5 6.8 5.9 5.6 5.7 5.6 6.1 6.6
Latin America 
Argentina 7.2 7.7 10.9 9.5 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.8 10.6 10.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 11.8 0.3 7.2 6.9 4.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 5.0 4.7
Brazil 5.9 4.3 5.9 6.5 5.2 4.9 5.3 5.8 6.6 6.5
Chile 7.1 -1.4 3.0 4.4 3.8 2.6 2.8 1.5 1.5 0.9
Colombia 7.7 2.0 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.1 2.4 1.9 2.0
Costa Rica 13.9 4.0 5.8 4.7 4.2 4.6 4.5 4.5 6.2 5.3
Cuba b -0.1 -0.1 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 ... ...
Dominican Republic 4.5 5.7 6.3 7.8 4.9 2.7 2.6 3.9 5.0 5.0
Ecuador 8.8 4.3 3.3 5.4 6.1 5.0 5.2 4.2 3.0 3.0
El Salvador 5.5 -0.2 2.1 5.1 4.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.1
Guatemala 9.4 -0.3 5.4 6.2 4.6 3.5 3.3 3.4 4.3 4.3
Haiti 10.1 2.0 6.2 8.3 5.7 4.9 6.5 7.6 7.7 7.3
Honduras 10.8 3.0 6.5 5.6 5.7 4.7 5.3 5.4 5.6 4.8
Mexico 6.5 3.6 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.3 4.8 3.6 4.3 4.6
Nicaragua 12.7 1.8 9.1 8.6 8.8 6.8 6.9 7.1 6.8 8.0
Panama 6.8 1.9 4.9 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.4 4.6 4.1 3.7
Paraguay 7.5 1.9 7.2 4.9 3.3 3.9 2.8 4.0 1.2 0.9
Peru 6.7 0.2 2.1 4.7 4.2 4.0 3.7 2.6 2.6 2.5
Uruguay 9.2 5.9 6.9 8.6 7.5 8.0 8.6 7.5 8.5 8.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 31.9 26.9 27.4 29.0 24.2 21.2 19.1 19.5 24.2 33.7
The Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.7 2.4 2.9 4.0 4.5 3.9 1.9 1.8 1.4 ...
Bahamas 4.6 1.3 1.4 3.2 2.9 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.2 c ...
Barbados 7.3 4.4 6.5 9.6 7.4 4.4 3.2 2.4 2.3 d ...
Belize 4.4 -0.4 0.0 2.6 2.2 1.6 0.5 1.0 -0.1 ...
Dominica 2.0 3.2 2.3 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.9 1.8 ...
Grenada 5.2 -2.3 4.2 3.5 3.9 1.4 1.8 1.8 0.0 ...
Guyana 6.4 3.6 4.5 3.3 1.2 1.9 2.3 3.4 ... ...
Jamaica 16.9 10.2 11.8 6.0 7.3 6.7 6.6 8.0 9.1 9.2
Saint Kitts and Nevis 6.5 1.2 5.2 2.9 1.9 1.5 2.2 0.2 0.1 ...
Saint Lucia 8.7 -1.6 0.9 4.7 3.9 2.8 0.9 1.0 1.7 ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3.4 -3.1 4.2 4.8 4.0 3.2 3.1 5.0 3.3 ...
Suriname 9.4 1.3 10.3 15.3 6.5 3.5 3.7 4.4 1.4 1.5 e
Trinidad and Tobago 14.5 1.3 13.4 5.3 9.1 11.0 7.7 7.2 6.9 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a The only English-speaking Caribbean countries included are Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
b Refers to national-currency markets. 
c Twelve-month variation to January 2013.
d Twelve-month variation to February 2013.










Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2013
Table A-33 
Latin America and the Caribbean: central government primary and overall balances
(Percentages of GDP) 
Primary balance Overall balance
2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012 2 009 2 010 2 011 2 012
Latin America and the Caribbean a -0.9 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -3.5 -2.3 -2.4 -2.6
Latin America b -1.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -2.8 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9
Argentina 1.4 1.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -0.1 -2.3 -2.4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c -0.4 1.4 -0.2 2.7 -2.0 -0.1 -1.1 1.8
Brazil 1.2 2.1 2.3 2.0 -3.5 -1.7 -2.6 -2.0
Chile -3.7 0.1 1.8 1.1 -4.2 -0.4 1.3 0.6
Colombia -1.2 -1.2 -0.3 0.1 -4.1 -3.9 -2.8 -2.3
Costa Rica -1.3 -3.1 -1.9 -2.3 -3.4 -5.2 -4.1 -4.4
Cuba -3.8 -2.2 … … -4.9 -3.6 -1.7 -3.8
Dominican Republic -1.6 -0.6 -0.5 -2.9 -3.5 -2.5 -2.6 -5.4
Ecuador -3.5 -0.9 -0.7 -1.0 -4.2 -1.7 -1.6 -2.0
El Salvador -1.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.5 -3.7 -2.7 -2.3 -1.7
Guatemala -1.7 -1.8 -1.3 -0.9 -3.1 -3.3 -2.8 -2.4
Haiti -0.7 1.8 2.5 -0.6 -1.3 1.3 2.1 -1.0
Honduras -5.3 -3.7 -3.2 -1.7 d -6.0 -4.7 -4.6 -2.9 d
Mexico -0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 -2.2 -2.8 -2.5 -2.7
Nicaragua -0.7 0.3 1.6 2.7 -1.7 -0.7 0.5 1.7
Panama 1.4 0.1 -1.2 -1.5 -1.5 -2.5 -3.5 -3.5
Paraguay 0.6 1.6 1.0 -1.5 0.1 1.2 0.7 -1.7
Peru -0.2 1.2 2.0 2.2 -1.4 0.1 1.0 1.2
Uruguay 1.3 1.3 1.9 0.4 -1.5 -1.2 -0.6 -2.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -3.7 -2.1 -1.8 -2.2 -5.0 -3.6 -4.0 -4.8
The Caribbean e -0.5 0.6 -0.0 0.1 -4.5 -3.0 -3.5 -3.4
Antigua and Barbuda -8.1 1.4 -2.7 1.1 -11.0 -1.2 -5.3 -1.4
Bahamas f -2.8 0.6 -3.3 -3.9 -5.1 -2.1 -5.7 -6.2
Barbados g h -3.5 -2.3 0.9 0.7 -8.3 -7.8 -5.2 -5.3
Belize g 0.8 1.8 2.3 1.3 -2.9 -1.7 -1.1 -0.5
Dominica -1.0 -3.2 -6.9 -8.7 -2.1 -4.9 -8.8 -12.0
Grenada -2.8 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 -4.9 -2.4 -3.2 -3.8
Guyana -2.1 -1.2 -1.6 -3.6 -3.7 -2.9 -3.1 -4.7
Jamaica g 6.3 4.7 3.3 4.5 -11.4 -6.4 -6.5 -5.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis 5.5 2.7 8.7 13.0 -1.0 -4.1 2.4 7.2
Saint Lucia 0.8 2.2 -1.9 -3.4 -2.1 -0.6 -4.9 -7.2
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1.1 -0.0 -0.2 0.4 -1.7 -2.9 -2.6 -1.8
Suriname 2.9 -2.0 0.9 -1.6 2.1 -2.9 -0.1 -2.6
Trinidad and Tobago i -3.2 3.5 1.2 1.3 -6.1 1.1 -1.3 -1.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries.




f Fiscal years, from 1 July to 30 June.
g Fiscal years, from 1 April to 31 March.
h Non-financial public sector.
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Table A-34 
Latin America and the Caribbean: central government tax revenues composition
 (Percentages of GDP) 
Total tax burden Social security contributions Direct taxes  Indirect  taxes Other taxes
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Latin America and the Caribbean a 19.7 … 3.4 … 6.0 … 11.4 … 0.3 …
Latin America b 18.4 … 3.3 … 5.6 … 9.4 … 0.3 …
Argentina c 34.6 37.3 7.4 8.3 9.4 10.1 17.5 18.5 0.4 0.4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)c 22.2 22.8 1.8 1.8 5.9 6.3 14.1 14.2 0.4 0.5
Brazil c 34.8 … 8.8 … 10.5 … 15.3 … 0.2 …
Chile 18.7 18.7 1.3 1.2 7.6 7.5 9.5 9.7 0.2 0.2
Colombia 15.1 16.1 1.7 1.8 6.9 8.0 6.6 6.3 0.0 0.0
Costa Rica c 21.9 … 7.5 … 5.1 … 9.2 … 0.1 …
Cuba 24.4 … 4.3 … 4.9 … 13.9 … 1.3 …
Dominican Republic 12.9 13.5 0.1 0.1 3.8 4.8 9.0 8.6 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 17.6 20.1 5.1 5.6 4.1 4.1 8.4 10.2 0.0 0.1
El Salvador 15.4 16.0 1.7 1.7 4.9 5.3 8.4 8.7 0.4 0.4
Guatemala 10.9 10.9 0.3 0.3 3.4 3.4 6.9 7.0 0.2 0.2
Haitid 13.1 12.9 … … 2.3 3.0 8.4 8.2 2.4 1.7
Honduras 16.1 16.2 1.4 1.4 5.2 5.2 9.6 9.6 0.0 0.0
Mexico 10.6 10.1 1.6 1.6 5.4 5.2 3.4 3.1 0.2 0.2
Nicaragua 18.4 18.9 3.6 3.8 5.2 5.4 9.5 9.6 0.0 0.0
Panama 17.8 18.0 6.5 5.9 5.0 6.1 6.1 5.9 0.2 0.1
Paraguay 13.4 13.8 1.2 1.5 2.4 2.6 9.7 9.7 0.1 0.1
Peru 17.0 17.5 1.7 1.8 7.4 7.6 7.5 7.5 0.4 0.7
Uruguay 27.2 27.6 7.9 8.5 7.0 6.9 12.3 12.1 0.1 0.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 12.5 13.5 0.5 0.6 3.9 4.3 8.0 8.6 0.0 0.0
The Caribbean d e 21.1 21.1 … … 6.8 6.8 14.1 14.2 0.2 0.2
Antigua and Barbuda 18.2 19.0 … … 2.8 3.1 15.3 16.0 0.0 0.0
Bahamas f 16.4 17.3 … … 1.6 1.8 12.7 13.4 2.1 2.1
Barbados g h 27.4 27.0 … … 10.7 10.7 16.7 16.1 0.0 0.2
Belize g 23.3 22.5 … … 8.7 7.5 14.6 15.0 0.0 0.0
Dominica 24.2 23.4 … … 5.0 4.9 19.3 18.5 0.0 0.0
Grenada 19.1 18.9 … … 4.2 4.3 14.9 14.6 0.0 0.0
Guyana 21.2 20.8 … … 8.6 8.1 12.6 12.7 0.0 0.0
Jamaica g 23.4 23.9 … … 8.8 8.9 14.6 15.0 0.0 0.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis 20.2 20.1 … … 4.7 4.8 15.5 15.3 0.0 0.0
Saint Lucia 23.4 23.1 … … 7.6 7.2 15.8 15.9 0.0 0.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 22.1 22.4 … … 6.3 6.5 15.8 15.9 0.0 0.0
Suriname 19.0 20.2 … … 9.5 10.6 9.4 9.6 0.0 0.0
Trinidad and Tobago i 16.5 16.1 … … 10.5 9.6 5.9 6.5 0.0 0.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries.
b Simple averages. Does not include Cuba.
c General government.
d Does not include social security contributions. 
e Simple averages.
f Fiscal years, from 1 July to 30 June.
g Fiscal years, from 1 April to 31 March.
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Table A-35 
Latin America and the Caribbean: central government expenditure composition
 (Percentages of GDP) 





2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Latin America and the Caribbean a 25.1 25.1 20.2 20.2 2.4 2.3 4.9 4.8 22.0 22.1
Latin America b 20.4 20.9 16.0 16.4 1.7 1.7 4.4 4.5 18.7 19.3
Argentina 24.5 25.7 21.5 22.9 2.2 2.2 3.0 2.7 22.2 23.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c 33.9 33.3 21.8 22.5 1.0 0.9 12.1 10.8 32.9 32.4
Brazil 26.4 26.3 21.6 21.1 4.9 4.0 4.8 5.2 21.6 22.3
Chile 21.4 21.4 17.3 17.4 0.6 0.6 4.1 4.0 20.8 20.8
Colombia 18.0 18.4 15.5 15.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.8 15.5 16.0
Costa Rica 18.7 18.8 17.2 17.4 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.5 16.5 16.8
Cuba 48.4 43.2 40.2 34.5 0.0 0.0 5.7 5.8 48.4 43.2
Dominican Republic 16.1 19.3 12.5 13.6 2.1 2.4 3.6 5.8 13.9 16.9
Ecuador 23.7 25.1 13.4 14.1 0.9 1.0 10.3 10.9 22.8 24.1
El Salvador 17.7 17.5 14.6 14.2 2.2 2.2 3.1 3.3 15.5 15.3
Guatemala 14.4 14.0 10.4 10.7 1.5 1.5 4.0 3.3 12.9 12.5
Haiti g 12.5 14.2 10.2 10.5 0.4 0.3 2.3 3.7 12.2 13.9
Honduras 21.6 20.0 17.0 16.7 1.4 1.2 4.6 3.3 20.2 18.8
Mexico 18.7 18.5 16.0 16.0 1.6 1.6 2.7 2.5 17.1 17.0
Nicaragua 16.9 15.9 13.4 13.4 1.0 1.0 3.5 2.5 15.9 15.0
Panama 21.3 21.2 13.3 12.4 2.3 2.0 8.0 8.8 19.0 19.2
Paraguay 16.7 20.1 12.8 15.5 0.3 0.2 3.9 4.7 16.5 19.9
Peru 16.8 16.9 12.7 12.7 1.0 1.0 4.1 4.2 15.8 15.9
Uruguay 21.8 22.5 20.3 21.0 2.5 2.4 1.5 1.5 19.3 20.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 26.4 28.3 21.7 23.5 2.1 2.7 3.1 4.8 24.3 25.6
The Caribbean d 30.3 29.8 24.7 24.8 3.5 3.5 5.5 5.1 24.7 24.8
Antigua and Barbuda 25.8 21.8 23.5 21.1 2.5 2.5 2.2 0.7 23.5 21.1
Bahamas 25.7 24.7 20.7 20.4 2.3 2.3 5.0 4.3 20.7 20.4
Barbados e 34.3 34.5 33.2 32.0 6.1 6.0 1.1 3.0 33.2 31.5
Belize 29.0 27.1 24.3 22.2 3.3 1.8 4.8 4.9 24.3 22.2
Dominica 39.2 39.2 25.5 26.1 1.9 3.3 13.7 13.1 25.5 26.1
Grenada 26.2 26.6 20.0 21.5 2.4 3.5 6.2 5.1 20.0 21.5
Guyana 28.7 29.4 19.1 19.7 1.5 1.1 9.5 9.7 19.1 19.7
Jamaica 32.4 31.2 28.1 28.3 9.7 9.6 4.3 2.9 28.1 28.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 33.6 29.9 29.5 26.3 6.2 5.7 4.1 3.6 29.5 26.3
Saint Lucia 31.0 33.4 22.8 25.8 3.1 3.8 8.2 7.6 22.8 25.8
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 29.9 27.3 26.5 25.5 2.5 2.3 3.4 1.8 26.5 25.5
Suriname 25.2 29.5 20.3 24.6 1.0 0.9 5.0 4.9 20.3 24.6
Trinidad and Tobago 32.5 33.1 28.0 28.7 2.5 2.6 4.5 4.4 28.0 28.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries.
b Simple averages. Does not include Cuba.
c General government.
d Simple averages.
e Non-financial public sector.
Table A-36 
Latin America and the Caribbean: non-financial public sector gross public debt
 (Percentages of GDP) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Latin America and the Caribbean a 64.6 54.2 47.9 47.0 50.3 50.0 49.7 50.6
Latin America a 47.6 38.9 33.4 32.4 33.6 32.2 32.0 33.0
Argentina 87.6 76.3 66.7 57.8 53.6 45.3 42.4 39.0 b
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c 78.1 52.4 40.0 36.8 39.5 38.1 34.5 31.3
Brazil d 67.7 56.4 58.0 57.4 60.9 53.4 54.2 59.3
Chile 12.3 10.0 8.7 11.4 12.1 14.7 17.8 19.1
Colombia e 50.1 47.4 43.8 42.7 45.1 46.2 42.9 39.1 f
Costa Rica 42.9 38.4 31.8 29.9 34.0 35.7 38.3 42.7
Dominican Republic … 20.9 18.9 25.5 28.7 29.5 30.4 33.5
Ecuador 34.6 28.5 26.9 22.0 16.3 19.5 18.6 21.9
El Salvador 39.7 39.9 37.0 36.9 45.2 45.1 44.2 47.9
Guatemala 21.5 21.9 21.6 20.4 23.3 24.4 23.9 24.5
Haiti g 47.5 38.7 35.9 44.5 35.1 23.2 24.4 28.2
Honduras 44.8 30.0 18.3 19.1 22.2 24.7 27.2 29.2
Mexico h 22.9 22.6 22.7 26.9 34.9 34.1 35.4 35.6
Nicaragua 71.5 53.9 33.1 30.3 34.2 34.8 33.1 32.1
Panama 66.2 61.0 52.9 45.4 45.4 43.0 40.9 38.9
Paraguay i 31.2 24.0 19.6 17.5 16.8 14.6 12.3 11.5 f
Peru 38.2 31.3 27.2 24.5 23.7 21.5 19.2 17.7
Uruguay 67.4 61.8 53.3 52.4 49.4 43.5 44.2 44.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) j 33.1 24.0 19.1 14.0 18.2 20.2 25.1 27.4
The Caribbean a 88.2 76.6 69.0 68.3 74.6 76.1 75.4 76.4
Antigua and Barbuda 101.8 90.5 81.1 81.5 95.7 87.1 86.7 89.4
Bahamas k 35.5 36.2 36.9 37.4 44.1 45.7 50.2 54.5
Barbados l 49.5 50.7 51.7 55.7 66.0 75.1 80.3 78.7
Belizel 99.5 92.5 83.6 79.4 82.2 72.3 70.7 77.6
Dominica 95.7 89.4 81.2 72.0 66.4 73.1 70.7 72.7
Grenada 83.8 87.5 82.9 79.1 90.0 91.8 86.8 88.6
Guyana 183.9 93.1 60.0 61.6 60.5 61.2 65.2 62.0
Jamaica l 121.1 117.7 113.0 120.3 134.4 136.1 131.3 133.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 160.6 149.5 134.6 127.6 142.0 151.4 141.1 129.3
Saint Lucia 68.2 65.3 64.7 61.9 64.0 65.5 66.3 71.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 65.9 62.3 55.5 58.4 64.7 66.7 65.5 67.0
Suriname 44.0 29.2 23.0 27.9 27.6 27.5 27.6 30.0
Trinidad and Tobago m 36.8 32.1 28.8 24.7 32.9 36.2 38.4 39.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Simple averages.
b Preliminary figures to June.
c Refers to the external debt of the non-financial public-sector and central-government domestic debt.
d General government.
e Consolidated non-financial public sector. 
f Preliminary figures to September.
g Does not include public sector commitments to commercial banks. 
h Public sector.
i Internal debt includes commitments to the central bank only.
j Central government. 
k Fiscal years, from 1 July to 30 June.
l Fiscal years, from 1 April to 31 March.
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